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ABSTRACT 
Title: Learning “Local” Languages: Passive Revolution, Language Markets, and Aborigine 
Education in Taiwan 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
Temple University, 2004 
Doctoral Advisory Committee Chair: F. Niyi Akinnaso 
 
This dissertation examines contemporary linguistic markets and language policy in 
Taiwan in terms of the historical processes of state formation, class alliances, and identity 
politics, drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of linguistic markets and Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as well as the literature on nationalism and linguistic 
ideology. Emphasis is placed on the historical processes underlying the construction of 
Taiwan’s linguistic markets as Taiwan’s linguistic nationalism emerged throughout 
history, focusing on the continuities and changes across Qing, Japanese, KMT and DPP 
rule. 
 Accordingly, with language policy always in the background, the dissertation 
touches on several interrelated issues, including (a) the impact of each ruling historical 
bloc on Taiwan’s linguistic nationalism, focusing on continuities and discontinuities in 
language and education policies; (b) the formation of Taiwanese identity as a series of 
nested concentric circles radiating out from local communities to encompass the nation, 
the larger Chinese community, and eventually the world; (c) the differential processes of 
incorporating mountains and plains Aborigines into the state and the resultant differences 
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in their implementation of state policies; (d) the alternative paths taken by local 
intellectuals in implementing state policies; and (e) the contradictions between ideology 
and practice that often besets nationalist projects and the role of “cultural corruption” in 
bridging the gap. 
 The findings reveal, among others, that, while Bourdieu’s theory of linguistic 
markets is useful in understanding the language hierarchy in Taiwan, the historiography 
of the linguistic markets is critical to an understanding of the political processes 
underlying their construction. It is here that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony enters the 
picture. Gramsci’s emphasis on the political process of alliance formation between elite 
and subaltern groups and the cross-class alliance involved in a “passive revolution” 
implies that the dominant ideology cannot easily be equated with the class interests of the 
ruling elite. This questions Bourdieu’s theory that assumes a direct correlation between 
the linguistic capital possessed by the ruling elite and that valued by the linguistic 
marketplace. In Taiwan’s case, the value accorded to languages in the marketplace has 
been a product of political negotiation and competition over control of the Taiwanese 
nation-state. 
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CHAPTER 1 
TAIWAN: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines contemporary linguistic markets and language policy in 
Taiwan in terms of the historical processes of state formation, class alliances, and identity 
politics, drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of linguistic markets and Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as well as the literature on nationalism and linguistic 
ideology. Emphasis is placed on the historical processes underlying the construction of 
Taiwan’s linguistic markets as Taiwan’s linguistic nationalism emerged throughout 
history, focusing on the continuities and changes across Qing, Japanese, KMT and DPP 
rule. 
 Accordingly, with language policy always in the background, the dissertation 
touches on several interrelated issues, including (a) the impact of each ruling historical 
bloc on Taiwan’s linguistic nationalism, focusing on continuities and discontinuities in 
language and education policies; (b) the formation of Taiwanese identity as a series of 
nested concentric circles radiating out from local communities to encompass the nation, 
the larger Chinese community, and eventually the world; (c) the differential processes of 
incorporating mountains and plains Aborigines into the state and the resultant differences 
in their implementation of state policies; (d) the alternative paths taken by local 
intellectuals in implementing state policies; and (e) the contradictions between ideology 
and practice that often besets nationalist projects and the role of “cultural corruption” in 
bridging the gap.  
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Introduction 
For over half a century, from the 1930s through the 1980s, first the Japanese, and then the 
Chinese Nationalist Party 國民黨 (KMT, Guómíndǎng)1 waged aggressive campaigns 
promoting the use of the National Language ੣დ (guóyǔ) by all Taiwanese. What 
changed is the definition of what constituted the nation. For neither the Japanese nor the 
KMT was the island of Formosa considered an autonomous state. The Japanese 
considered it part of the greater Japanese empire. While some Japanese believed, from 
the moment the Japanese acquired Taiwan in 1895, that the Taiwanese could and should 
be fully assimilated into Japanese society, the colonial authorities decided that such 
efforts were a waste of time and money. That is until the 1930s, when war in the Pacific 
required a Taiwan that was loyal, obedient, and Japanese speaking. With a few 
exceptions, Chinese was banned from the local papers. When Taiwan became a part of 
the Republic of China ˁൢͻ੣ (ROC, Zhōnghuá Mínguó) in 1945, the ROC still 
dreamed of driving out the “communist bandits” ιࢌ  (gòngfěi) and establishing 
Nanjing ۸՛ (Nánjīng) as the capital of all of China. Forced to flee to Taiwan in 1949, 
the KMT leadership maintained the myth that it was the true government of all of China, 
and that Taiwan was just a province of the greater Chinese nation. This myth was 
maintained until 1979, when the US officially recognized the PRC government in Beijing. 
Language played a central role in maintaining this myth. The national language of the 
ROC is Mandarin Chinese, and the KMT aggressively promoted Mandarin in Taiwan, 
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starting in the 1950s, prohibiting the use of other languages in the schools, and severely 
restricting their use in the broadcast media.  
 After half a century of repression, the surprising thing about the situation of local 
languages in Taiwan is that some of them are still thriving. Not only do taxi drivers chat 
away in Hokloၱա༽ (pronounced “ho-lo”, Holooe in Hoklo),2 and listen to Hoklo 
programming on the radio, but even politicians make a show out of learning Hoklo, and 
use it in their stump speeches. But the extent of the damage caused by fifty years of 
repression becomes much more obvious when we look at the younger generation. The 
younger generation might understand Hoklo, but they do not often speak it. The situation 
is even worse for Taiwan’s other languages, such as Hakka ܰࣂ༽  (Kèjiāhuà, 
sometimes written as “Hakfa”), and the ten Austronesian languages which still retain 
active speech communities. (There were 17 such languages recorded by the Japanese at 
the end of World War II). Hakka, like Hoklo, is a Chinese language, and varieties of both 
languages have been spoken in Taiwan since the first Chinese settlers arrived in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both are related to languages still spoken in 
Southern China and in Chinese communities throughout the Pacific Rim. The Hoklo 
community accounts for about 70 percent of Taiwan’s current population of 22 million, 
while only about 15 percent are Hakka speakers (Government Information Office, 2003a). 
Taiwan’s 439,000 Aborigines, on the other hand, collectively represent less than two 
percent of Taiwan’s population of twenty three million (2003a). Descended from 
populations that can be traced back several thousands of years, many Aborigine groups 
assimilated with early Chinese settlements on Taiwan’s West coast. Those who have 
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retained their languages reside mostly in Taiwan’s high central mountains, or on the 
remote East coast. Warfare against the Japanese, the KMT’s assimilation policies, and 
economic migration have reduced the population of speakers for the remaining 
Austronesian languages into the hundreds, or low thousands. One language, Pazeh˷۲ 
(Bāzé) has only one remaining speaker, an 89 year old woman (Blust, 1999).  
 This dissertation was inspired by the announcement, in 1994, of nation wide 
curricular reforms that would introduce native language education to Taiwan’s schools 
for the first time in history. It is not, however, so much about the new curriculum (which 
was first implemented during the 2001-2002 school year, the year after I left the field), as 
it is about the political and economic changes which led to its adoption, and upon which 
its success or failure will ultimately depend. The language policies of the Japanese and 
the KMT were based upon “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991) that were imposed 
on Taiwan from above. The new curriculum marks the emergence of a new and uniquely 
Taiwanese conception of nationhood, one that departs from the monolithic cultural 
nationalism of the Japanese and Chinese eras. This can be seen in the fact that Hoklo 
does not simply replace Japanese and Mandarin as the new National Language. To be 
sure, there are those who desire to make Hoklo the new National Language, but what is 
surprising is that Taiwan has instead replaced cultural nationalism with multiculturalism. 
This is not to say that there are not forms of Taiwanese cultural nationalism that compete 
with the new multicultural framework, but simply that at present these have been 
effectively marginalized. 
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 Žižek has called multiculturalism the “cultural logic of late capitalism” (Žižek, 
1997), and Allen Chun has called Taiwan the first “postmodern nation” (Chun, 2000: 21). 
There can be no doubt of the significance of the relatively late emergence of a uniquely 
Taiwanese national identity; however, I argue in this dissertation that the 
political-economic dynamics underlying contemporary Taiwanese nationalism emerged 
out of the very process of Taiwanese state formation; a process which started in the late 
nineteenth century and continued to follow similar forms throughout the late Qing era, 
the Japanese era, and the early years of KMT rule. Each of these regimes alternated 
between more conciliatory periods aimed at appeasing the local elites, and authoritarian 
periods during which brutal repression was used to suppress the development of a local 
cultural identity. The final, cautious, hesitant, emergence of such a local identity at the 
dawn of the twenty-first century is predicated upon the compromises, political alliances, 
and negotiated identity constructs, as well as the political-economic developments that 
shaped the previous hundred years of rule. 
 While it is axiomatic that nationalist ideologies tend to either legitimate existing 
power relationships, or serve as a challenge to them, the link between specific ideological 
positions and the interests of those they serve is still poorly understood. If official 
ideology serves to prop up the class interests of the ruling classes, why do so many 
people embrace this ideology against their own class interests? And, if the opposition 
ideology challenges the ruling class interests, how is it that even when such opposition 
ideologies, such as post-colonial nationalisms, become ascendant, the entire social 
structure can remain relatively unaltered by this transformation? It is possible to answer 
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this question by breaking the assumption, so often implicit in theories of ideology, that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between a dominant ideology and the class interests 
of the ruling class. As the political philosopher Antonio Gramsci understood, ruling 
classes never rule alone, but always in an alliance with subaltern classes. Gramsci 
referred to such alliances as a “historical bloc” (Gramsci et al., 1972: 360). Ideologies, 
therefore, legitimate the rule of a specific historical bloc, and not just the class interests of 
the ruling elite. Nor is it the dominant ideology simply an amalgam of each groups class 
interests, but represents the process of political compromise necessary to secure a 
working alliance. Ideologies must be understood as being constantly negotiated and 
re-negotiated between the leaders of allied classes. Moreover, as sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu has shown, the resulting ideology need not benefit all members of the historical 
bloc equally, but simply offer the possibility of social mobility for enough members that 
the system itself is seen as legitimate (see Chapter 2).  
 Of course, state power is always ruled by both the carrot and the stick. When it is 
not possible to co-opt entire sectors of the population into the ruling historical bloc, the 
state must rely upon outright repression. For most of the twentieth century, military rule 
was necessary to enforce state ideology. With the emergence of a more democratic and 
open Taiwan it was no longer possible to impose an ideology that was so contrary to the 
historical reality of Taiwan’s population. Entire sectors of Taiwanese society had to be 
integrated into the state as equal partners without radically transforming the nation’s 
social structure. This process required the creation of a new historical bloc, as well as the 
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concomitant negotiation of a new national ideology. That this could be peacefully 
negotiated is the true miracle of Taiwan’s transformation.  
 This dissertation explores this transformation from three perspectives: First, the 
history of nation building in Taiwan that created the previous historical bloc. Second, the 
forces that led to the transformation. And third, the effects of both the previous and 
current historical bloc on one of Taiwan’s subaltern populations, the Aborigines. 
Throughout, language and education policies are set against the process of ethnic 
formation and the underlying political and economic transformations within which these 
changes have occurred. 
 
Nationalism and Langauge, an Anthropological Approach 
Nationalism has always been closely linked to the role of language. Most famously, 
Herder asserted that it was “the possession of its own distinctive language that constitutes 
the touchstone of a people or Volk, the sine qua non of its national identity and spirit” 
(Bauman and Briggs, 2000: 173). The link between linguistic vernaculars and 
nationalism is a recurrent theme in all of the classic works on nationalism (Fishman, 1968, 
Fishman, 1973, Gellner, 1983, Anderson, 1991, Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992, Breuilly, 
1993, Gellner, 1996, Anderson, 2001), and especially prevalent in the literature on 
Taiwanese nationalism (Fix, 1993, Chun, 1994, Wachman, 1994, Wakabayashi, 1995, 
Chang, 1997, Chang, 1998, Hsiau, 2000, Ching, 2001, Corcuff, 2002, Wu, 2002, Shih, 
2003, Sommers, 2003). Joshua Fishman observed that the tendency to link vernaculars 
with nationalist authenticity derived from “the ease with which elites and masses alike 
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could extrapolate from linguistic differentiation and literary uniqueness to sociocultural 
and political independence” (original emphasis, Fishman, 1973: 52).  
 But what is it about language that lends it so easily to appropriation by nationalist 
projects? One answer can be found in the link between printed language and the 
construction of “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991). Benedict Anderson linked 
the rise of vernacular nationalism to the emergence of print capitalism, especially 
newspapers, which produced a national community of readers (1991; see also, Eisenstein, 
1979). 
the fixing of print-languages and the differentiation of status between them 
were largely unselfconscious processes resulting from the explosive 
interaction between capitalism, technology and human linguistic diversity. 
But as with so much else in the history of nationalism, once ‘there,’ they 
could become formal models to be imitated, and, where expedient, 
consciously exploited in a Machiavellian spirit. (1991: 45) 
But Anderson later goes beyond technology to suggest that there are three features 
intrinsic to language itself which makes it so readily appropriated: First, the origins of 
language are lost in history, making them “appear rooted beyond almost anything else in 
contemporary societies” (1991: 145). Secondly, linguistic performances, such as songs, 
suggest the existence of a “contemporaneous community”, connecting us to people we do 
not even know (1991: 145). And third, perhaps most importantly, language presents a 
semi-permeable boundary. We can learn a language, but it is not easy to do so. It is 
easiest to do so from birth, for later in life we are likely to be marked by our accent.  
If every language is acquirable, its acquisition requires a real portion of a 
person’s life: each new conquest is measured against shortening days. 
What limits one’s access to other languages is not their imperviousness 
but one’s own mortality. Hence a certain privacy to all languages. (1991: 
148) 
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However, having established the link between language and nationalism, Anderson later 
clarifies that language is not linked with all nationalisms in the same way. Anderson 
considers “linguistic nationalism” to be a specific type of nationalism,  
it began to appear at the start of the nineteenth century in the dynastic 
empires of Europe, and had its philosophical origins in the theories of 
Herder and Rousseau. The underlying belief was that each true nation was 
marked off by its own peculiar language and literary culture, which 
together expressed that people’s historical genius. Hence enormous energy 
came to be devoted to the construction of dictionaries for many languages 
which did not have them at that point—Czech, Hungarian, Ukrainian, 
Serbian, Polish, Norwegian, and so on. (Anderson, 2001: 40) 
This kind of linguistic nationalism did not work the same way in every country. Political 
realities determined the effectiveness of state’s efforts to shape the linguistic reality of the 
nation: 
In the nineteenth century, for example, Paris succeeded, through control of 
the school system and most publishing, in reducing the many languages 
actually spoken in France to the status of dialects or patois. Less 
successful was Madrid in turning the many languages spoken in Spain (e.g. 
Catalan and Galician) into mere dialects of Castilian. London came very 
close to completely eliminating Gælic as a living language, but today it is 
making a considerable comeback. (2001: 40) 
In looking at contemporary linguistic nationalism in Asia, he remarks that the success or 
failure of linguistic nationalism bears little relationship to the strength of individual 
nationalisms. He points out that Indian nationalism is not any weaker than Chinese 
nationalism simply because of India’s continued dependence on English as the national 
language (2001: 42). Anderson also sees differences between the print capitalism of the 
nineteenth century and the kinds of nationalism enabled by electronic mass media. He 
argues that television’s reliance on images makes language less important than it once 
was. After all, it is fairly trivial to broadcast the same television image in multiple 
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languages (2001: 42). He also argues that new electronic media allow for “long-distance 
nationalism” to flourish among diasporic communities (2001: 42), spreading the 
boundary of the imagined community beyond the geographical borders of the 
nation-state. 
 The study of the links between language and nationalism has, in the past two 
decades, received considerable anthropological attention, under the rubric of the study of 
“language ideology” (Woolard and Schieffelin, 1994, Kroskrity, 2000a). The 
contributions of this new literature can be grouped into two categories. At the micro level, 
anthropologists have contributed to understanding the links between observable linguistic 
behavior and language ideology (Hill, 1998), while at the macro level, they have shown 
how historical transformations have affected the language attitudes of entire communities 
(Woolard, 1989, Woolard and Gahng, 1990, Gal, 1993). The key insight brought to bear 
by the anthropological approach to the study of language policy, as opposed to other 
competing approaches which have emerged contemporaneously, such as that of 
“linguistic ecology” (Muhlhausler, 1996), is the anthropological focus on process. 
Whether at the micro or the macro level, anthropologists are interested not simply in 
historical changes, but in understanding the role of human agency both in bringing about 
and responding to these changes.  
 Blommaert’s “historiography of language ideologies” (Blommaert, 1999: 1) 
emphasizes macro level historical process.  
In any attempt to understand how and why some views of language 
gradually emerge as dominant while others are suppressed and 
marginalized, we need to attend to the historical processes that inform the 
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dynamics of social power as these obtain in specific debates over language 
… (Johnson, 2002: 551) 
Blommeart’s historiographical approach is clearly present in the anthropological study of 
“colonial linguistics” (Errington, 2001). Joseph Errington looks at how the construction 
of colonial and postcolonial linguistic work, much of it done by missionaries, “gave rise 
to new, language-linked socioeconomic stratification that served political and economic 
agendas of the colonial states that sanctioned their work” (2001: 25). And Johannes 
Fabian, in his seminal study of Language and Colonial Power in the former Belgian 
Congo, traces the development of Swahili as a “one-way conduits for command and 
persuasion” in the coal-mining region of Katanga (Fabian, 1991: 136). 
 In surveying the literature on language and ideology, I observed that there exists 
an underlying tension between the assumption that ideologies represent specific group 
interests and the reality in which group interests prove to be much more diverse than such 
a simple one-to-one mapping of ideology and interests seems to warrant. In Paul 
Kroskrity’s introduction to his edited volume, Regimes of Language (Kroskrity, 2000b) 
he lists four features of language ideologies. The tension I speak of emerges out of his 
discussion of the first two - the first being the link between ideology and group interests: 
language ideologies represent the perception of language and discourse 
that is constructed in the interest of a specific social and cultural group. 
(2000b: 8) 
And the second being the diversity of “meaningful social divisions” within groups: 
language ideologies are profitably conceived as multiple because of the 
multiplicity of meaningful social divisions (class, gender, clan, elites, 
generations, and so on) within sociocultural groups that have the potential 
to produce divergent perspectives expressed as indices of group 
membership. (2000b: 12) 
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Kroskrity realizes the challenge posed by the disjunction between these two features of 
language ideology, which poses the question as to how group interests come to be 
associated with particular ideologies when the groups themselves are so diverse and 
language ideologies are sites of “conflict and contestation” (2000b: 12)? Whenever these 
questions arise, two theorists always seem to be invoked: Pierre Bourdieu and Antonio 
Gramsci. Kroskrity uses Bourdieu to discuss how ideologies come to be “successfully 
‘naturalized” by the majority of the group,” and Gramsci to discuss how “state-endorsed 
hegemonic cultures” are imposed through “struggle and adjustment between states and 
their opponents” (2000b: 12-13). This is a formulation that is traceable to Kathryn 
Woolard’s seminal essay "Language Variation and Cultural Hegemony: Toward an 
Integration of Sociolinguistic and Social Theory" (Woolard, 1985), and which was more 
recently revisited by Niloofar Haeri (Haeri, 1997), and is also addressed by a forthcoming 
essay by F. Niyi Akinnaso (Akinnaso, forthcoming). The literature emerging around 
these questions falls within the larger framework of language ideology, but its particular 
focus on the relationship between language and theories of political economy justify 
categorizing these works as “language and political economy” rather than simply 
language ideology, and places it alongside a growing body of work in this area (Woolard, 
1985, Friedrich, 1989, Gal, 1989, Irvine, 1989). 
 
Peripheral Identities and Education in East Asia 
In addition to the relationship between group interests and ideology, which I discuss in 
depth in Chapter 8, my research also draws from a growing body of anthropological 
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research into education, ethnic identity, and nationalism in East Asia. This literature 
seeks to understand the role of the periphery in the construction of the nation-state 
(Harrell, 1999). These issues are particularly salient in the East Asian context where rapid 
political and economic change has forced states to invest in the construction of new 
national discourses to maintain their legitimacy (Harrell, 1995, Ong and Nonini, 1997, 
Huang and Hsu, 1999). Because of the importance of education to the national project, 
the specific links between minority education and nationalism in China and Taiwan have 
also began to attract increased academic attention (Borchigud, 1995, Huang and Hsu, 
1999, Postiglione, 1999). Previous studies of education and nationalism in Taiwan have 
shown how the curriculum's strong emphasis on teaching Confucian morality was linked 
to notions of nationhood (Meyer, 1988a, Meyer, 1988b, Stafford, 1995). Similarly, 
military discipline in the schools, such as military training classes aimed at preparing 
students to defend the island against an attack by the Mainland (Strawn, 1999) also 
served to strengthen official nationalism while repressing the emergence of alternative 
nationalisms.  
 Taiwanese debates about the education reform (see Chapter 2), parallel those in 
the United States where there has long been a debate between those who think that 
immersion into mainstream cultural standards would better help disadvantaged children 
from minority backgrounds, and those who think that better understanding one’s own 
culture and language will best prepare one to enter the educational mainstream (Collins, 
1999). More than anything else, my research aims to show the extent to which these 
debates are shaped by the political, historical, cultural, and economic context in which 
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they are framed. In doing so, my research contributes to several overlapping discussions 
within the field of education about: (a) the role of the state in educational policy (Dale, 
1989, Apple and Aasen, 2003), especially with regard to language planning (Akinnaso, 
forthcoming, Tollefson, 1991, Tollefson, 2002), (b) the development and implementation 
of “multicultural” curriculums that reflect local cultural traditions (Giroux, 1981, Giroux 
and McLaren, 1994), particularly among indigenous peoples (Hansen, 1999, Hansen, 
1999, McCarty and Bia, 2002), and (c) the role played by educational institutions in 
reproducing race-based social inequalities (Ogbu, 1978, Ogbu, 1982, Ogbu, 1987, Gould, 
1999, Ogbu, 1999, Ogbu, 2003). By conceptualizing policy studies as process, I hope to 
contribute to educational practices that take into account the needs and concerns of local 
learning communities, especially those that have been historically marginalized by the 
educational system. 
 
The Language Socialization of the Anthropologist 
I first arrived in Taiwan in January of 1991, after having backpacked my way through 
China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia over the preceding seven months. While 
in China the Westerners I met who spoke the most fluent Chinese had all come to study 
in Taiwan. Not only was I informed that Taiwan had the best Mandarin language schools, 
but I also learned that it was easy to make money teaching English at Taiwan’s many 
cram-schools༪ஒक़ (bǔxíbān) for students preparing for their exams. 1991 was an 
interesting year for Taiwan. Martial law had ended just a few years before, in 1987, and a 
palpable sense of excitement was in the air. Public protests were common, and people 
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were experimenting with new forms of identity politics. On that trip I became aware of 
the Aborigine Rights Movementࢎфͻ̠ᛲར੃ (yuánzhùmín zhǔquán yùndòng), and 
heard stories about how people had been punished (e.g. beaten, forced to wear a placard, 
or fined) in school for speaking Hoklo. I saw fights in the legislature on TV as the 
opposition party fought for democratic reforms. All of these things stayed with me as I 
went back to college, and then graduate school. When I became interested in studying the 
relationship between language policy and political economy, Taiwan seemed an obvious 
choice. There was one problem, even after years of Chinese study, my Mandarin was still 
far from where it needed to be to conduct research, and I spoke none of Taiwan’s local 
languages. 
 Language skills are something that Anthropologists rarely discuss in their 
ethnographies (Owusu, 1978: 313). Occasionally we get glimpses, such as when Stevan 
Harrell writes: 
For the first six weeks, I employed an interpreter to translate my Mandarin 
Chinese into the villagers’ Hokkien [Hoklo] and back again, but when he 
left to go to college, I interviewed and interacted almost exclusively in the 
Hokkien language, I started out missing things, but learned fast, out of 
necessity. (Harrell, 1982: viii) 
Having heard second hand reports on how excellent Harrell’s Chinese skills are, I am apt 
to believe that he did, indeed, learn fast and did not miss much. But how many 
anthropologists are actually such fast learners? I know that I, for one, am not. I had 
studied French from fifth grade through twelfth, spent two summers studying in France, 
and I still am only minimally conversant (although my comprehension is better than my 
speaking). Because of my own difficulty with language learning, I often wish for a little 
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more anthropological reflexivity (Ruby, 1980) regarding the relationship between 
language learning and fieldwork. 
 I was able to audit a course in Hoklo at the University of Pennsylvania, one of 
only a handful of such courses in the country, mainly targeting second generation 
Taiwanese who are interested in doing business in Taiwan. Then, in 1997, I secured a 
Fulbright scholarship to study at Taiwan’s premier language school, the International 
Chinese Language Program ੣ᄒൢდߨஒ؀  (ICLP, Guójì Huáyǔ Yánxí Suǒ) at 
National Taiwan University ੣Ι͔ᝰʩዖ (Guólì Táiwān dàxué). This was, without 
exaggeration, one of the most difficult years of my life. The style of learning at ICLP is 
similar to that of a Taiwanese school, emphasizing great feats of memorization; we were 
expected to remember entire dialogs and hundreds of Chinese characters each day. I was 
truly beginning to despair when the teacher of one of the classes I was having the most 
difficulty in asked me to take a class with her the next semester. I was dumbfounded, 
since I was performing so poorly in her class. However, she informed me that she was 
taking classes at National Taiwan Normal University’s ੣Ιࣗᇸʩዖ (Guólì shīfàn 
dàxué) program for teaching Chinese as a foreign language ൢდ̂૦ዖߨԦ؀ 
(Huáyǔwén Jiāoxué Yánjiùsuǒ), where she had been exposed to some alternative teaching 
techniques, not usually used in ICLP’s conservative classrooms, and she wanted to 
experiment on me. It was a revelation! Rather than struggle with memorizing text before 
discussing it in class, the order was reversed. We would spend days listening to and 
discussing the text without books, and then work on vocabulary and grammar drills after 
we had become familiar with the texts. I did much better, and was able to perform well in 
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class with much less struggle. During this time I was also taking Hoklo classes, but that 
was unfortunately not progressing as well as I would have liked.  
 One of the things I learned through my experience at ICLP was invaluable. I had 
personally experienced the planned educational reforms that I had hoped to study. Apart 
from the language and identity issues I hoped to focus upon, one of the major impetuses 
for reform was to replace the emphasis on dry, wrote memorization with a more 
communicative and engaging style of learning (Lii-Shih, 2002), long advocated by 
educational reformers in the America (but not necessarily implemented in most American 
classrooms). Despite my progress, after a year of intensive study, I still did not feel that I 
had the necessary communicative competence to begin my fieldwork. I decided to extend 
my research an additional year and spend the time auditing classes at Taiwanese 
universities, where I could familiarize myself with local debates surrounding language 
and education reform. With the support of a visiting position at the Institute of Ethnology
ͻ૰ዖߨԦ؀ (mínzúxué yánjiùsuǒ) at Academia Sinica ˁ͛ߨԦਗ (Zhōngyāng 
Yánjiùyuàn), I was able to audit classes on educational history, language policy, 
sociolinguistics, and even a course on Paulo Friere, as well as attending every conference 
I could on educational reform, anthropology, and language policy.  
 I continued to study Hoklo, but it simply was not coming as fast as my Mandarin. 
I eventually decided against going to a primarily Hoklo speaking community, as I had 
originally planned, and instead looked for an Aborigine community, knowing that 
Mandarin would be the primary language of communication. I am very happy that my 
linguistic ineptness forced me to make such a decision, because I ended up gaining 
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valuable insights into Taiwan’s ethnic politics that I would never have gotten otherwise. 
A classmate in my Paulo Friere class was on the education board at the Education and 
Culture Department of The Council of Aboriginal Affairs at the Executive Yuanнݭਗ
ࢎфͻ૰ֵ࢝๢ (Xíngzhèngyuàn Yuánzhùmínzú Wěiyuánhuì), and he was able to 
arrange a series of meetings which eventually secured me an invitation to spend a year 
living in the faculty dorm of a primary school in a rural Aborigine village on Taiwan’s 
bucolic East coast. Once I saw the location of the school, nestled in the foot of the 
mountains, I made up my mind. 
 Even after arriving at the school, however, my language skills were still limited. 
The academic language I had learned at ICLP, and improved in university classes, bore 
little resemblance to the Taiwanese Mandarin ͔ᝰ੣დ (Táiwān Guóyǔ) spoken in 
rural Taiwan. Living immersed in the environment, I was able to absorb the local 
vernacular, much to the dismay of my Mandarin teachers at ICLP who scolded me for my 
“bad habits” when I visited them in Taipei. After about three months in the field I was 
ready to conduct interviews. This learning process made me very sensitive to the 
distinctions between the various forms of Mandarin spoken in Taiwan. Unfortunately, so 
focused was I on trying to get my Mandarin to the level where I could avoid 
embarrassment, that I never had time to pick up any of the local languages spoken in the 
village (which included Hoklo, Hakka, Amis, and Bunun). For the most part this was not 
a problem, although it did limit my ability to speak with some older villagers who had 
only limited Mandarin skills. 
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Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation starts, in Chapter 2, with a historical account of the political and 
economic forces that resulted in Taiwan’s recent education reforms. This account draws 
on a Gramscian framework of history, which is set out in the beginning of the chapter and 
further elaborated in Chapter 8. Central to such an account is the relationship between 
nationalist ideology and the political process of alliance formation between elite and 
subaltern groups. After providing a detailed account of Taiwan’s sociolinguistic profile 
and history, I explore the proximate historical causes of the reforms implemented in the 
1980s, as well as their consequences for Taiwanese nationalist ideology. The reforms 
came in two stages, the “new social studies education” of the eighties and nineties, and 
the “9-year integrated social studies” curriculum of the new millennium (Liu and Hung, 
2002: 572), after examining each of these separately, I then move beyond the curriculum 
to look at parallel developments in the construction of “local” Taiwanese culture. Finally, 
having established the social and historical context, I discuss the native language 
curriculum itself.  
 Chapter 3 explores the emergence of a uniquely Taiwanese Hoklo ethnic identity 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Political and economic developments 
during this period are discussed in the context of a history of Qing era education, and the 
forms of cultural capital that were institutionalized during that period. This period is 
crucial for understanding later developments, since it was at the end of this period, just 
before the Japanese arrived in 1895, that many of the key features of Taiwan’s political 
economy were established. Central to the history of this period, as it is the history of any 
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settler state, is the story of the displacement of the indigenous population. One of the 
unexpected discoveries in writing this dissertation was the crucial link between land 
policy and education policy in each stage of Taiwan’s history. Land was central to elite 
power, and land policies defined relations between Chinese and Aborigines. The rise of 
local elites was, in turn, directly linked to the establishment of the Qing education system 
in Taiwan. The rise of local elites is also part of the history of factional violence and 
rebellion, which marked so much of this period in Taiwanese history. I also explore how 
education was used as a means to reward loyal Aborigine populations, and the role of 
Confucian morality in Aborigine education.  
 Chapter 4 explores the history of nationalism in Taiwan. I show that the power 
structure, what Gramsci refers to as a “historical bloc” (see Chapter 8), established during 
the Japanese colonial era was very similar to that later adopted by the KMT, even as 
Chinese nationalism replaced Japanese nationalism. I explore the extent to which the 
transition from Japanese to KMT rule was both a radical departure and a continuation of 
a set of relationships that had already congealed at the end of the Qing era. Despite the 
best efforts of both regimes, local languages continued to flourish in Taiwan. I look at 
those features of Taiwanese state formation that limited the state’s power to arbitrarily 
impose language markets. Throughout both periods coercive rule was the norm; however, 
I argue that even in such situations a certain degree of legitimacy is necessary for the 
functioning of the state, and the creation of language markets in the National Language 
was central to the manufacture of consent. I end with a discussion of the break down of 
this legitimacy and the forces that later forced the changes discussed in Chapter 2. 
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 Chapter 5 explores the links between language and nationalism by looking at two 
contemporary debates in Taiwanese society. The compromise between Taiwanese and 
Chinese nationalism reached in the 1990s led to the adoption of a view of Taiwanese 
identity as a series of concentric circles radiating out from local communities to 
encompass the nation, and then the greater Chinese community, and eventually the world. 
However, as the balance of power in Taiwan has shifted in favor of the opposition 
Democratic Progressive Partyͻ̠඲ӵᚏ (DPP, Mínzhǔ Jìnbù dǎng), this compromise 
has increasingly been called into question. Language issues have played a key role in 
shaping this debate. First, I explore the debate over a national orthography. By choosing 
to adopt a Latin orthography the DPP seeks to reach out to the international (non-Chinese 
speaking) community, and yet by rejecting the standard used in Mainland China, they do 
so in a way that challenges the view of Taiwanese culture as embedded within the larger 
Chinese cultural sphere. The second issue I explore is English education. Here again, 
Taiwan seeks to enhance its status as a member of the international community by 
promoting English education. While Taiwan’s elite have long had access to private 
English education, many even studying abroad in the United States, attempts to 
democratize access to English education have been controversial. I explore the question 
of whether such attempts are genuine efforts to level the playing field, or perhaps are yet 
another avenue for imposing Taiwanese linguistic nationalism. 
 Chapter 6 sets the stage for the ethnographic account of education in a rural 
community on Taiwan’s remote East coast provided in Chapter 7 by discussing the 
unique history of Taiwan’s mountains and eastern regions. In discussing the Qing era, 
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when Aborigine policy focused mostly on those Aborigines inhabiting the same western 
plains as the Chinese settlers, it is possible to address Aborigine policy together with 
those governing the Han Chinese population; however, under the Japanese Aborigine 
policy refers primarily to policies governing the mountain region, rich in valuable 
camphor, and the remote East coast. In Chapter 6 I explore Japanese and KMT Aborigine 
policies, focusing on language and education. I argue that the current ethnic differences 
between “mountain” and “plains” Aborigines in Taiwan is largely due to the different 
processes by which each group was integrated into the state. During the Japanese the 
mountain area was cordoned off and subject to a massive military occupation intent on 
killing and subduing the Aborigine population. The system of police-run schools set up 
during the Japanese era was abandoned by the KMT, who sought instead to fully 
assimilate Aborigines into mainstream Chinese society. In this context I also explore the 
local history of eastern Taiwan, where I conducted my fieldwork, since it was shaped by 
the same policies that governed the Aborigine population. The integration of this remote 
region into the rest of the country also saw the integration of the Aborigine population 
into the lowest rungs of Taiwanese society.  
 Chapter 7 paints a portrait of a rural community on Taiwan’s eastern plains. I 
explore how the policies of promoting “local” languages and culture are actually 
implemented in the community around a small primary school with a predominantly 
Aborigine student population. I contrast this community with that surrounding another 
nearby school which, although only a short distance away, is considerably different 
because of the different ways in which the mountain Aborigines who live there were 
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integrated into the community. Then, drawing on Gramsci’s theory of “intellectuals,” I 
explore how two local intellectuals implement state based cultural initiatives. Each of the 
intellectuals represents different local constituencies and is dependent upon different 
sources of state funding. The first is a local volunteer cultural worker. A highly educated 
businessman, who devotes his free time to community building and cultural events, as 
well as collecting local histories, he is primarily interested in regional boosterism. The 
second is a primary school principal who is also an Aborigine woman. She is a fierce 
advocate for Aborigines, but she sees defines her goal primarily in terms of securing state 
funding for Aborigines students. Despite their differences, both the cultural worker and 
the school principal end up reproducing stereotyped portrayals of Aborigine culture as 
primarily embodied in traditional dance performances. The main difference between 
them lies not in their conception of local culture, but in the populations each of them 
targets. The cultural worker primarily focuses on the Hoklo and Hakka speaking middle 
class, while the Principal works hard to ensure that the poorer Aborigine population is 
able to gain something from the state funds she secures. I then look at a third local 
intellectual, a young Aborigine schoolteacher who decides to give up teaching to become 
a Presbyterian minister. I explore the ways in which Taiwanese multiculturalism forced 
this schoolteacher to seek an alternative framework within which to help his fellow 
Aborigines. 
 In Chapter 8, drawing on Gramsci’s historical writings, I refigure Bourdieu’s 
theory of Language Markets, giving greater emphasis to the political and economic 
processes by which linguistic markets are formed. In doing so, I avoid the simplistic 
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correlation of hegemony with the class interests of the ruling elite, by showing how the 
incorporation of subaltern groups into an alliance with the ruling bloc requires the 
creation of new linguistic and cultural markets. The creation of these new markets, I 
argue, is an essential feature of post-colonial nationalism. I then look more closely at 
Gramsci’s own writings on nationalism, exploring the links between nationalism and 
modernity. In particular, I explore Partha Chatteree’s application of Gramsci’s theory of 
Passive Revolution to post-colonial nationalisms, and the role that modernity played in 
shaping such nationalisms. Then, drawing on Peter Ives study of the linguistic roots of 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, I contrast Gramsci’s approach to social reproduction with 
that found in Bourdieu, highlighting the importance of historical processes such as state 
formation and globalization as has been observed in recent anthropological work 
grounded in Bourdieu. 
 Finally, in the concluding chapter (Chapter 9) I discuss what linguistic 
nationalism in Taiwan can teach us about the theoretical issues discussed in Chapter 8. 
The traditional approach to discussion nationalism is to categorize countries into various 
taxonomic classifications; I offer an alternative grounded in Bourdieu’s theory of 
linguistic capital and Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. I look at what decentralization of 
Taiwan’s linguistic markets means for linguistic nationalism, especially focusing on 
those at the bottom of Taiwan’s linguistic hierarchy: Aboriginal speakers of Taiwan’s 
Austronesian languages. I then look at the current struggle between those who favor a 
multi-layered notion of identity and those who promote replacing Chinese nationalism 
with Taiwanese nationalism, and how despite their symbolic importance in this struggle, 
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Aborigines are often sidelined. I conclude by suggesting that Taiwan has entered a 
critical period of struggle over its national and linguistic identity 
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Notes
 
1 As discussed in Chapter 5, the question of which orthographic system to use is a 
highly political one. By choosing Hanyu Pinyin I do not mean to intervene in this debate, 
but simply to use the system I am most familiar with, and which is the standard for 
scholarship conducted in the United States. I consider orthography to be primarily 
targeted at the non-native speaker since most Taiwanese do not rely upon orthography 
but read the Chinese characters directly. I have accordingly provided the Chinese 
characters wherever possible. It is common for Taiwanese names to be written in a 
variety of orthographic systems (and sometimes to invent new spellings not existing in 
any known system). It is here that having a standard orthography can help overcome 
confusion. In the case of Japanese and Austronesian phrases I tried as best as possible to 
provide the Chinese characters which would help scholars who only know Chinese 
identify the phrase, even if they are unfamiliar with the orthographic representation that is 
used 
 
2 It is sometimes simply referred to as Taiwanese ͔ᝰ༽ (Táiwānhuà), but out 
of sensitivity to speakers of Taiwan’s other languages, is now referred to as Hoklo 
(sometimes spelled Holo), and this is the term that will be used here (Chiung, 1999; 
Heylen, 2001: 10, n. 10; Hoklo.org, 2003). The other term, Southern Min, (also variants 
such as Minnaneese) is no longer used for both scientific and political reasons. On the 
one hand, the language spoken in Taiwan is now quite different from that still spoken in 
Fujian province (where the Min river runs). And, there is also a political desire to 
distance Taiwanese identity from that of Mainland China. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LOCAL CULTURES, LOCAL LANGUAGES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION REFORM IN TAIWAN 
 
Taiwan’s Passive Revolution 
In the 1990s Taiwan made a historic break with the Chinese nationalist ideology, which 
had legitimated the power of the ruling party for the previous forty-two years. What is 
remarkable about this break is not so much the abandonment of a vision of China which 
had became more absurd with each passing year, after all, it has already been decades 
since anyone seriously considered the possibility of reclaiming mainland China and 
re-establishing the Republic in its previous capital of Nanjing; rather, what was 
remarkable was the fact that Chinese nationalism was not replaced with Taiwanese 
nationalism. Taiwanese nationalism had emerged, over the course of the seventies and 
eighties, as a viable alternative. There was a nostalgic literature about lost peasant values, 
there was a historiography that highlighted the uniqueness of the Taiwanese history, 
emphasizing Dutch and Japanese colonial rule, as well as Taiwan’s status as a renegade 
frontier during the Ming and Qing eras. Finally, there also existed a language, Hoklo, 
spoken by nearly three quarters of the population, which stood ready to be claimed as the 
official language of the Taiwanese nation. However, instead of replacing Chinese 
nationalism with Taiwanese nationalism, Taiwan’s leaders engineered a compromise 
between the two. Under the leadership of KMT President Lee Teng-hui өചቩ (Lǐ 
Dēnghuī), Taiwan adopted a multiculturalist ideology which effectively undermined 
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efforts to promote Taiwanese nationalism by doing three things: First, it served to 
deligitimate a vision of Taiwanese nationalism grounded in Hoklo culture, by placing it 
on equal grounds with Taiwan’s Hakka, Mainlander, and Aborigine cultural traditions. 
Secondly, it avoided a wholesale rejection of Chinese nationalism by viewing culture as a 
series of concentric circles, radiating outward from individual communities, to the entire 
Taiwanese nation, but also beyond to include the greater Chinese cultural sphere and 
global culture as well. And third, as Wu Rwei-Ren points out, it served to effectively 
enhance the power of the native elite within the KMT without relinquishing power to 
those outside of the party (Wu, 2002: 200). 
 Both Wu and I have argued that this transformation in Taiwanese ideology is best 
understood as a “passive revolution” in the Gramscian sense (Friedman, 2002; Wu, 2002: 
200). Gramsci used the term to distinguish between genuine populist revolutions, such as 
the Jacobin revolution in France, and top-down elite-driven revolutions such as the 
Risorgimento in Italy. I discuss Gramsci’s theory of passive revolution in detail in 
Chapter 8, but here I wish to highlight what I consider to be its defining feature: the lack 
of a political alliance between elite and subaltern classes. Whereas in the French 
revolution, the bourgeoisie was forced to make an alliance with the French peasantry 
against the aristocracy, in Italy the bourgeoisie allied with the Southern aristocracy 
against the peasants. This resulted, Gramsci argues, in France having a more organic 
national language and culture, as opposed to the more “cosmopolitan,” elite, and 
European culture and language of Italy (Gramsci, 1985: 246). In essence, Gramsci saw 
national ideology as defined not simply by the interests of the ruling elite, but as the 
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outcome of a political process in which the ruling elites forged political alliances with 
other groups. The new national ideology represents the generalization not simply of the 
aggregate interests of the allied groups, but of those shared interests, which allow them to 
form and maintain their alliance. Gramsci referred to such ruling alliance as “historical 
blocs.” 
 I differ from Wu in interpreting the underlying dynamics of Taiwan’s passive 
revolution. Wu sees this largely in terms of ethnicity and party affiliation. He starts by 
pointing out the way in which the KMT divided local elites by incorporating some of 
them into the party system, while excluding others. 
it should always be borne in mind that the KMT's system of clientism also 
divided the native elite into two groups, one inside the KMT and the other 
outside of it. Differentially situated in the structure of power game (sic.), 
these two groups developed, for all their common interest in nativizing the 
state, different interests and thus different preferences as to how to achieve 
this goal (Wu, 2002: 200) 
While correct, this analysis treats elites as autonomous entities and overlooks how 
political parties serve as mechanisms of forging alliances between groups. As I argue in 
Chapter 4, the ruling bloc represented by the KMT included not just Mainlander and 
native elites, but crucially tied these groups to various subaltern classes including 
workers at large state enterprises, farmers, Aborigines, and military personnel. The 
opposition party which emerged in the 1980s, the DPP, was initially more directly 
associated with the interests of local elites, but it too grew to incorporate a diverse 
alliance of various interests, including a broad array of identity-based movements, 
including feminists, environmentalists, teachers, as well as Hoklo, Hakka, and Aborigine 
rights advocates. The DPP came to power voicing the dissatisfaction of these groups, but 
30 
their inability to adopt a class based politics forced them to articulate their concerns in 
terms of national identity. The nativist elite within the KMT was able to appropriate the 
nativism of the DPP by promoting a multiculturalist discourse. For this reason I disagree 
with Wu’s assessment regarding the significance of the recent rise of the DPP from an 
outlawed party to its current status as the ruling party.  
 Wu’s mistake is to assume that the rise to power of the DPP is as much a success 
for the nativist faction within the KMT as it is for those in the DPP. 
Ideologically speaking, the victory of Chen Shi-bian, the quintessential 
native son of Taiwan, in the presidential election of 2000 extends the rule 
of the very native KMT-DPP historical bloc that emerged during Lee's 
reign, even though the power relation between the two partners has now 
been reversed (Wu, 2002: 212-13). 
Wu, drawing on Chatterjee’s reading of Gramsci (Chatterjee, 1986), argues that there was 
a passive revolution because the DPP rose to power through a war of movement as 
opposed to a war of position (Wu, 2002: 201). I believe Chaterjee makes too much of 
strategy. A change in the ruling historical bloc constitutes a passive revolution because of 
the failure of this new historical-bloc to produce a genuinely national-popular ideology. 
Gramsci saw this failure as deriving from the different forms of political alliances he saw 
in various European revolutions, but he did not equate passive revolution with a specific 
revolutionary strategy. In fact, Gramsci’s argument was precisely that different strategies 
were necessitated by different state formations (Anderson, 1977: 28). 
 Has there been a passive revolution in Taiwan? In the sense that a new concept of 
identity has emerged which allows the native elite to gain a foothold in the traditional 
power structures, the answer is “yes”; however, it would be a mistake to assume that a 
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stable historical bloc has emerged out of this. The two sides are still very much 
competing for control. The continued appeal of older forms of national identity, the lack 
of an alliance between the nativist elite and subaltern groups, such as workers and 
Aborigines, is apparent in the new ideology of national identity.  
 What is the new ideology of identity negotiated between Taiwan’s competing 
historical blocs? It is multiculturalism, but not American style multiculturalism; rather, it 
is a specific form of multiculturalism imported from Japan (Lu, 2002), one in which 
identity is defined in terms of one’s “local” community, rather than ethnicity (although 
the de-facto ethnic segregation of Taiwan’s rural landscape makes one a useful stand-in 
for the other). Viewed in terms of Slavoj Žižek’s theory of multiculturalism as “the 
cultural logic of multinational capitalism” (Žižek, 1997), the pantheistic respect for the 
uniqueness of local cultures embodied by multiculturalist ideology serves to mask the 
monotheism of the global marketplace. It is the embrace of this location-based 
multiculturalism that is the hegemonic ideology of Taiwan’s current standoff between 
two competing historical blocs. What Žižek’s view of multiculturalism as a by-product of 
globalization misses, however, is the role played by individual nation-states in shaping 
the specific form of multiculturalism. The Japanese form of multiculturalism adopted in 
Taiwan needs to be understood in light of the specific historical processes by which the 
Taiwanese state came to adopt multiculturalist ideology.  
 In this chapter I lay out the immediate causes that led to the adoption of the 
ideology by which Taiwanese identity is seen as but one level in a series of concentric 
circles radiating out from the local level. First, I explore Taiwan’s ethnic and linguistic 
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makeup. Secondly, I identify the immediate antecedents of the adoption of the new 
ideology as the basis for the primary school curriculum. Then I explore the nature of 
those changes, first in the 1994 revised history curriculum, followed by the new 
integrated curriculum for primary and middle school implemented in 2001. Finally, I 
focus on the linguistic implications of the new curriculum, relating them to the ideology 
of localism. 
 
Taiwan’s Language Situation 
Before the arrival of the Japanese in 1895, the official language of the Qing bureaucracy 
was what is commonly referred to as Classical Chinese ̂Զ̂ (wényánwén). It was 
primarily a written language, which was pronounced differently in each region of the 
Empire. During the reign of the Yong Zheng ྌ͹ (Yōng Zhèng) Emperor1 there was an 
attempt to unify pronunciation with the establishment of Pronunciation Correcting 
Academies ͹ࡗऐਗ (zhèngyīn shūyuàn) in 1729 (Lee, 1995: 134). But the effort was 
short-lived. The Taipei academy closed its doors in 1750 (1995: 134). The Mandarin 
Chinese that became official after the KMT succeeded the Japanese (1895-1945) is quite 
different from this classical language. Mandarin is based on the vernacular lingua-franca 
spoken by Ming and Qing era bureaucrats, Guanhua ׈༽ (guānhuà) (Heylen, 2001: 43). 
While initially based on the vernacular spoken in the old Chinese capital of Nanjing, 
Mandarin changed, acquiring local characteristics, when the capital was moved north to 
Beijing at the start of the fifteenth century (2001: 94-99). This is important because even 
those few Taiwanese literati who became bureaucrats during the late Qing were unlikely 
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to have had much exposure to spoken Mandarin, knowing only the written Classical 
Chinese which they pronounced in their own vernacular (2001: 97). When Mandarin was 
imposed as the official language by the KMT, it was an alien language, although it was 
already widely in use as the lingua franca of the over two million soldiers, KMT officials, 
and other Mainlanders who came to Taiwan at that time. 
 The languages spoken in Taiwan before the arrival of the Japanese fall into two 
language families: Chinese and Austronesian. Initially there were three local Chinese 
languages, deriving from the various regions of southern China from which settlers had 
come in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. By the end of the nineteenth century, as 
ethnic feuding between settlers from Zhangzhou ူϴ (Zhāngzhōu) and Quanzhou ޜ
ϴ (Quánzhōu) settlers subsided (see Chapter 3), the differences between the two 
varieties of Hoklo accordingly became less important. Today the language resulting from 
this merger is the mother tongue of seventy-three percent of Taiwan’s population. The 
other Chinese language native to Taiwan is Hakka. The Hakka are a Chinese minority 
ethnic group. Having purportedly migrated to Guangzhou ᅪϴ (Guǎngzhōu) from 
Northern China during the Song Dynasty (960-1279), they found a niche in the sparsely 
populated mountainous regions of the south, living in close proximity with the She≑૰ 
(shēzú) Aboriginal group, from whom they adopted many economic and social practices. 
The language seems to have been adopted from the local southern population as well 
(Leong, 1997: 4, introduction). The Hakka came to Taiwan around the same time as the 
Hoklo-speaking Chinese, and today account for about fifteen percent of the population 
(Government Information Office, 2003c). 
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 The other language family in Taiwan consists of the Austronesian languages. 
These are, in turn, divided between the majority, which are classified as Formosan 
Austronesian languages and Yami ෕ࠁ૰  (Yǎměizú), which is classified as 
Malayo-Polynesian Austronesian (the Yami are believed to have migrated to Taiwan 
from the Philippines). Genocide, assimilation, intermarriage, and forced relocation have 
all contributed to the loss of a significant number of Taiwan’s Austronesian languages. 
There were 24 Austronesian languages spoken during the Dutch colonial era (1624-1662), 
and of these, there were 17 still spoken at the end of World War II, according to Japanese 
records (Huteson, personal communication, 2003). Altogether, Taiwan’s Austronesian 
population, which uses the term “Aborigine” ࢎфͻ  (Yuánzhùmín) to refer to 
themselves, is made up of only 433,689 people, accounting for 1.7 percent of the island’s 
population (Chiung, 1999: 3). The government officially recognizes twelve Aborigine 
ethnic groups. The chart below is from the government’s 2003 yearbook, and shows only 
eleven of these twelve, since the Truku ˰ክᄍ૰ (Tàilǔgézú) Aborigine ethnic group 
was only recognized as distinct from the larger Atayal ऴ෕૰ (Tàiyǎzú) population in 
July of 2004 (Government Information Office, 2003a; Ko, 2003). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Taiwan’s Aborigine Ethnic Groups2 
 
 
 
 Today, there are only ten Austronesian languages with populations of more than a 
hundred speakers. Kavalan ዎၚᚲ૰  (Gámǎlánzú), Thao ڽ૰  (Shàozú), Pazeh, 
Saaroa ೝпࠡ૰ (Xiāngxīmiáozú), and Kanakanavu ̀Ջ̀Ջౘ૰ (Kǎnàkǎnàfùzú) 
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have between one and ten living speakers each (of these, only Kavalan and Thao are 
recognized as distinct Aborigine ethnic groups by the government). 
 
 
 
Table 1: Estimated Number of Speakers of Living Austronesian Languages in Taiwan 
Language Total Pop. (2004)3 # speakers (low)4 # speakers (high)5  
Amis (ۇࠁ૰) 166,608 28,323 130,000 
Atyal (ऴ෕૰) 88,025 14,964 63,000 
Paiwan (૜ᝰ૰) 78,346 13,318 53,000 
Bunun (ͦཡ૰) 45,979 7,816 34,000 
Truku (˰ክᄍ૰)6 15,359 2,611 28,000 
Rukai (ክఝ૰) 11,213 2,100 8,000 
Puyuma (ֆ۸૰) 9,900 1,683 7,225 
Tsou (ཱ૰) 5,798 350 (986) 3,000 
Saisiyat (ᒯࢭ૰) 5,457 500 (928) 3,200 
Yami (෕ࠁ૰)7 3,248 552 5,000 
 
 
 
Survey data based on Aborigine college students suggests a language attrition rate of 
“15.8 percent over two generations, and 31 percent over three generations” (Tsao, 2001). 
While neither is in threatened with language death in quite the same way as the 
Austronesian languages are, Hakka and Hoklo are also in decline, with the situation being 
much more serious for Hakka than Hoklo: 
The Hakka students performance was only slightly better than that of the 
aborigines, with 40 percent of the students surveyed saying that Hakka is 
the most frequently used language at home. Elsewhere, according to 
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Huang's 1993 survey of 327 Hakka students in the Taipei area and 404 
Hakka Taipei citizens, only 70 percent of those whose parents are both 
Hakka speakers claim that they can speak Hakka (2001). 
While Hoklo is not declining as quickly, recent surveys continue to show a decline in 
Mother Tongue proficiency (2001). For all of the languages, it is far to early to tell if any 
of the current linguistic reforms, discussed below, will do anything to reverse their 
decline. In order to understand this decline, it is necessary to look back at the process by 
which the value of local languages in the linguistic marketplace was undermined during 
both the Japanese colonial era and the early years of KMT rule. 
 
The Defining Moment 
In 1990 KMT President Lee Teng-hui invited a hundred and fifty of “Taiwan’s leading 
lights,” including academics and business leaders as well as politicians from across the 
political spectrum, to discuss the future of such important topics as: “the local 
government system, the central government system, constitutional revision and mainland 
China policy” (Rigger, 1999: 151-52). No other moment so clearly defines the end of the 
ruling historical bloc which had first been established during the Japanese colonial era 
and solidified under KMT martial law as the 1990 National Affairs Conference੣՗๢ 
(NAC, guóshìhuì). As I have argued (see Chapter 4), political economic factors under 
both the Japanese and the KMT had always made it difficult for the ruling bloc to exert 
its hegemony over the island’s local elites. At the same time, I have argued that the 
legitimacy of the KMT was based on more than just coercion; that a system of alliances 
and incentives served to secure the consent of at least some sectors of society, tying them 
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together to the ruling party in a historical bloc. The foundation of this system, including 
the school system, local elections, farmers associations, ethnic division, linguistic and 
cultural nationalism, etc., had already been established during the Japanese period, and 
were adopted wholesale by the KMT after the shock of the February 1947 uprising. The 
announcement of the NAC made it clear that every aspect of this system was now open to 
change, and just a week before the conference had begun, on June 21, 1990, the Council 
of Grand Justices responded to a joint resolution brought by KMT and opposition 
Democratic Progressive Partyͻ̠඲ӵᚏ (DPP, Mínzhǔ Jìnbùdǎng) party members by 
announcing that “all life-tenure members of the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan and 
National Assembly” would have to step down by the end of the following year (1999: 
152).  
 All this had been a long time in coming. Martial Law had ended in 1987, and in 
May of 1990 Lee Teng-hui announced that he would “abolish the Temporary Provisions, 
the source of his extra-constitutional powers, a year hence” (1999: 152). Pressures for 
reform had been increasing from a variety of both internal and external sources. While 
the Korean War (1950-53) had served to bolster U.S. support for Taiwan, the official 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China ˁൢʇͻι֝੣ (PRC, Zhōnghuá 
Rénmín Gònghéguó, also “mainland China”) by President Carter in 1978 created a 
political crisis for the KMT, who could no longer claim to be the true political 
representatives of China, and cast serious doubt on their ambitions to one day retake the 
mainland. The life-tenure members of the Republic of Chinaˁൢͻ੣ (ROC, Zhōnghuá 
Mínguó) government who were ordered to step down at the end of 1991 were supposed to 
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represent each of the provinces of Mainland China. Because the ROC had not been able 
to hold elections in these provinces since retreating to Taiwan, many of these members 
had been in office since before 1945 and were already quite old.  
 There were other pressures for reform as well. Taiwan had had a Green 
Revolution under the Japanese, but KMT land reforms (see Chapter 4) had done little to 
slow a downturn in agricultural output starting in the late sixties. Rising wages, mixed 
with slower growth created a serious crisis in the agricultural sector (Amsden, 1979: 374). 
At the same time, “embarrassed by the apparent successes” of China’s Great Leap 
Forwardʩᛀ඲ (Dàyuèjìn), and threatened with a cutoff of aid by the U.S., who were 
upset with the limits Taiwan’s import-substitution policies placed on free trade, the KMT 
had to shift over to an export-oriented economy (Gates, 1996: 221; Shiau, 1996: 216). 
This had the effect, by the 1980s, of shifting the balance of power between the large 
state-owned enterprises that the KMT had inherited from the Japanese era, to the small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) owned by Taiwan’s burgeoning middle class: 
In 1958, public and private enterprises contributed equally to the total 
industrial production value. Since then, private enterprise has been more 
productive than public firms. (Shiau, 1996: 218-19) 
It was Taiwan’s burgeoning middle class who, in the 1980s, encouraged by the thawing 
of martial law, began to mobilize along identity and issue based New Social Movements. 
At least seventeen such movements had emerged by the end of 1988: 
Their claims were varied, but we can delineate the following types: 1) 
Grievances against the state's inaction when confronted by problems, with 
new demands for consumer protection, pollution control, and ecological 
conservation. 2) Protests against state policies regarding ethnic groups and 
minorities' language rights, land control, and cultural identity and 
preservation. Protests have also arisen against inadequate policies in 
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caring for disadvantaged groups such as the elderly, the handicapped, and 
veterans and even the treatment of certain religious groups. 3) Challenges 
to the state's corporatist mode of control over key social groups such as 
workers, farmers, students, women, and teachers and intellectuals. 4) 
Demands to change the established rules governing politically sensitive 
issues such as the ban on contacts between the peoples of Taiwan and the 
Mainland, and the human rights of political victims. (Hsiao, 1990: 166) 
The political voice of these heterogeneous social movements was the newly legal 
opposition political party, the DPP, who had had unprecedented success in the 1989 
elections, both in the Legislative Yuan, where they captured 30% of the seats, as well in 
municipal elections, where they secured six important victories (Rigger, 1999: 139).8 
The DPP’s core supporters were owners of SMEs, who opposed the preferential 
treatment the KMT awarded to the larger state-owned businesses (Rigger, 2001: 40). 
Because of this, and because the KMT had “worked to secure a base of support in all 
socioeconomic classes,” either through favoritism, or through “patronage and pork barrel 
projects,” (2001: 40), the DPP could not easily engage in a class-based politics. Instead, 
they focused primarily on non-economic issues, especially the identity and issue based 
politics of the new social movements (2001: 40). 
 This was the context in which the NAC met in 1990. It was an outright attempt on 
the part of the KMT to appropriate the core issues of identity politics and democracy, 
which had catapulted the DPP onto the national stage the year before. I have argued (see 
Chapter 2) that hegemony must be understood not simply as the ascent an ideology that 
reflects the interests of the ruling class, but as the result of the political processes by 
which the interests of both ruling and subaltern classes come together to form a historical 
bloc. What happened at the NAC was no less than the moment of conception of a new 
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Taiwanese hegemony in which the political base represented by the DPP, together with 
the newly powerful local Taiwanese leadership of the KMT (more about them later), 
joined together to lay the groundwork for both a new institutional relationship and a new 
ideology which would serve to legitimate that relationship. Gramsci used the term 
“passive revolution” to capture this kind of revolution “from above” in which a new 
hegemony is established without disturbing the underlying social relations (Gramsci et al., 
1972: 107-120, 321).  
 The ideology that would legitimate the new historical bloc was first developed by 
a committee put together (at the 1990 NAC) to develop educational reforms. The old 
conception of ethnicity in which all local differences were subordinated to a greater 
Chinese identity was to replaced with a more pluralistic conception of “concentric 
circles,” ω˼ฑ (tóngxīnyuán) (Corcuff, 2002: 87). This concept of Taiwanese identity 
as a series of concentric circles, and how it would apply to the new curriculum, was most 
clearly articulated in 1996 by Kuo Wei-fan, a Taiwan-born KMT leader, during an “inner 
meeting of the ruling KMT”: 
If we look at things from the point of view of the textbook structure, a 
student book must start learning from the immediate environment, then 
extend the scope step by step to local culture and the main ethnic groups 
of the society, extending it then to the knowledge of the culture of all 
ethnic groups that compose the territory and the nation. Only then can one 
understand the worlds' culture. Consequently, primary and secondary 
programs are being reformed following a strategy consisting of standing 
on Taiwan, having consideration for China, opening eyes on the world 
(2002: 87).  
This new conception of Taiwanese identity grounded in the “local” was a unique form of 
multiculturalism imported from Japan. Not coincidentally, the same year that the 
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educational reforms were finally announced (1994) was also the year that a program of 
sponsoring culture-building at the community level was announced by the government. 
The Integrated Community-Making Programڋੈᑨᝃᐰ௫࠴഑ (shèqū zǒngtǐ yíngzào 
jìhuà) was a state-sponsored program which, like the pluralistic notion of 
concentric-circles, aimed to undo the damage of the previous era, which had sought to 
stamp out local differences in the name of national unity. 
Following its implementation local organizations [ϛϚ࿌ᝃ  (zàidì 
tuántǐ)], including community associations, cultural and historical 
societies, cultural foundations, and so on, flourished in virtually every 
corner of the island. Wittingly or unwittingly, their works became a 
collaborative engineering of "local differences" within the national scope. 
(Lu, 2002: 18). 
Slavoj Žižek’s calls multiculturalism “the cultural logic of multinational capitalism” 
(Žižek, 1997), but it is not enough to argue that Taiwan’s integration into the global 
marketplace allows these local traditions to flourish, for this would be to skip over the 
crucial political processes by which the emergence of multiculturalism is mediated 
through the political processes of negotiation and alliance formation. It is true that the 
same forces which have pushed Taiwan into the global marketplace have also been the 
same ones which strengthened the power of the SME business owners who are the DPP’s 
base, but it is likely that given free reign the DPP would have sought to replace the 
Chinese nationalism of the KMT with a new Taiwanese nationalism grounded in the 
majority Hoklo culture, instead of adopting a more tolerant and nuanced policy of 
multiculturalism and localization. This latter policy must be seen as a compromise, 
imposed of political necessity. As we will see, it is a compromise that remains inherently 
unstable. 
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Language, Localization, and Identity 
Rewriting History 
Electoral democracy, the rise of identity-based politics, and the decline of the centralized 
control over the historical ruling bloc all conspired to force the KMT to meet the 
opposition half-way in an effort to forge a new ideology which could appease the newly 
powerful local elites without leading to a wholesale abandonment of the KMT’s 
hegemony. Nowhere is this new ideology more apparent than in the changes to the 
national curriculum, and the new history textbooks. The universalistic Chinese vision of 
nationhood (Duara, 1993) that had been the basis of the old curriculum was abandoned in 
favor of a more flexible “multi-leveled” conception of Taiwanese national identity 
(Hughes and Stone, 1999). This new conception of identity was articulated as a series of 
concentric circles, with a newly formed “local” culture at its core. Localism has the 
advantage of not explicitly favoring one ethnicity over another, even if the fact that 
Hoklo language and culture is dominant in most of Taiwan’s “local” cultures can be 
expected to give it a de facto advantage.  
 The transition from Chinese universalism to localism can be broken down into 
three eras: “those of ‘traditional Social Studies education’ (1950–1980), ‘new social 
studies education’ (1980–2000) and ‘9-year integrated social studies’ (2001–present)” 
(Liu and Hung, 2002: 572). During the traditional era the middle school social studies 
curriculum only mentioned Taiwan “at the very end of a grand narrative on the 
development of the Chinese nation from the stone age to the present” (Hughes and Stone, 
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1999: 982). Taiwanese frequently complain that they learned the names of every railway 
station on the Mainland, but did not even learn the first thing about their own history. The 
textbooks taught that all of Taiwan’s ethnic groups were essentially Chinese: 
the 1975 textbooks still stress that the aborigines, along with all other 
‘Chinese’ ethnic groups, have acquired a common ethnicity after 5000 
years of ‘assimilation’ [፰ϑ  (rónghé)]. The textbooks indoctrinated 
students into the belief that the people of Taiwan all belong to the same 
‘Chinese’ ethnic group. (Liu and Hung, 2002: 582) 
In 1994, Lee Teng-hui introduced the new middle school social science textbooks, Know 
Taiwan ვᗱ͔ᝰ (rènshi Táiwān). In Lee's own words these new textbooks were 
intended to consolidate and promote “a Taiwan Gemeinschaft [·֢ιωᝃ (shēngmìng 
gòngtóngtǐ)], a term that is central to Lee Teng-hui's thinking on the relationship between 
Taiwanese and Chinese identity" (Hughes and Stone, 1999: 987). The notion of ethnicity 
embodied in the new textbooks was radically different: 
the Society volume has a whole sub-chapter under the title "We are all 
Taiwanese" [ӎ࡮௳ݶ͔ᝰʇ (Wǒmen dōu shì Táiwānrén)]. It also 
departs form the established categorization of those who can trace their 
origins to Fujian or to Hakka ancestry as belonging to the Han ethnic 
group, by dividing the population into the four ethnic groups [Hoklo, 
Hakka, Mainlanders, and Aborigines]. (1999: 986) 
At the same time as the middle school social science textbooks were revised, a new 
course was introduced into the primary school curriculum, starting in 3rd Grade. The 
Native Place Teaching Activities (NPTA) sought to integrate the “study of students’ local 
living environment” and each county was expected “edit and publish its own textbooks 
for NPTA” (Liu and Hung, 2002: 573). These were similar to the new middle school 
books in purpose, but focused even more specifically on the local region. Unfortunately, 
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these textbooks were written at a level far above that of most of the students for which 
they were intended. Lu Hsin-yi offers two good explanations of why these books were so 
difficult: the first being that they were written by university professors who knew little 
about primary education; the second was that “the course content was mostly new to the 
school teachers” themselves (Lu, 2002: 51). My own fieldwork confirms Lu’s 
observations. The NPTA textbooks for Hualian County were still in use when I arrived at 
Fountainhead Primary. The texts were far beyond the reading level of most of the 
primary school students. When I asked the school’s principal about the suitability of the 
textbooks she replied: “We didn’t write them.” 
 The third period of educational reform coincides with the rise to power of 
Taiwan’s first opposition party president, Chen Shui-bien ௿̑ݛ (Chén Shuǐbiǎn), but 
the policy is one that was already under development during the last years of Lee 
Teng-hui’s rule. In 1968, in his “Memo on Educational Reform” «ࡔ๙૦ԯٍิ՗ො» 
(Géxīn jiàoyù zhùyì shìxiàng), President Chiang Kai-shek had centralized and unified the 
production of Taiwan’s textbooks and curriculum standards (Lu, 2002: 47). This 
remained the state of affairs until 1996, when private companies were allowed to publish 
books as well, although they needed to be approved by the MOE before they could be 
used (Liu and Hung: 572). The new 9-year Integrated Curriculum Plan for Elementary 
and Junior High Schools ʄϷɿௗ (jiǔnián yíguàn, henceforth referred to as the 9-year 
Curriculum), however, seeks to decentralize the education system, giving much greater 
power to regional Education ministries, schools, and especially to classroom teachers.  
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This curriculum plan is widely regarded as a turning point for curriculum 
decentralization because it involves the replacement of the previous 
curriculum standards by non-prescriptive curriculum guidelines, while the 
centralized and prescriptive national curriculum will be replaced by 
school-based curricula (Liu and Hung, 2002: 574). 
These changes are not all entirely welcomed by the teachers themselves. More 
responsibility means more work. There is a general feeling I observed amongst 
schoolteachers and parents that curriculum reforms served political agendas, not the 
needs of students and teachers.  
 The move towards decentralization is in many ways a continuation of Lee 
Teng-hui’s localization program as it was initially envisioned. At the same time, it is also 
a strategy to deflect the criticism and controversy raised by the first stage of curriculum 
reform in the 90s. Which were accused of being “full of ideology and political 
motivation,” and were associated with the movement for Taiwanese independence (Lu, 
2002: 50). By focusing on local communities rather than the nation as a whole, the new 
curriculum is able to appear less politicized. The holistic approach of the new 9-year 
Curriculum calls for teachers and schools to find their own ways to integrate the “special 
characteristics” ॑׸  (tèxìng) of their own community into the curriculum. This 
effectively extends the goals of localization while attempting to insulate the national 
government from debates about curriculum ideology. 
 
The 9-Year Curriculum 
The new curriculum’s name derives from the fact that it seeks to integrate all nine years 
of compulsory education into a single developmental program. Previously, the six years 
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of primary school and the three years of middle school were considered separately. This 
division was further highlighted by the taking of a national exam at the end of primary 
school that determined which middle school a child would attend. Another exam at the 
end of middle school was similarly important for determining high school placement, 
dividing students between those who would go to vocational college and those who 
would go on to high school and (hopefully) university. However, as Taiwan’s middle 
class has expanded, so too have the educational aspirations of the population. In addition 
to the reforms included in the 9-year Curriculum (discussed below), there has been a 
tremendous expansion in the number of colleges and universities, both public and private. 
In 1988 there were 496,530 college students in Taiwan, by 2003 that number had gone up 
to 1,270,194 (Government Information Office, 2004). 
 Although still constantly being revised in response to parents and teacher’s 
concerns, central to the entire reform process are efforts to reduce the importance of the 
Joint College Entrance Exams ʩዖᑸЩ (JCEE, dàxué liánkǎo), taken at the end of 
high school. These exams have been criticized for the “washback effect” they have upon 
the entire educational process (Lii-Shih, 1994). The entire curriculum is geared towards 
teaching for the exams. This results in the emphasis of easily memorizable and testable 
facts over basic skills and ideas. In language education it encourages grammar and 
translation approaches over those that emphasize communicative competence (Lii-Shih, 
2002). Although students can still take the exams that mark each transition in the 
educational process, they can now also use other methods, such as applying directly to 
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their school of choice (as is the norm in the United States), as well as a third option of 
Selection by Recommendation૖ᕎၝ᎛ (tuījiànzhēnxuǎn).  
The selection by recommendation method calls for recommendations by 
senior high schools on the student's behalf. Each senior high school will 
have a quota of students they can recommend. (Government Information 
Office, 2003b) 
Students opting to use alternative methods of advancement will still have to take tests, 
but these differ from the JCEE in emphasizing the testing of skills over information. 
Accordingly, the new 9-year Curriculum seeks to expand the ways in which students are 
evaluated, as well as the content of the curriculum itself.  
 It is not surprising that many of the new educational reforms reflect the thinking 
of educational reformers in the United States, as many of the people leading the reform 
process, indeed many of Taiwan’s leaders, have been educated in the United States. 
Central to these changes is a shift from subject based teaching (i.e. math, history, social 
science, etc.) to an interdisciplinary program that focuses on “basic skills” (Liu and Hung, 
2002: 574). A concrete example of what this might mean was provided by a first grade 
teacher at a school meeting: Each week there might be a “theme” which unifies class 
activities. One such theme might be “summer.” Students would learn science by studying 
butterflies and summer ecology, they would learn math by counting butterflies, or 
estimating their population, etc. and they would learn social science by studying activities 
that traditionally happen in the community during the summer (field notes, March 7, 
2001). The weekly schedule would reflect these changes, no longer being divided up into 
set time slots for each subject, but, instead, divided into chunks of time that could be 
devoted to exploring a concept fully. For instance, a full two weeks might be devoted to 
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trying to explore a math problem from different angles, if the teacher felt that to be 
appropriate (field notes, March 7, 2001). Linked to this holistic approach is an attempt to 
tie classroom activity more closely to the community. Decentralization and localization 
are thus tied together in both the content and the process of creating the new curriculum. 
 
Localization and Cultural Consumption 
The clearest example of cultural policy functioning as a form of corruption, in the 
Gramscian sense (see Chapter 2), comes from Lu Hsin-yi’s work on the creation of local 
culture in Taiwan (Lu, 2002). Drawing on Lu’s work, I argue that localization should be 
seen as a means by which local elites are co-opted by the state. In doing so I do not intend 
to disparage the place-based social movements that gave rise to Taiwan’s localization 
policies; rather, I simply examine the ways in which the demands of cultural activists 
have been appropriated by the state.9 Lu makes clear that cultural research was used by 
the KMT (and, I would add, the Japanese before them) as a means to incorporate local 
elites into the state as early as 1948, just a year after the February 28th incident. For thirty 
years, from 1950 to 1980, most of the historical research on Taiwan’s local history was 
conducted at the Taiwan Provincial Archive Center͔ᝰ̂ᙌֵ࢝๢ (Táiwān wénxiàn 
wěiyuánhuì), which was established in 1948. The center has been described as “an easy 
workplace with almost no political significance” other than providing jobs for the local 
elite (Lu, 2002:52). 
 Even post-reform era cultural construction, such as the famous indigenization 
efforts of Ilan county’s government and its successors, while originated in opposition to 
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the central government, were still far from “grassroots” mobilizations. If anything, they 
seemed to be a means of attracting back educated locals who had left their villages to 
seek better paying careers in Taipei. 
Most of my cultural-worker friends in Ilan were newcomers or return 
migrants form Taipei. Some of them were successful professionals in 
Taipei, tired of living an uprooted life style and delighted to have a chance 
to come home without having to settle for unskilled jobs as did their 
parents' generation. Their experiences of return were not all positive, 
however. Some of them soon realized that Ilan's cultural construction was 
based on political maneuvering and did not really emerge from the 
"grassroots." Once the political wind changed direction, the policy would 
soon collapse. (2002: 103) 
Allen Chun traces the emergence of local cultural production to the establishment of a 
Committee for Cultural Reconstruction̂ˣ݀௏ֵ࢝๢ (Wénhuà jiànshè wèiyuánhuì, 
now known in English as the Council for Cultural Affairs)  in 1981 (Chun, 1994: 65). 
Cultural Reconstruction replaced the Cultural Renaissance movement ̂ˣ౮፟ར੃ 
(wénhuà fùxīng yùndòng) which had been inaugurated by Chiang Kai-shek in 1967, in 
response to the Cultural Revolution̂ˣʩࡔ֢ (wénhuà dàgémìng) on the mainland 
(1994: 57). Chun argues that the political use of culture to shore up Chinese nationalism 
in Taiwan “was simply the first step in a long-term process to objectify (and 
'commodify') culture” (1994: 58), paving the way for the culture-as-commodity approach 
implicit in the localization of the reform era. However, unlike the Cultural Renaissance 
movement, 
cultural reconstruction was meant to be explicitly 'non-political' in 
orientation and as such regularly sponsored cultural interchange of various 
sorts. Cultural centres [̂ˣˁ˼ (wénhuà zhōngxīn)] were set up in each 
township to organize and promote cultural activities. They were 
responsible not only for cultivating the broader view of Chinese tradition 
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but also for promoting interest in and preservation of local traditions of 
culture during this era of reconstruction coincided with the development of 
'the culture industry' in Taiwan in other regards - e.g., tourism, media 
commercialization, public festivals and popular arts. (1994: 65-66) 
Concepts of leisure and tourism were widely promoted as a sign of Taiwan’s progress 
and prosperity (Harrell, 1994). 
 Lu’s study provides us with a detailed look at the production of local culture in 
the town of Baimi, now famous for its wooden clogs. These wooden clogs, known as 
mujỉ࣋ (mùjī), were introduced to Taiwan during the Japanese era, but Baimi was 
only a center of muji production from 1955 to 1961 when a craftsman setup shop there 
(Lu, 2002: 121). As Lu shows, Baimi’s fame for its muji production was entirely 
manufactured through the collaboration of the central government, local cultural workers, 
and the media; all eager to glorify local culture. The choice of muji as the cultural symbol 
of Baimi was entirely arbitrary; it could easily have been an old cement factory, the 
decision being made by a local committee (2002: 117).  
 Lu refers to muji as an example of “spectacle consumerism” or “making 
something for display,” which she says is a “basic requirement to obtain and renew 
government funding” (2002: 123). In 1997, Baimi received two million NT dollars to 
promote muji manufacture, money that was used to create an exhibition hall and a studio 
(2002: 121). Lu is skeptical of claims that the newly founded muji industry is able to 
sustain itself through tourist revenue, reporting that in 1998 and 1999, “at least one third 
of the clogs were distributed through governmental promotion” (2002: 127). Overall, 
Baimi received “over ten million NT,” about US$30,000, “to develop its unprofitable 
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wooden clog industry,” with most of the money going to “support a unique profession of 
‘community planners’” (2002: 164-65).  
 Throughout my time in Taiwan, I continually observed the modern relics of such 
spectacle consumerism. Community centers, libraries, museums, etc. all having sprouted 
up in recent years in order to seize upon government money to promote local culture, but 
most of these sites were largely empty, locked up and unused. 
 
Learning Native Languages 
Until the 90s, Taiwan’s languages had been referred to by the government as “dialects” 
̅Զ (fāngyán), with the rise of identity-based politics in the 80s, this began to change 
and the terms “mother tongue” ͺდ (mǔyǔ) or “native language” ͵ʦდԶ (běntǔ 
yǔyán) began to be used instead (Sandel, 2003: 530). This was part of a concerted effort 
to sever the association of these languages with “backwardness, vulgarity, ignorance, 
femininity, aging, and so on” (Hsiau, 1997: 308). These stereotypes were perpetuated by 
the nature of Hoklo programming on Television and Radio, most of which was targeted 
at a poorer and more rural audience. The amount of native language programming had 
also been limited by requirements established in 1976 that Mandarin should account for 
no less than 55 percent of radio broadcasts and 70 percent of television air time (1997: 
308). Ending these restrictions had been one of the aims of the 1988 Return My Mother 
Tongue protest by Hakka speakers in Taipei. They were finally lifted in May of 1990 
(Hsiau, 2000: 133). Native language education was a part of the political platform of the 
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DPP in the 1989 elections, in which a number of DPP candidates swept into power in 
mayoral and county magistrate elections (Hsiau, 1997: 311; Sandel, 2003: 530).  
 Behind these political movements was an intellectual movement for nativist 
literature that had begun in the 1960s, but which had roots in the nativist literary 
experiments during the Japanese era (see Chapter 4). During the 1950s any kind of social 
realism was considered suspect by the anti-Communist KMT, who favored modernism 
and tended to ignore rural issues (Bain, 1993: 96). Moreover, because of the potentially 
fatal consequence of writing in Hoklo, and the limited Mandarin proficiency in Mandarin 
on the part of most of the native elite, most of the writers in the early post-war years were 
Mainlanders (Hsiau, 2000: 80). In the 1960s a new generation of writers began to 
question the “Westernism” of contemporary literature by writing stories set in rural 
Taiwan, idealizing the Taiwanese farmer as a bastion of traditional values under attack by 
modernization (Bain, 1993: 97). This new Hsiangtu බʦ (xiāngtǔ) literature was highly 
controversial and was attacked for provoking class divisions (1993: 104). In the 1970s 
this took on stronger political overtones when the writing was renamed the Bentu͵ʦ 
(běntǔ) literature by members of the Li poetry society, emphasizing the unique history of 
Taiwan as opposed to Mainland China (Hsiau, 2000: 86). 
 Few of the nativist literature writers used the local vernaculars, but wrote in 
Mandarin instead. One exception was the poet Lin Tsung-yuanع׆ກ (Lín Zōngyuán) 
who used Hoklo “phrases and syntax” in Mandarin poems written during the 1960s, and 
then began writing in “pure Hoklo” in the 1970s (2000: 136). In 1984 a Taiwanese 
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historian residing in Japan wrote an essay in a Taiwanese journal “on the relationship 
between the Taiwanese language and Taiwanese literature” (2000: 136); but it was not 
until 1987 that a Taiwanese writer openly advocated creating a modern Hoklo literature. 
This was Sung Tse-lai’s Үጏ൦ (Sòng Zélái) essay “On the Issue of Writing in Hoklo” 
ሿ͔დ̂ϫˣ੖ᖆ (Tán Táiyǔ wénzìhuà wèntí) (2000: 137). As there had been during 
the Japanese era, a debate ensued about whether or not a Hoklo literature should be 
written in Chinese characters or entirely in phonetic script, this debate still rages today, 
but “for the past decade, a mixture of these two writing forms has been the most popular 
way to write Hoklo” (2000: 138). 
 During this time the use of local languages in political speeches become more and 
more common. In 1987  
A prominent DPP member of the Legislative Yuan, Chu Kao-chen, used 
Hoklo instead of Mandarin to address a session in March. As a defiant 
legislator of the newly-established opposition party, Chu deliberately 
spoke Hoklo to embarrass KMT Mainlander cabinet officials and old 
permanent legislators. Chu's challenge exposed the fact that Mainlander 
political elite could not understand and were unwilling to learn the major 
local language, though they had lived on the island for nearly forty years. 
(2000: 132) 
Since that time, speaking local languages has become essential for political success on 
the national stage in Taiwan. Prominent Mainland politicians, such as Taipei Mayor Ma 
Ying-jeou ਡࠢʄ (Mǎ Yīngjiǔ), and presidential hopeful James Soong Ү๥ະ (Sòng 
Chǔyú), have made a public show of their own efforts to study Hoklo. I once saw a T.V. 
show in which Ma Ying-jiu was practicing his Hoklo with people on the street in Taipei, 
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and the books used by James Soong to study Hoklo became best sellers. Code-switching 
into local languages has also become de-rigueur (Chen, 2003: 116-17; Lii-Shih, 1998).  
 There were a total of six municipalities that sought to implement native language 
education10 after the 1989 elections (Hsiau, 2000: 138), the most famous being Ilan, 
Kaohsiung, and Taipei. Because of the rigidity of the national curriculum at this time, 
mother tongue classes, as well as teaching local history, was introduced during periods 
usually reserved for electives. This meant that only an hour or two a week were spent on 
language education, and that the time would often be missed altogether when pressure 
from exams or other events caused the electives to be canceled. On top of this, limited 
budgets, poorly trained teachers, and inadequate teaching materials made these early 
efforts quite limited (2000: 133). And when the political fortunes of the DPP changed in 
those municipalities, the native language curriculum was often the first casualty.  
 Native language education finally became a part of the national curriculum with 
the announcement of the 9-year Curriculum in 1999. The program was to be phased in 
slowly, starting with the first grade in 2001, second and third grade in 2002, and all of 
middle school the following year (Sandel, 2003: 530). Which languages would be taught 
would depend on the ethnic composition of the local community. The number of hours 
remained small, still only an hour or two a week. Because the 9-year Curriculum’s 
schedule is more flexible, the fact that these courses are no longer “elective” does little to 
ensure that they would always be taught. The opening up of text book publishing means 
that there is tremendous competition amongst private publishers to produce new materials 
for these courses, but the quality is often questionable. The situation is better for Hoklo, 
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which is now widely heard in the mainstream media, but for Taiwan’s minority languages, 
especially Austronesian languages, there is still a dearth of reading material and even 
popular culture. Despite the fact that so many Aborigines are successful pop-music 
personalities, very few of them sing in Austronesian languages. Recently a group 
organized a competition with the hopes of rectifying the situation (Hsueh, 2004). For 
many Aborigines, once they gain literacy the only texts they can read in their mother 
tongue are religious texts provided by the Church. There are programs underway to train 
teachers, with the goal of only having certified teachers teaching native languages; 
however, in the meantime schools must rely upon native speakers either among the 
faculty or within the local community. Because of the limited number of hours, poor 
materials, and inadequately trained teachers, only communities which already have strong 
speech communities in the native language are likely to be able to adequately teach the 
language in the schools. But one of the biggest challenges faced by native language 
educators is the fact that they must compete with the simultaneous introduction of 
English education into the primary school curriculum. 
 
Conclusion 
I started this chapter by arguing that the emergence of a new ideology in which 
Taiwanese identity is seen as a series of concentric circles radiating outward from the 
local level can only be understood as the result of a passive revolution engineered by the 
native elite within the KMT, simultaneously overthrowing official Chinese nationalism, 
and avoiding the threat of an emergent Taiwanese nationalism which sought to replace it. 
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I then laid out the basics of this new multicultural ideology, and explored its effect on 
Taiwan’s language markets. What is missing is the history of ethnic and class formation 
which shaped the current situation. In order to fully understand the new ideology as a 
form of passive revolution, it is necessary to first fully understand the nature of the 
historical bloc which this revolution overthrew, as well as the sources of social power 
which gave the native elite sufficient leverage to enact this transformation, but not 
enough leverage to impose Taiwanese nationalism. In the following two chapters I lay 
out this history, starting, in Chapter 3, with the initial emergence of a native elite in the 
eighteenth and eighteenth centuries, followed, in Chapter 4, by the transformations that 
took place under Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945), and during the early years of KMT 
rule (1945-1987). I argue that the historical bloc which took place during the very end of 
the Qing era, in the 1890s, and was solidified and expanded under the Japanese. When 
the KMT took over they adopted not just the institutions of the previous era, but the 
political economic structure as well. At the same time, it was also in the end of the 
nineteenth century that a strong and independent rural gentry class began to emerge. 
Throughout the Japanese and KMT eras attempts to forcibly suppress the aspirations of 
this class met with failure, leading to concessions, compromise, and greater integration of 
this class at the end of the Qing, Japanese, and KMT eras. In each era, I use language and 
education policy as a means of gauging the status, aspirations, and ideology of the 
various segments of society. Then, in Chapter 5 I look at linguistic globalization, 
including English language policy and roman orthography for Chinese characters to 
explore whether globalization might not once and for all change the balance of power.  
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Notes 
 
1 Ruled from 1723 to 1735. 
2 Based on map by Taiwan’s Government Information Office (Government 
Information Office, 2003a). 
3 Source: (Council on Indigenous Peoples, 2004b), with the exception of the 
Truku population which is based on the much larger number listed here (Council on 
Indigenous Peoples, 2004a).  
4 With the exception of Saisiyat and Tsou, these numbers are based on the 
estimated percentage of the population over the age of 50. For Taiwan’s Aborigine 
population as a whole this is 17% (16.59%) (Council on Indigenous Peoples, 2004c). 
Accordingly, this percentage was used to estimate the number of people over 50 for each 
ethnic group. The reasoning behind this number comes from Greg Huteson who argues 
that although some of the younger generation can understand the language of their 
parents, very few use it (Huteson, personal communication, 2003). While no method is 
perfect, this seems better than survey data, since self-reported use is notoriously 
unreliable (Huteson, 2002). The two exceptions are based on communication between 
Huteson and scholars who have done fieldwork with those populations which suggests 
that a much smaller percentage of these populations still speaks the language (Huteson, 
personal communication, 2003). The estimated population is provided in brackets for 
those two populations. 
5 The high end estimates are from the Ethnologue database, compiled by the 
Summer Institute of Lingustics. (Summer Institute of Linguistics, 2004). Many of these 
are from 1993, which is why the number of speakers sometimes exceeds the 2004 
population.  
6 This group actually includes the Seediq (ᒯᅮѠ૰), who see themselves as 
distinct (Ko, 2003). 
7 Also known as Tao (སࣨ૰). 
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8 Those six municipalities were Ilan ׉ᚲ (Yílán), Kaohsiung ਣූ (Gāoxióng), 
Taipei, Pingtung ܴس (Píngdōng), Hsinchu ๙Т (Xīnzhú), and Changhwa ࿺ˣ 
(Zhānghuà). 
9 Lu offers an useful discussion of the debates between critics (such as David 
Harvey) and proponents (such as Arif Derlik) of place based social movements (Lu, 
2002: 20-22). My goal is not to criticize or promote such movements, but to understand 
their role in shaping Taiwanese nationalist ideology. 
10 This is sometimes referred to as “bilingual education” (Hsiau, 2000; Sandel, 
2003), but this is a misnomer. By law, apart from language classes Mandarin is always 
the medium of instruction. In Taiwan, “bilingual education” usually refers to private 
schools which teach subjects in both English and Mandarin (see Chapter 5). 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRANSFORMATIONS UNDER THE QING: CLASS FORMATION, ETHNIC 
RELATIONS, AND EDUCATION 
 
Introduction 
In order to understand the history of education in Taiwan under the Qing, it is necessary 
to understand it in its historical context: as a source of legitimation for the imperial 
Chinese state, and the basis for the authority of the gentry. In this chapter I will explore 
the historical forces that prevented the development of a strong upper gentry in Taiwan 
and how this hindered the development of traditional Confucian education. In the 
Chinese heartland, elite held power through corporate control of property by strong clan 
lineages. In Taiwan, as we will see, the lack of strong kinship networks combined with a 
tripartite system of landownership worked against the establishment of similar sources of 
social power. Central to this discussion will be the role of Taiwan’s Aborigine population. 
Not only did Aborigine relations shape Taiwan’s land policies, but Aborigines 
themselves were also the beneficiaries of some of the state’s most ambitious education 
policies. Finally, I will look at the important ways that elite class formation shaped, not 
only relations between Aborigines and Han immigrants, but also the often-violent 
relations between different Han ethnic groups. In doing so I hope to provide a portrait, 
not only of ethnic and class formation at the dawn of Japanese rule, but of the underlying 
forces which shaped pre-colonial Taiwanese society. 
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The Origin of the Confucian System in Taiwan 
It was not the Qing who first introduced the Confucian examination system to Taiwan. It 
was their sworn enemy, Zheng Cheng-gong ቸϿ̸ (Zhèng Chénggōng), whose family 
ruled Taiwan from 1661 till 1683 as a base for their military opposition to the Qing. 
Zheng was a self-styled Ming loyalist who sought to recapture China from the “foreign” 
Manchu dynasty. The Ming emperor was still the figurehead of the Confucian system put 
in place by Zheng, but Zheng himself was their temporary representative till the dynasty 
was restored (Shepherd, 1993: 96). In 1666, the Zheng regime established a full-fledged 
examination system, as well as Taiwan’s first Confucian school (Lee, 1995: 32, 97).  
 The primary target of Zheng’s examination system was its own ruling elite and 
clan leaders, whose power was legitimated by the exams and associated Confucian rituals. 
But there was also a proselytizing element, as can be seen from the fact that some 
Confucian schools were even established in Aborigine villages (one even established by a 
prominent Ming official who taught Aborigines the art of Chinese medicine), and 
students were even exempted from corvée labor to encourage their studies (Shepherd, 
1993: 103). The importance of Confucian education for the Aborigines was perhaps 
greater than it was for the Chinese immigrants and soldiers, as the latter were already 
indoctrinated into the values of the Confucian state, while many Aborigines had been 
exposed to protestant missionary education during the previous forty years of Dutch rule1. 
As Shepherd says, “teaching the Chinese classics to natives who had learned to speak 
Dutch and to write their own languages in roman script was nevertheless an important 
step in their sinicization and continued submission to Cheng rule” (1993: 103). 
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 Aborigines greatly outnumbered the Chinese, even with the 70,000 troops that 
followed the Zheng to Taiwan when he personally arrived in 1670 (1993: 96). But they 
were hardly a unified force and those living in the Western plains (where the Chinese 
settled) were subject to Chinese “tax farmers” who competed for the right to levy taxes, a 
right that also gave them a monopoly over the declining, but still lucrative trade in deer 
products. These Chinese traders and tax collectors, many of whom may have held a 
similar position under the Dutch, were a tyrannical lot whose abuse of their tremendous 
power in the Aborigine villages had been the cause of many an uprising (1993: 14, 77, 
115). But the Zheng regime made relatively few incursions into Aborigine land, having 
been quick to recognize the land claims which Aborigines had established under the 
Dutch (1993: 97).  
 Despite his desire to avoid antagonizing the Aborigines, Zheng was also under 
intense pressure to placate his numerous troops when they were not fighting. Drawn from 
the ranks of the miserable peasants and fisherman of China’s southeastern coastal regions, 
their ranks swelled when the Qing ordered the entire population to move inland several 
miles from the coast behind fortified walls (1993: 96). Zheng’s solution was to establish 
military colonies on which soldiers were encouraged to farm.2 Not until the Nationalists 
(KMT) would arrive in the wake of World War Two would Taiwan’s political economy 
be so similarly tooled for war against the mainland. Sugarcane production, which had 
grown in importance as an export under the Dutch, was cut back in favor of the 
subsistence production of grain (Ka, 1995: 13). But in 1683 the Qing arrived with an 
overwhelming force, and put an end to two decades of Zheng rule. 
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The Settlement of Taiwan 
Over the course of two hundred years a steadily increasing immigrant population laid 
claim to a rapidly diminishing supply of unclaimed land. Only the subjugation of the 
indigenous population could expand the supply of this precious resource. But doing so 
threatened the stability of this ill guarded frontier region where foreign powers were 
known to seek influence and provoke unrest. Moreover, ethnic unrest among the 
immigrant population made Taiwan’s Aborigines useful allies of the state. The state 
sought a compromise that would encourage the settlement of the island without 
antagonizing the local population. In doing so, it formed a unique system of land 
ownership that had the perverse effect of weakening state power in Taiwan and 
encouraged factional violence. 
 War had thinned the ranks of Zheng’s army, but there were still 40,000 troops 
remaining on the island when the Qing arrived. All of the defeated soldiers were shipped 
back home (Shepherd, 1993: 96). Taiwan had seemingly been returned to the Aborigines, 
but it was only a temporary aberration. “Taiwan's Chinese population increased from 
about one hundred thousand in 1683 ... to almost two million by 1811. By 1895, this 
population had risen to nearly three million, although natural increase rather than 
immigration accounted for much of the later growth” (Lamley, 1981: 292). This massive 
migration to Taiwan was but one of many migrations (many of which were much larger 
in scale) caused by the population explosion on the Mainland. “The peace and prosperity 
following the consolidation of Ch’ing rule resulted in the growth of the Chinese 
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population from at most 150 million in 1650 to 270 million by 1776” (Shepherd, 1993: 
4).  
 In an effort to control the immigrant population, the Qing vainly attempted to 
institute legal restrictions. Although a series of policy reversals on allowing or banning 
immigration entirely seems to have had little effect (Shepherd, 1993: 140-41), the Qing 
did have more of an impact with their restriction on families, albeit with unintended 
consequences. By restricting the immigration of families the Qing hoped to do two 
things: first, keep migration seasonal, forcing the men to return home when the farming 
season was done, and secondly, to control the immigrant population by retaining the 
possibility of retaliating against their kin in the event of crime or insurrection. The direct 
result of these restrictions was that most of the migrants were men until the ban was 
finally lifted in 1795 (Lee, 1995: 43). The resultant roving bands of unmarried men were 
later seen as one of the major causes of social unrest. Shepherd notes that “much of the 
debate on immigration policy was conducted in terms that asked whether bachelors or 
families would be more law-abiding on the frontier or whether it was ethical to keep 
families divided, rather than focusing on the desirability of further reclamation or even 
the economic problems of the southeast coast where the migrants originated” (Shepherd, 
1993: 139). It is not surprising that recent genetic studies have shown a remarkable 
amount of mixing between the Han and Aborigine gene pools (Stainton, 1999: 40). 
 The Qing similarly went through a series of reversals in their policy towards the 
settlement of Aborigine land. On the one hand, those who sought to encourage 
immigration and land reclamation as a means to extend the rule of law to the unruly 
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frontier. While, on the other hand, there were those who advocated protecting Aborigine 
land from encroachment, and setting strict limits on immigration (Shepherd, 1993: 16-18). 
The local administration, often in response to Aborigine rebellion, routinely ordered 
surveys of the boundary between Han and Aborigine settlement, as well as the 
construction of huge earthen walls to mark the limits of permissible Han settlement. Each 
time the surveys simply acknowledged the previous boundary transgressions as a fait 
accompli, and did little to halt future movement across the boundary.  
 Qing policy towards the Taiwanese was heavily influenced by their encounters in 
other peripheral regions of the Qing, such as Yunnan and Quanzhouޜϴ (Quánzhōu). 
But it was also shaped by the existing relations that had initially been established by the 
Dutch, and were continued through the Zheng era. The Formosan Aborigines 
encountered by the Dutch were the descendants of peoples who had been living on the 
island as far back as 4,500 BCE (Thorne 1997: 83-85). At the dawn of the seventeenth 
century there still existed over 19 language groups (see Chapter 1), with significant 
variation between those groups in both cultural practices such as the nature of kinship 
relations and the size of individual communities, as well as differences in material culture 
that largely matched the geographic distribution of the communities. Still, there was 
considerable similarity as well, with society being based mostly on “swidden cultivation 
of millet … hunting of deer … and fishing" (Shepherd, 1993: 29). Warfare was common, 
as well as headhunting, but villages also had peaceful contact and would inter-marry 
(1993: 29). The deer population, whose trade had been so important for the Dutch, was 
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beginning to dwindle by the Qing era and the former hunting grounds were quickly 
opened up for Chinese settlement.  
 In discussing the Aborigines, the distinctions used by the Qing were the same that 
they used wherever they encountered indigenous populations: Raw · (shēng) and 
Cookedᇉ (shú), a distinction that ostensibly referred to how “civilized” the indigenous 
people were, meaning how sinicized. In practice, those living in the plains tended to be 
more “cooked” than those in the mountains, although not necessarily so. Although 
scholars such as Jack Goody (Goody and Watt, 1968) have attributed this distinction to 
the presence or lack of literacy in the population, the Taiwanese case seems to suggest 
that it was the willingness to pay taxes and enter into military alliances with the Qing that 
earned Aborigines the “cooked” designation. This is shown by the “Song of the Sinicized 
Aborigine”: 
Knowing that officials are in the city,  
[they] go before the yamen and bow.  
Twittering like birds -- no Chinese understands; 
uncomprehended, [they] gesture to make pictures. (Martin, 1994: 54) 
 
Literacy often came later, when their allegiance was rewarded with schooling, a topic we 
will return to later. Still, the records show that many Aborigines were literate at the time, 
with some even using the Romanized script they had learned from the Dutch a hundred 
years earlier to translate Chinese land contracts before signing (Shepherd, 1993: 252-53). 
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The Ownership and Reclamation of Land 
Central to understanding Taiwan’s agrarian economy, is the unique system of 
dual-ownership that developed “through the process of frontier land reclamation,” so well 
documented by John Shepherd. 
Wealthy and well-connected persons acquired government land patents 
allowing them to reclaim large tracts of wasteland and obligating them to 
pay land taxes once the land was reclaimed. Some land-grant holders 
invested in reclaiming the land, built irrigation canals and terraces, and 
recruited immigrant settlers as ordinary tenants. In other cases the tenants 
themselves invested labor and capital in reclaiming the land and thereby 
acquired a right of permanent tenancy. These reclaiming tenants could not 
be evicted as long as they paid the patent holder a large-rent fixed in 
perpetuity; this right of permanent tenancy was called the small-rent right. 
In many communities, neighboring civilized aborigine tribes, rather than 
wealthy Chinese, held the land patent rights ... (Shepherd, 1993: 8-9) 
Over the course of the Qing period, the power of the small-rent holder gradually came to 
eclipse that of the large-rent holder, and brought with it a commensurate change in 
Taiwan’s class and ethnic relations.  
 The emergence of a tripartite land ownership system (large-rent, small-rent, and 
tenants) in Taiwan looks superficially similar to similar arrangements that arose on the 
Mainland. However, on the mainland the “owner/taxpayer” was often forced to sell 
partial title to the land in exchange for having their taxes paid or reduced for them 
through the personal connections of an official who therefore gained rights to the land. In 
Taiwan, on the other hand, the small-rent holder gained rights in perpetuity to the land for 
a fixed fee and gained power by himself becoming a rentier (Ka, 1995: 26). This meant 
that when the tripartite system declined, towards the end of the Qing period, in favor of a 
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dual ownership system (finally recognized as such during the Japanese era), it was these 
peasant landlords, rather than the upper gentry whose power was solidified.  
 The small-rent holder had numerous advantages. The large-rent holder frequently 
lacked the resources, knowledge, or simply the desire to do the work necessary to reclaim 
the land. Whether because they were cash-poor Aborigines, with little experience at 
wet-field agriculture, or because they were urban gentry who were only in it as an 
investment, the net result was that the small-rent holder would front the money, 
knowledge, and labor necessary to make the land profitable. The small-rent holder could 
lease land to tenants on a yearly basis as well as collect half of the produce as tribute, 
while the large-rent owner only received his fixed income, upon which he had to pay tax 
(Chen, 1999: 139-40).  
From the 1780s onward, many resident secondary leasing agents replaced 
the absentee primary leasing agents as the managerial class and major 
source of rural capital and loans, effectively making them the dominant 
social class in the countryside. Whenever primary leasing agents were in 
need of cash they would pawn their ownership rights to rich peasants (that 
is, the farm managers). Thus, the relationship between the proprietor and 
the tenant farm managers emerged into one of leaser and banker. As a 
result, the ownership rights of proprietors, particularly among the 
aborigines, gradually slipped into the hands of the farm managers. (1999: 
138-39). 
Ka further elaborates on the sources of small-renter power: 
He was (1) the organizer of land reclamation, (2) the leader of hired militia 
that made possible the invasion of aboriginal land and protection of tenant 
farmers against aborigine attack, (3) the provider of initial expenses during 
land reclamation, and (4) the coinvestor in irrigation systems. (1995: 21). 
For absentee landlords this system simply meant that they continued to receive a fixed 
income while the renter was able to make a considerable profit; however, where 
69 
Aborigines were the landowners, this meant that they lost control of their land. In both 
cases, the right to a steady fixed rent eventually withered away.  
 Not all Aborigines lost everything. Some successfully entered the landlord class, 
and in the process adopted Chinese names, customs (including ancestor worship and the 
maintenance of family genealogies), and even wives (Chen, 1999: 153; Shepherd, 1993: 
389). But most were simply unable to make the transition to the new agricultural methods 
and associated lifestyle changes. Already in 1748 there are found reports describing 
“‘civilized’ aborigines as ‘impoverished’” (Shepherd, 1993: 274). Eventually, the 
pressure became too much, and groups of Aborigine villages migrated en-mass to the 
unsettled plains in Ilan ׉ᚲ (Yílán), on the northeast coast, and the Puli ࢩՎ (Pǔlǐ) 
basin in Central Taiwan in 1804 and 1823 respectively (1993: 358).3  
 One way that the Qing state dealt with the pressures facing the Aborigines was to 
create Aborigine military colonies. Starting in 1787, these colonies were set up along the 
Han-Aborigine border, ostensibly to protect the border from Raw Aborigine raids; 
however, for most of the early nineteenth century these Aborigine troops were used to 
suppress ethnic feuding amongst the Han settlers (1993: 333, 357). Only towards the end 
of the Qing period were they mobilized against the Raw Aborigines (1993: 357). The use 
of Aborigines in this manner was so common that when the Qing nearly lost Taiwan to 
the Lin Shuangwen Uprising عୃ̂˄෪ (Lín Shuǎngwén zhī luàn) of 1786-7, 2,000 
Aborigine military colonists from Sichuan joined the 50,000 mainland troops that were 
called in to quell the rebels (1993: 324, 334). In the next section we will explore the 
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nature of the many rebellions as well as the communal strife that engulfed Taiwan for so 
much of its early history. 
 
Rebellion and Ethnic Violence 
The frequency of rebellions, riots, and ethnic feuds in Qing Dynasty Taiwan is often 
commented upon with a reference to the saying “every three years an uprising; every five 
years a rebellion” (Kerr, 1965: 4), and indeed, the sheer extent of violence is truly 
remarkable: “From 1684 to 1895, 159 major incidents of civil disturbances rocked 
Taiwan, including 74 armed clashes and 65 uprisings led by wanderers. During the 120 
years from 1768 to 1887, approximately 57 armed clashes occurred, 47 of which broke 
out from 1768 to 1860.” (Chen, 1999: 136). In classifying these outbreaks, the Qing state 
did not distinguish between communal conflict amongst local communities and uprisings 
against the state, both of which were viewed as rebellions (Lamley, 1981: 309). As we 
will see, there is some logic to grouping them together. First of all, “Taiwan's most 
serious rebellions of the Ch'ing period … all involved subethnic strife” (1981: 307).4 
And, secondly, both did emerge out of tensions between state and local power. Local 
elites were forced by the weakness of the state to turn to village elders, regional 
organizations, strongmen, and secret societies in order to secure their power (Chen, 1999: 
145). The state, in turn, exploited local factional divisions to maintain control of the 
island, with the unintended consequence of conflagrating these tensions.  
 Up till now, I have used the term “Han” to refer to all of the settlers from the 
Mainland, but it was only at the end of the nineteenth century that there seems to have 
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emerged something akin to a unified Chinese identity in Taiwan. Having left their 
families behind, settlers were unable to rely on traditional lineage networks for support. 
Instead, they tended to form associations based on linguistic and regional differences 
associated with their place of origin. They set up temples to deities popular in their home 
region rather than ancestral halls (Lamley, 1981: 295). Many settlers also joined secret 
societies, such as the Heaven and Earth 天地會 (Tiāndìhuì) society responsible for the 
massive Lin Shuang-wen uprising mentioned above. After this last major uprising was 
put down, feuding between ethnic groups embroiled the island in communal violence 
from the 1780s to the 1860s. When the violence finally subsided, and a Chinese identity 
did begin to emerge at the end of this period, it was through a combination of factors, 
including class differentiation between small- and large-rent holders, government led 
efforts to reclaim the last remaining Aborigine lands, and the loss of Taiwan to the 
Japanese in the Sino-Japanese war (Harrell, 1990). 
 Immigrants to Taiwan came mostly from three locations on the southern coast of 
China: two different regions of Fujian province: Zhangzhou ူϴ (Zhāngzhōu) and 
Quanzhou, as well as from Guangzhou province. The Fujianese from Zhangzhou and 
Quanzhou comprised the majority of the population, and both spoke mutually intelligible 
varieties of the same language – Southern Min, or Hoklo. The differences between these 
two varieties have diminished in time, so that now most people no longer distinguish 
between Quanzhou and Changzhou varieties of Hoklo, but during the first half of the 
nineteenth century it was not uncommon to be killed for one's regional accent (Ownby, 
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1990: 87). Many of the Guangzhou migrants were from the Hakka ethnic minority, and 
even those Hakka who were not from Guangzhou are often associated with that region.  
 The Hakka are one of the four major ethnic groups in Taiwan. Having purportedly 
migrated to Guangzhou from Northern China during the Song Dynasty (960-1279), they 
found a niche in the sparsely populated mountainous regions of the south, living in close 
proximity with the She aboriginal group, from whom they adopted many economic and 
social practices. The language seems to have been adopted from the local southern 
population as well (Leong et al., 1997: 4, introduction). The Hakka became experts at 
cultivating difficult mountainside terrain, of little value to other farmers or tax collectors 
(1997: 6, introduction, 33). The Hakka are famous for having a relatively egalitarian 
gender system, which allowed the women to go with their feet unbound.5 The main 
advantage of which was that the women and children could tend to the farming, while the 
men engaged in migrant labor and mining (1997: 9, introduction). In Taiwan, the Hakka 
tended to occupy the same ecological niches that they had lived in on the mainland. There 
are two schools of thought on this, with some arguing that they preferred these areas, 
knowing better how to utilize them, and others arguing that they moved there only after 
being driven out by inter-ethnic strife with the Hoklo population (1997: 56).  
 The Hakka and the Aborigines were both occasional allies of the Qing, especially 
during the early years of their rule on the island. Two northern Aborigine communities 
rebelled in 1699, and in 1721 there was the infamous Zhu Yigui Rebellion Ѝɿක՗έ 
(Zhūyīguì shìjiàn) during which the government was forced to flee its capital in Tainan. 
In both cases, the government was able to play one group against another to secure its 
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rule. When the Aborigine tribes in the north rebelled, the Qing were able to count on the 
support of the An-li Aborigines to put down the rebellion. This policy initially backfired 
in suppressing the Zhu Yigui Rebellion, as the Aborigines sided with the rebels after a 
series of government missteps; however, the government soon found support amongst the 
Hakka ethnic community (Shepherd, 1993: 129). These same Hakka braves helped again 
later that year when nearly two thousand Aborigines “surrounded Chang-hua city, 
devastated the area around it, and slaughtered the soldiers stationed at two nearby 
military posts” (1993: 130). As a result of their loyalty and bravery, the Hakka earned the 
right to increased immigration quotas and also greater quotas for the imperial 
examinations (Lee, 1995: 92; Leong et al., 1997: 54; Shepherd, 1993: 212). And during 
the last major anti-government revolt, the Lin Shuang-wen rebellion discussed earlier, 
Hakka and Quanzhou loyalists helped put down a simultaneous uprising in the North, 
while Raw Aborigines put down the last remaining rebels who had fled to the mountains 
(Shepherd, 1993: 324, 326). 
 The ineffective and corrupt bureaucracy of the Qing is often blamed for the 
frequency of uprisings and communal violence (Lee, 1995). Early on in the process of 
both the rebellions and ethnic feuds there was often an appeal for state intervention, and it 
seems as if many of these disturbances might have been avoided if the state had not 
ignored or mishandled their claims; forcing people to turn to secret societies or local 
strongmen to seek justice (Ownby, 1990: 81). However, as we have seen, it is perhaps the 
particular strategies adopted by the Qing state, rather than lack of effort which was 
responsible. One Qing official is quoted as saying: “We are fortunate … that the different 
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groups are divided and will not yield to one another. Whenever evil people rise up, their 
ethnic enemies become yimin and fight them” (1990: 93, n. 54). The Qing’s use of 
non-standard troops to guard the island also created problems. These so-called “Green 
Standard” troops were themselves from either Quanzhou or Changzhou, and would often 
side with their homeland compatriots in the violence (1981: 309-10). These Green 
Standard troops were only replaced by professional troops in 1875 (1981: 290-91).  
 The state cannot bear all of the blame for Taiwan’s violence. Shepherd has 
admirably shown that Taiwan’s administration was not necessarily less effective, nor 
more corrupt than other peripheral regions of the Qing Empire (Shepherd, 1993: 6). The 
class structure of local society must also be examined. Chen Chiukun, in discussing the 
ethnic feuds, or xiedou ଇਤ (xièdòu), states it most forcefully,  
Generally speaking, the major goal of such clashes was to gain control 
over land resources and water rights. But by far the most important reason 
was to use these forces to maintain and enlarge the power of the landlords 
at the local level in a situation in which Ch'ing officials could not 
effectively protect the property rights of landlords (Chen, 1999: 136).  
Ownby also sees control of resources as central to the xiedou, arguing that by the end of 
the eighteenth century the settlement of Taiwan ended its “pioneering phase” resulting in 
attempts to solidify local power (Lamley, 1981: 304; Meskill, 1979: 84; Ownby, 1990: 
78). However, for Ownby, this only explains how these feuds started. He claims that 
landlords turned to local strongmen to fight their feuds for them, but that these 
professional militia leaders had a vested interest in escalating and prolonging the violence 
beyond what their bosses would have wished for (Ownby, 199076).  
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 The fluidity of frontier society meant that strongmen and gentry were not two 
distict classes, but that there was a certain fluidity between them: 
Rural strongmen were, in short, both rivals and colleagues of urban elite 
figures. They represented an unofficial power in the countryside, but they 
were always candidates for entrance into the regular local elite. Should a 
strongman decide to launch his son into the gentry, or should he aspire to 
official rank himself, neither the local elite nor the local magistrate would 
stand in his way. (Meskill, 1979: 91) 
Harrell elaborates: 
On the whole, the militia leaders were members of wealthy local families, 
many of them somewhat literatized, who seem to have been trying to hold 
on to their local power, to the support of their tenants, hired laborers, and 
clients, in the face of a changing social order (Harrell, 1990: 120-21). 
When the feuding finally did come to an end in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
it was, Harrell argues, precisely because of changes that took place in the status of local 
elites and strongmen. 
 The Qing did worry about the consequences of this feuding, especially the 
possibilities it presented for foreign intervention on the island, but many of their efforts to 
control it were futile. In particular, efforts were made at introducing local village security 
councils, or pao-chia “under which registered households were organized into small units 
and the inhabitants held accountable for each other's actions” (Lamley, 1981: 310). But 
these only worked as long as they remained actively supervised by government officials 
(1981: 311). 
 What finally brought an end to the xiedou, according to Harrell, is the social 
changes brought about by increased commercialization, combined with this increased 
government control. As Lamely points out, “growth and development, at least, continued 
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in those parts of Taiwan most affected by recurrent subethnic strife” (1981: 307) The 
gentry even managed to organize work crews of “mutually estranged Hoklo and Hakka 
workers” (1981: 307). Harrell argues that these changes fostered a class division among 
the island’s elite: 
Ethnic conflict and xiedou were clearly no longer viable strategies for 
these men: the supralocal economy had become too integrated by 
commercialization, and government control of local society had 
strengthened somewhat with Liu's administration. Their real adversaries at 
this point were the big operators … whose holdings increased dramatically 
in the late nineteenth century and probably seemed very threatening to the 
livelihood of small landlords (Harrell, 1990: 121). 
This coincided with the decline of the large-rent holder. Where the large-rent holder was 
an Elite, this now meant that they came to be enmeshed in state-based tributary relations 
based on educational credentialism (1990: 122). On the other hand, the small-rent holder 
gained power vis-à-vis the tenant, and their relationship became more commercial and 
more exploitative: employing strategies such as “shorter periods of lease, deposits 
required in advance, and sometimes requiring a tenant to lend the landlord a large amount 
of money free of interest in order to secure cultivation rights” (1990: 117).  
 All this happened under a regime that sought to increase tax revenues through 
greater state control at the local level (1990: 119). Regular army troops were brought in, 
and local militias were united together in an island-wide effort to “enter the mountains to 
rule the Aborigines” ʉʲᆓ፧ (rùshān fǔfān) (1990: 118). By the time the Japanese 
came, Taiwan had actually been declared a separate province of the empire, but it was too 
late. 
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 Harrell points out that the general outlines of the history of Taiwanese ethnic 
relations could easily fit into E.E. Evans-Pritchard's model of segmentary systems, in 
which lineage groups form tactical alliances at higher and higher levels of abstraction 
(family, kin-group, village, etc.) depending on the nature of the threat (1990: 105). Thus, 
we see residents of Quanzhou fighting residents from Changzhou, then the two groups 
uniting against the Hakka, followed by all three groups uniting against the Aborigines, 
etc. (and it might even be possible to extend the model to the national level struggle 
against the Japanese) (1990: 110). But Harrell argues, and I believe rightly so, that the 
players and conditions for each level of struggle were quite different and actually 
represent changes at the social-structural level, not just tactical moves on the part of key 
players. In the middle of the nineteenth century, “local leaders could mobilize followers 
through ethnic ties to be able to consolidate their own positions” (1990: 111). Such 
place-based networks had accomplished all the process of opening up the land, and 
building up irrigation works (1990: 112). By the 1880s the situation had changed. The 
land ownership system which had favored the small-rent holder to encourage opening up 
new land, now led to the decline of the large-rent holder’s power over the local 
population and its channeling into more official forms of power which had previously not 
been accessible. One of the most important of which was education. 
 
Qing Education 
The Qing was ostensibly a meritocracy, with bureaucratic privilege legitimated through 
an examination system that tested mastery of an esoteric corpus of Confucian knowledge. 
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While there existed a belief that anyone could pass the exams if they studied hard enough, 
there was not a tradition of public education to ensure that everyone had the chance to 
pursue such studies. Throughout the Ming and the Qing dynasties there were various 
attempts to provide widespread access to education, but these were generally short lived 
and unsuccessful. One paradox of Qing educational policy is that such efforts were 
generally greatest in the regions where state policy was weakest, but inhabitants of these 
areas often had the least to gain by associating themselves with the central state. One 
exception was that of indigenous populations, where the state was an important ally 
against the immigrant Han population. Before discussing the specifics of Qing education 
in Taiwan, I will first discuss some general features of the Confucian examination system. 
Education in Taiwan to this day continues to be influenced by the ideals of this system 
and it is important to understand how it worked in practice. 
 
The Confucian Examination System 
The Qing civil examination system required families to invest heavily in the education of 
children in order to memorize extensive texts written in a language that differed 
considerably from vernacular speech. Although this system is often hailed as a 
meritocracy of sorts, the sheer numbers (three million candidates for the biennial 
provincial exams, out of a total population of 300 million Chinese in 1800 (Elman, 2000: 
236)) of examinees meant that luck or cunning was at least just as important as one’s 
technical mastery of the classics. Most examinees remained in the system to maintain 
their status as literati, thus providing their kin with tax breaks and exemption from corvée 
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labor, even if they themselves never passed the exams. Some became clerks in the local 
administration, while others became private tutors. Passing the exams remained, however, 
the holy grail of family expectations. By having just one member of the family enter into 
officialdom, the entire family would gain much more than just the associated prestige. 
Officials could help families push civil cases through the legal system and start 
investigations into the affairs of their enemies (Meskill, 1979: 158-59), they could also 
collect taxes. Hill Gates argues that state limits on the accumulation of private wealth 
forced families to convert their private wealth into a means of gaining public power 
(Gates, 1996: 38). For this reason, clans would even invest in the schooling of their 
poorest relatives, lest they show talent for mastering the difficult curriculum. 
 The training regime was truly excruciating, although not impossible for young 
children with good memories and strong family support. Elman has pointed out that the 
unequal distribution of the “linguistic and cultural resources” necessary for full mastery 
of classical literacy effectively excluded nearly ninety percent of China’s population from 
the competition (Elman, 2000: 247).6 Still, the limited number of positions available kept 
the competition fierce. Elman estimates that while “minimal” literacy may have only 
required knowledge of some 2,000 glyphs, full classical literacy required mastery of over 
10,000 (2000: 266)!7 The road to classical literacy consisted of “a three-stage learning 
process: (1) memorization of Chinese graphs; (2) reading the Four Books, one of the Five 
Classics (until 1786, when all the classics had to be memorized), and the Histories; (3) 
and composition” (2000: 262). Composition, especially the “eight-legged” essayʊڜ̂ 
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(bāgǔwén) required for the highest level exams, was a highly refined skill; not necessarily 
mastered in the process of acquiring passive reading skills.8 
 The Qing was a time during which schooling began to receive increased 
importance vis-à-vis the examination process. As early as the eleventh century, reformers 
had called for increased importance to be placed on dynastic schools as a means of 
selecting officials, but they remained little more than examination training centers (2000: 
17, 127-28). Degrees were conferred by one’s rank on state exams and could not be given 
by the schools. Although there were always some academies, such as the famed Hanlin 
academy whose students seemed to have a direct link to positions of power within the 
higher echelons of the imperial state (2000: 160). It is interesting to note that the 
standards of elite literacy were even higher for the Hanlin entrance examination than they 
were for the imperial exams.9  
 There was also a separate system of schools set up for the imperial family, and for 
the Manchu and Mongolian military bannermen (Crossley, 1994: 352). The Qianlongਧ
ැ  (Qiánlóng) emperor was especially concerned about preserving Manchu and 
Monglian language and culture, even making it possible to take the examinations in either 
language (1994: 361). However, the fact that women did not receive schooling meant that 
preservation of this minority language, especially in its archaic form, was a losing battle 
(1994: 366). The importance of these schools declined over time, in parallel with the 
decline of banner power: 
The role of governors once envisioned of the bannermen had faded very 
early in the Ch'ing period under insurmountable pressures to meet 
continuing military challenges and to give way in civil affairs to the 
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well-entrenched Chinese bureaucratic class. But the curriculum still 
demanded not only competence in the Four Books and other foundational 
works of the civil examinations but also technical competence in military 
skills, translation, mathematics, and astronomy. Small wonder that few 
bannermen were attracted by either the challenges or the rewards of the 
banner educational institutions (1994: 359).  
As the examinations grew in importance the banner schools, as well as the dynastic 
academies, became little more than “quota-based way stations for students to prepare on 
their own for civil service examinations and receive stipends for their efforts” (Elman, 
2000: 127). Because these schools both presupposed a mastery of classical literacy, 
training which was “left to the private domain,” few of the schools remained important, 
with the exception of the prestigious Hanlin academy (2000: 128). 
 The academies were only for advanced study. Earlier training took place at the 
home, with literate mothers (2000: 241), a private tutor, or at a lineage run school. For 
much of late imperial Chinese history, the southern gentry dominated the examinations, 
academies and imperial bureaucracies precisely because of their heavy investment in 
such lineage schools (2000: 92). Students at these schools would receive a stipend while 
studying, and if they actually passed the exams would often receive special award money 
from the clan as well (2000: 128).  
 While the gentry were able to perpetuate their class status through such lineage 
schools, “merchants, artisans, and other commoners, however, frequently lacked access 
to the proper linguistic training and educational facilities for mastering literati political 
and moral discourse.” 
To address this problem, charitable schools (i-hsueh [義學 (yìxué)]), some 
within but most outside lineages, increasingly were created. They 
represented the intermingling of gentry charitable institutions, elementary 
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education, and local philanthropy, and complemented “community 
schools” (she-hsueh [社學 (shèxué)]) set up by the dynasty to deliver 
instructions to deserving local commoners. In such semi-official charitable 
institutions, “primer literacy” could commence for an elementary student 
from a poor family or one from a poorer segment of a well-off lineage. 
Buddhist temple schools also fulfilled this function (2000: 246). 
Whereas the she-hsueh were often a means of subsidizing elite education, the i-hsueh 
were genuinely open to the community (Leung, 1994: 384). Such charitable schools 
became quite widespread. Charitable schools rarely provided stipends or even lodging for 
their students, and classes were often held at the local temple, so the only real costs 
involved supporting and paying for the teacher. However, their dependence on local 
funding (the state provided no support) meant that they often did not last very long, 
“ending with the term of an enthusiastic magistrate, or when donations from a private 
individual stopped” (1994: 391).  
 Although they were modeled in part on lineage schools, the curriculum at 
charitable schools differed quite considerably in form and purpose. The primers used for 
charitable schools emphasized characters found in daily life, rather than the esoteric 
literacy of elite education (Rawski, 1979: 49). They were not set up to train students to 
take the examinations, and it was not expected that they would learn more than a basic 
functional literacy. Evelyn Rawski argues that the widespread use of characters in printed 
advertising, village record keeping, tax collection, popular songbooks, etc. points to 
widespread and vibrant literacy in Qing China (1979: 109-22). Certainly, a basic 
knowledge of under two thousand basic characters could greatly enable one to handle 
numerous daily bookkeeping tasks: “Written contracts were used for purchasing or 
mortgaging real estate, for renting land, hiring laborers, borrowing money, and even for 
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selling children” (1979: 9-10). Boilerplate contracts of this sort were often included in the 
popular almanacs sold at this time (1979: 114).  
 The existence of a vibrant printing industry certainly was closely related to the 
popularity of charitable schools, but not necessarily in a utilitarian way. In fact, Leung 
persuasively argues that the charitable schools were much more motivated by elite 
concerns with popular morality than with a desire to provide vocational training. 
According to Leung, it was the easy availability of seditious and morally questionable 
tracts that motivated the elite to set up i-hsueh (Leung, 1994: 378-79). In fact, the schools 
were often founded by the same “community philanthropists who, later in the nineteenth 
century, organized regional ‘bureaus to burn and destroy licentious writings’” (1994: 
401). This moral focus was reflected in the curriculum, which emphasized Confucian 
rituals, self presentation, proper forms of address to peers and elders, cleaning the 
classroom, etc. (1994: 398). The end result was a bifurcated education system, and while 
truly gifted students might be recognized as such and given a chance to study for the 
exams, most charitable school students were simply taught enough to know their place in 
the system. 
 By the end of the nineteenth century the Qing system of education began to break 
down as reformers sought to replace the deteriorating examination and charitable school 
systems with a true public education system. The most obvious sign of the systems 
failure was the sheer number of degrees that were sold rather than obtained by taking the 
examinations. Purchase, as well as “recommendation” had long been alternative means of 
advancement, but by the end of the nineteenth century the numbers had gotten out of 
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hand (Elman, 2000: 126-27). While in 1764 less than one quarter (22%) of officials had 
simply purchased their degrees, by 1871 more than half (51%) of literati degrees were 
paid for (2000: 227). These figures do not include the many more that were got by 
bribing examiners, paying other people to take the exam, buying the questions before 
they were published, or other such schemes (2000: 196). At the same time, the portion of 
the population who had some degree of literacy had never been higher. Political changes, 
such as the Opium war and the Sino-Japanese war, increasingly cast doubt upon the 
Confucian system and led people to look to Japanese and Western educational models as 
alternatives. By 1901 the eight-legged essay was removed from exams, and the entire 
system came to an end in 1905 w (2000: 595, 604). 
 
Elite Education in Taiwan – The Lin Family 
After the Qing took Taiwan over from the Zhengs it became a prefecture of Fujian 
province, and the few students who passed the local prefectural exams had to compete 
against the rest of the province in order to go on to the highest-level exams at the imperial 
palace. However, immigrants often were required to take the exams in their place of 
origin, so presumably the earlier settlers did not take exams as inhabitants of Taiwan 
prefecture (Lamley, 1981: 134). Because the Qing were eager to prevent a concentration 
of power from any one region in China, special quotas were assigned to each prefecture 
and province. The combination of these factors meant that Taiwan had high quotas but 
few eligible candidates. As a result, gentry from the mainland would illegally come over 
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to take the exam, displacing some qualified local candidates in the process (Lee, 1995: 
145; Shepherd, 1993: 212). 
 Until 1823, the majority of Taiwanese degree holders were either those who had 
taken the military exams or those who had been recommended for a military degree 
(“Military Recommended Men”) (Lee, 1995: 16). The military exams did require 
knowledge of the classics, but it was much more limited than the exams for the literary 
degrees, and cheating was quite rampant (Elman, 2000: 184-96). The exams also tested 
strength and military prowess, especially riding and archery (Lee, 1995: 257). The 
government created a number of seemingly honorary titles that it bestowed upon the local 
population, such as “Ceremony Students, the Music-dancing Students, and Worshipping 
students” (1995: 183).10 Such titles, like those of the “Military Recommended Men,” 
were a useful means of granting legitimacy to local strongmen and others who were 
willing to demonstrate their loyalty to the Qing.  
 By the dawn of the nineteenth century, however, local elites had begun to 
consolidate their power. In Meskill’s account of the Lin family, we see how the local elite 
in Chang-hua “began to invest their wealth in the appurtenances of gentry culture.”  
They gave their sons a classical education and made them compete in the 
higher examinations. Soon after 1800, the district began to produce at least 
one chü-jen in each of the triennial examinations held at Foochow, and 
some of these men went on to compete in Peking. In 1823 a native son 
first gained the chin-shih. A second one, three years later, did well enough 
to be elected into the prestigious Hanlin Academy. Others followed. Soon, 
several of these higher degree-holders held office on the mainland; others, 
and the bulk of the lower literati, lived at home, strengthening the higher 
culture in the district (Meskill, 1979: 79). 
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These new gentry families seem to have set up several academies in the town, as well as a 
district gazetteer to document their own achievements. Yet, for many, it was easier to 
simply purchase a degree than to actually pursue the arduous study, and the “financially 
hard-pressed government” seems to have been eager to oblige (1979: 80).  
 As the frontier became more settled, it also became harder to make wealth quickly 
through agriculture alone (1979: 81). While some were able to convert this wealth into 
new forms of power through education, the weakness of the government in the region 
during the middle of the century meant that other routes to wealth and power were often 
more attractive. This was certainly the case for one of the more notorious members of the 
Lin family, Wen-ch’a:  
Failing in a preliminary examination, he gave up the academic life 
altogether and returned to Wu-feng, probably in the early 1840's. Here, he 
studied what he truly liked: proficiency in arms, the ruses of war, and the 
delicate art of gaining and holding his men's loyalty (1979: 95). 
Only when the Qing reasserted control of the island in the seventies did education seem 
to become important again to the Lin family. Ongoing lawsuits and numerous enemies 
made it important for them to gain the good will of powerful friends. “In 1874, for 
instance, the family granted travel money to an aspiring scholar on his way to Peking for 
the examinations. Such a gift, a familiar ‘social investment’ to gain a promising man’s 
favor, was a first for the Lins also” (1979: 159). Ten years later we see several members 
of the family pursuing the difficult examination path rather than simply purchasing their 
degrees (1979: 200-01). Even more surprising, perhaps, is the degree to which these 
students actually internalized the Confucian principles they were studying, developing a 
“genuine love of literature, and particularly of poetry” (1979: 202). Some of these fully 
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socialized literati actually sacrificed their wealth and power in Taiwan when the Japanese 
came, “abandoning their home and refusing to serve another ruler” (1979: 204). Qing 
education had seemingly succeeded in Taiwan, just when the Qing dynasty itself had 
faltered. 
 
Education in Taiwan – Rewarding Loyalty and “Civilizing” Aborigines 
While elite education in Taiwan was often privately funded by elites eager to gain access 
to power, there were two important aspects of education where the Qing state actively 
intervened. The first was in its ability to establish regional quotas, and the second was in 
the establishment of community and charity schools. Although such schools rarely 
received direct government funding, state policy seems to have ‘encouraged’ local elites 
to provide resources with which to fund the schools (Rowe, 1994: 432). Both of these 
areas of state policy making were directly involved in the formation of ethnic relations in 
the settlement of Taiwan. More often than not, it was ethnic minorities, such as 
Aborigines and the Hakka, who benefited most from state intervention in education. 
 Regional examination quotas were an important means of social control, often 
utilized by the Qing to reward loyal supporters, ensure that power would be evenly 
distributed geographically, and to cultivate the development of local elites “to cultivate 
the growth of a Confucian literati in regions where the state’s influence was weak” 
(Shepherd, 1993: 210). 
 Throughout the Ch'ing period, in fact, the government was generous in granting 
academic and expectant-office titles (conferring gentry status and privileges) to eminent 
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members of all three major subcultural groups as rewards for their services. Moreover, 
special Yueh (Kwangtung) quotas were established for civil and military sheng-yuan [·
࢝ (shēngyuán)] degrees in 1741 in an attempt to appease Taiwan's Hakka population. 
Thereafter, the competition became so keen among Hoklo and Hakka scholars about the 
island that quotas applicable to both groups were gradually enlarged. Early in the 
nineteenth century, a separate Yueh quota was also introduced for island Hakka 
competing in the provincial examinations held in Foochow (Lamley, 1981: 311). 
The creation of special quotas for the Hakka was, no doubt, affected by the important role 
they played in helping suppress the Zhu Yigui rebellion, as well as later uprisings. These 
policies were also instituted in the Hakka homelands around the same time. In 1730 
Yuanzhou prefecture instituted special Hakka quotas to diffuse ethnic tensions there 
(Leong et al., 1997: 70).  
 Aborigines also benefited from special quotas, but the lack of a Confucian 
tradition meant that it was also necessary to provide basic schooling as well. After the 
suppression of the large-scale Aborigine revolt of 1731-31 in the village of Ta Chia Hsi 
ʩΌпڋഒ෪ (Dàjiǎxīshè fānluàn), Aborigine schooling was expanded with a large 
number of imperial schools: 
In 1734 the Taiwan intendant Chang Ssu-ch’ang proposed that instructors 
be appointed in every county to educate aborigine youth in schools and 
that county directors of study conduct seasonal examinations in these 
schools. A total of 47 aborigine schools were founded, the great majority 
in villages that were also major aborigine taxpaying units … Seven of the 
schools were founded among the tribes participating in the Ta-chia-hsi 
revolt (Shepherd, 1993: 132). 
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Three of the subdued tribes demonstrated their commitment to adopting Chinese values 
by petitioning the emperor to allow them to adopt Confucian maxims as names for their 
tribes (1993: 132).  
 From Shepherd we know that the curriculum of these Aborigine schools was 
modeled directly upon that of the community schools in the villages: “Emphasis was at 
first on character recognition and calligraphy and then on recitation and memorization of 
the [classical Chinese] texts” (1993: 372). But the main focus was on Confucian morality.  
Both teacher and text spoke of notions of social hierarchy, duty, 
obligations to parents, and the subordination of women. Rudimentary 
cosmological notions rooted the imperial state and Confucian morality in 
the natural order of heaven, earth, and man. Students were taught the 
duties appropriate to each of the five cardinal relationships of 
ruler-minister, father-son, husband-wife, older-younger brother, and 
friend-friend … as well as the key virtues of loyalty and filial piety. (1993: 
372-73) 
Around the same time as the Qing were quelling the large eighteenth century rebellions in 
Taiwan, they were also trying to extend their rule over another rebellious peripheral area 
heavily populated by indigenous peoples: Yunnan province. There, even more than in 
Taiwan, education of the indigenous population represented one of the most extensive 
efforts at “public” education undertaken during the Qing. Ch’en Hung-mou, a particularly 
zealous official who governed Yunan in the 1730s, sought to implement what was “no 
less than a state-sponsored system of universal male childhood education” (Rowe, 1994: 
428). As with what we have learned about charity education elsewhere in China, the main 
purpose was to proselytize Confucian values rather than to promote mass literacy. It is 
true that there were some notable “examination successes” - enabling a few members of 
the indigenous elite to gain official status through the examination system was, no doubt, 
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good politics, but these new literati rarely returned home11 after gaining their new status 
(1994: 444). Despite these exceptional cases, the thrust of Ch’en’s innovative education 
system remained focused on primary education and the teaching of Confucian values 
(1994: 437). 
 The motivation for proselytizing Confucian values to the Aborigines is not too 
different from that which had earlier motivated the Dutch to preach Christian values to 
Taiwan’s Aborigines in the seventeenth century. The Dutch, who had also established 
extensive schooling for the Aborigines, demanded that villages destroy their idols before 
they could receive a school, and they sought to end the many practices that did not 
conform to European norms for relations between the sexes. Among the Siraya 
Aboriginesп؂෕ (Xīlāyă), men would live with their age-grade association until they 
were too old to hunt. Only after retiring from the age-grade association would the men 
settle down with a woman to form a family (Shepherd, 1993: 65). But for the Dutch with 
their protestant work ethic, equally disturbing was the men’s refusal to engage in 
agricultural labor, which was considered women’s work. But there was also an ulterior 
motivation — by teaching the men to plow, the Dutch sought to divert them from 
inter-village warfare and rebellion (1993: 81).  
 Rowe’s description of the motivations for educating Yunnan’s indigenous 
population sounds remarkably similar: 
At the same time, kinship reform was seen as a prerequisite to economic 
development. The male-headed domestic unit, the practice of sedentary 
agriculture, and the institution of private (household) property were 
inextricably linked in a version of agrarian idealism not all that different 
from that of the Lockean West ... Household proprietorship of agricultural 
land, in China as in the West, was "one of the central notions in the 
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organization of social life" and private landownership "one of the major 
positive values in the culture." ... From the state's point of view, moreover, 
household proprietorship was basic to civil law ... and to fiscal 
accountability. It was expected to give rise to an indigenous propertied 
elite who, given the educational opportunities offered by the new school 
system, would become the backbone of the new social order (Rowe, 1994: 
425). 
Although Taiwan’s educators presumably shared this moralizing principle, they seemed 
to have been less zealous then Ch’en. In fact, Shepherd argues that officials were quite 
tolerant of Aborigine “nonconformity” which “unlike some heterodoxies, … did not 
challenge the dominant cultural order, because it reinforced a separate ethnic identity for 
plains aborigine braves that served Ch’ing divide-and-rule methods of control” (Shepherd, 
1993: 382). Moreover, without Ch’en’s innovative methods of securing local funding for 
schools (Rowe, 1994: 428), it was difficult to sustain any kind of public schooling in 
Taiwan. The Qing state “did not allocate scarce tax revenues to mount a sustained 
educational effort. Rather, periodic campaigns to set up schools were launched either by 
the few vigorous reforming officials or in reconstruction efforts following major 
disturbances when lack of education was always identified as contributing to social 
disorder” (Shepherd, 1993: 373). 
 As in Yunnan, there were some Aborigines who were able to accumulate enough 
wealth and literacy to enter the ranks of the Chinese gentry, but the effect of this on the 
rest of the Aborigine population seems to have been rather minimal. There is some 
evidence of Confucian discourse being used by the Aborigines themselves in their 
dealings with the state. When a group of Aborigine villages signed a contract to settle the 
Puli basin in 1823, they used “Confucian terms” to express “their loyalty to the 
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Confucian state” as well as to “complain bitterly of their treatment by Han settlers” 
(1993: 382). They were thus able to use the official discourse to petition the state to 
recognize their claims for the territory (1993: 392). But there was always some tension 
between Aborigine and Confucian social values. Even when they adopted Chinese 
surnames, it was often done in a very non-Chinese way: 
The most commonly adopted surname was P’an, which is the Chinese 
character for barbarian (fan) written with a water radical added. Plains 
aborigine adoption of Han surnames generally did not reflect a sinization 
of family and clan organizations. So many families adopted the P’an 
surname in some villages that the Chinese practice of surname exogamy 
was impossible. Other groups transmitted their Han surnames 
matrilineally or changed them at will (1993: 384). 
Moreover, it seems that the marginalized position of plains Aborigines made them 
receptive to nineteenth century Christian missionaries who came to the island in the 
1870s, leading to mass conversions to Christianity (1993: 382). 
 As the Qing attempted to consolidate control of the island at the end of the 
nineteenth century, they continued to establish schools for Aborigines, especially on the 
West Coast regions that had just come under their control. When Taitong ͔س 
(Táidōng) Prefecture was established in 1875, “the textbook Proverbs for the Instruction 
of Savages was approved” for use in the new schools.  
At this time plans were made eventually to establish 44 schools for 
Aborigines in Taidong and Hualian Prefectures; however, only seven were 
actually opened, four of which were in Pangcah areas in 1880. The 
curriculum, besides apparently providing an introduction to Confucian 
morality, seems to have been limited to language instruction. After two 
years in these schools the majority of students could speak the Minnan 
dialect; but dissatisfaction with the regular use of corporal punishment 
soon caused attendance to drop, and by 1886 the schools existed in name 
only (Thorne, 1997: 114-15). 
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In response to military encounters between Aborigines and both the French and the 
Japanese, the Qing felt that it was necessary to further secure Taiwan from foreign 
intervention. In 1886 Taiwan became a full province and was placed under the command 
of “an aggressive governor with a military background, Liu Ming-ch’uan [ᄹᄂ෮ (Liú 
Míngchuán)]” (Shepherd, 1993: 360). Liu instituted a policy of using brute force, rather 
than Confucian morality to subdue the Mountain Aborigines (Harrell, 1990: 118).  
 
The Last Days of Qing Rule in Taiwan 
Liu’s new aggressive strategy was motivated by the need to consolidate Hakka and Hoklo 
Chinese against a common enemy, as well as to provide the expanding population with 
much needed land. An even more important motivation for these expensive mountain 
campaigns was the rising importance of camphor for Taiwan’s economy. Starting in 1865, 
trade with Americans in camphor had increased considerably (Thorne, 1997: 125, n. 60). 
Many Hakka risked loosing their heads as they ventured into the mountains in search of 
camphor, but the rewards were great enough to warrant the risks (1997: 124-25). “During 
the years 1891-95 Taiwan exported 30% more camphor than all of the rest of the world” 
(1997: 125). Still, Liu’s expensive mountain campaigns were severely criticized, and he 
was eventually forced to change tactics. 
Governor Liu sought to reduce his control costs by following an old 
Taiwan pattern: he offered to accommodate the raw aborigines of the 
mountains with allocations of land and rights to collect rents from Chinese 
settlers. At the same time he sought to increase his revenues through an 
island-wide cadastral survey to enroll “hidden” land on the tax registers 
(Shepherd, 1993: 360). 
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Part of Liu’s restructuring involved the reduction of rent paid to the primary landowners 
(large-rent). The shifting of the tax burden to the small-rent holder offset the loss of 
income from this shift. 
 Altogether, Liu was able to triple the land-tax revenue collected by the Qing, but 
his modernization initiatives, as well as his military campaigns meant that costs were 
even greater (1993: 361). He undertook a number of initiatives, such as the building of 
Taiwan’s first railroad, building the foundations of modern Taipei, and dredging the 
harbor at Jilong, all of which (including his aggressive tactics against the Mountain 
Aborigines) would later be continued by the Japanese (Harrell, 1990: 118-19). Many of 
his projects, such as the dredging of the harbor, were never completed for lack of funds. 
Added to his problems was the refusal of the newly pacified Aborigines in the East to 
remain pacified.  
18 Aborigine villages in eastern Taiwan with a total population of 50,000 
had agreed to submit in 1887. Yet in June of 1888 a major revolt began 
among the Siraya near Yuli; before it was finally suppressed in September 
with the aid of naval forces sent from North China the revolt had involved 
Hakka, Rukovon Pyuma and Pangcah as well …(Thorne, 1997: 112). 
The rebellion was finally suppressed, and the leaders taken on a tour of major Chinese 
cities in Taiwan and on the mainland, “the purpose of which was to impress them with 
the prosperity and scale of Chinese society” (1997: 112-13). Despite the quelling of the 
rebellion, Liu’s expenses were too much for the weakened Qing state to justify, and his 
tenure as head of the short-lived Province of Taiwan came to an end in 1891. 
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 In 1895 Taiwan was ceded to the Japanese after the Sino-Japanese war. There was 
some hope that Taiwan would be able to declare itself and independent state and gain 
foreign aid to defend itself against the arrival of the Japanese troops.  
the provincial governor, Tang Jingsong, along with other officials and 
gentry, announced the formation of the Democratic State of Taiwan 
(Taiwan Minzhu Guo [͔ᝰͻ̠੣]), and along with establishing a 
constitution, printing paper money, and taking over many of the 
administrative functions of the former Qing government, also organized 
military resistance to the Japanese occupying forces (Harrell, 1990: 99). 
As we have already seen, there was widespread support for the resistance by a newly 
emergent Taiwanese elite made up of “the elites of communities that had, only forty 
years earlier, fought each other in a series of inter-ethnic feuds,” but who were now 
united along class lines (1990: 103). However, the Japanese quickly squashed the 
resistance, and Taiwan entered the Twentieth century as a Japanese colony. 
 
Conclusion 
Kathy Walker has, citing Bernhardt, remarked that “the history of the Qing is in a large 
part that of landlords and the state attempting to adjust to peasant victories so as to 
maintain control of peasant surpluses” (1999: 10-11). The situation in the Taiwan 
periphery, where the landlord class never had a firm grip over the rural peasantry, is 
something of an exception to this rule. We have already seen that the process by which a 
dual-ownership system emerged in Taiwan parallels, but differs from that in the mainland. 
While on the mainland, “recognition of the dual-ownership system and its protection in 
customary law amounted to a compromise on the part of the state-elite between landlord 
and peasant property” (Walker, 1999: 10-11), in Taiwan it was the result of the system of 
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land reclamation which gave power to the small-renter from the very beginning. Still, it is 
true that the island’s endemic violence only subsided once the reality of small-renter land 
ownership was tacitly recognized by the state. This recognition also enabled the state to 
dramatically increase revenue from land-taxes, and was soon officially recognized by the 
Japanese after they took power (Ka, 1995: 51). 
 Hill Gates offers a different explanation of tensions between the state and local 
power under the Qing. For Gates, the political economy of China for the past thousand 
years is a struggle between two competing economic systems: the tributary mode of 
production (TMP) and the petty-capitalist mode of production (PCMP) (Gates, 1996). 
The former is characterized by state-based client-patron relationships arranged in a 
pyramid, with the emperor at the top, and courtiers, officials, clerks, etc. below him, all 
the way down to the family unit which mirrors the system-at-large through rigid 
patriarchal relations. It is this system that is legitimated by Confucian values at both the 
state and the family level: justifying the extraction of taxes by the state and of filial piety 
and female subservience within the family. The TMP seeks to limit the development of 
market relations that could undermine the power of the state and disrupt the kin-based 
relations of production that are its foundation.  
 The PCMP is also dependent upon kin-based relations of production, and Gates 
points out that the PCMP benefits, to a certain extent, from the autonomy granted the 
family-unit under the TMP (1996: 38). However, the PCMP is firmly entrenched in 
market relations. In addition to the buying and selling of land, almost every other aspect 
of their life had been monetized for hundreds of years before the arrival of foreign capital. 
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Gates is careful to point out that the existence of markets does not mean the existence of 
capitalism (1996: 33). Although the buying of daughters and sons was often a purely 
monetary transaction, labor was only sold in a fairly limited market, it was the 
uncompensated labor of family members that drove the economy.  
 Walker takes Gates to task for failing to “take into account structural changes in 
the forms of commodity production or in the historically specific social relations through 
which it was constituted” thus providing a static view of Chinese social relations (Walker, 
1999: 22). Gates does seem to see the model as equally applicable to both Modern China 
and the Qing era and, indeed, the specific formulation of class relations in Taiwan does 
seem to get lost in the grand narrative of TMP-PCMP conflict (Gates, 1996). However, 
the model does provide us with a useful tool for thinking about certain aspects of state 
formation in the Taiwanese periphery, where local institutions always seem to have 
sought a degree of autonomy from the state. 
 Although the PCMP benefits from the state’s preservation of patriarchal relations, 
and individual petty-capitalists benefit from maintaining patron-client relations, the 
tendency of petty-capital is to expand the monetization of social relations, something 
which fundamentally threatens the tributary relations upon which the privileges of state 
actors are based. This creates a fundamental tension that explains the contradictions 
underlying Qing era land policy in Taiwan. In a pre-industrial economy, land was 
simultaneously the foundation of the tributary relations and the basis of petty-capitalist 
wealth. Land had been a commodity in China since the Song, but the extent of its 
commoditization was inversely related to state power. Taiwan, especially during the early 
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settlement years, was a case of fairly extensive commoditization. The system of land 
reclamation allowed for small-renters to both avoid paying taxes as well as to make 
money by becoming moneylenders to both the large-rent owners and sub-tenants. 
 What is especially useful for our study is the link Gates makes between the 
different modes of production and the related ideological systems by which they were 
legitimated. Gates contrasts the Confucian rituals that legitimate tributary relations with 
the folk rituals that continue to thrive under petty-capitalism. For example, the practice of 
burning spirit-money to pay off supernatural debt is a clearly monetized spiritual 
transaction that accurately represents the way people actually experienced state morality 
(1996: 168-73). In light of this discussion, it is interesting to note that temples to local 
deities were one of the most important sites of resistance against the state in Taiwan 
(Lamley, 1981: 295). These contrasted sharply with the Confucian temples built by the 
state (Lee, 1995: 102). We also see the conflict between folk and official traditions in the 
history of Taiwanese education. Aborigine matrilineal traditions were one of the main 
targets of Confucian education, as was the desire to impart a respect for Confucian social 
hierarchies outside the family.  
 Class differentiation at the end of the Qing meant that there did emerge an elite 
culture rooted in classical literacy, but the land ownership system had resulted in a large 
landowning elite not tied closely to the state. Although there was a move towards the 
development of lineages temples, temples to local deities and place-based associations 
remained strong. Linguistically, attempts at standardization of the official dialect failed 
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early on and were not repeated. The end of Qing rule created a space for the initial, 
short-lived, rise of a Taiwanese nationalist identity grounded in these traditions. 
 Aborigines who had not been able to assimilate or join the elite class were 
increasingly marginalized. Many were forced to migrate or rebel against increasingly 
hostile forces. However, the increasing importance of trade in camphor, rice, tea, and 
sugar meant that Aborigine lands were more valuable than ever before. Mountain 
Aborigines, whom the state had long left at arms length, found themselves increasingly 
under attack by ethnically unified Han forces. As with the Liu’s modernization drives to 
build trains and dredge harbors, these military incursions into the mountains would be 
continued even more aggressively by the new Japanese rulers. 
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Notes
 
1 In the North, the Aborigines had been colonized by the Spanish, rather than the 
Dutch. When the Dutch drove the Spanish out in 1640, the Aborigines asked the Dutch to 
provide a priest who could lead the Catholic mass, causing some consternation among the 
Protestant missionaries (Shepherd, 1993: 72). 
2 In addition to this “brigade” land, there was also “government land” (which had 
been cultivated in the name of the King during the Dutch period) farmed by Chinese 
immigrants, as well as “private land” which was actually land owned by officials and 
members of the most powerful clans (Ka, 1995: 13; Lee, 1995: 30; Shepherd, 1993: 97). 
3 It is these nineteenth-century migrations that have given rise to the common 
misperception that Chinese settlers pushed taiwan’s plains aborigines into the mountains 
or, in a different version, that the ancestors of all present-day mountain aborigines lived 
on the plains. Both versions are incorrect. Many plains groups never participated in the 
migrations, and those that did, did not do so in toto. Rather, many plains aborigine 
villagers remained and became increasingly sinicized. Moreover, those that resettled 
migrated not into the mountains but to plains areas free of Han domination (the east coast 
and the P’u-li basin). (Shepherd, 1993: 358) 
4 Stephen Harrell objects to the term “subethnic” on the grounds that it serves no 
purpose which could not be accommodated just as easily by the term “ethnic.” I believe 
he is correct to attribute the term to the “silly” and “unconciously politically motivated” 
notion that they are subdivisions of a larger Han Chinese ethnic group (Harrell, 1990: 109, 
n. 16). 
5 Leong argues that the Hakka were unique in not binding women’s feet only 
because they conformed earlier than other groups to Qing banning of the practice, 
whereas other groups resisted (Leong et al., 1997: 10, introduction). 
6 Elman deliberately avoids using Bourdieu’s terminology of linguistic and 
cultural “capital” but for our purposes we can easily substitute Bourdieu’s terms for 
Elman’s.  
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7 “Altogether there were about 48,000 different charcters in late imperial times, 
but many of them were simply varients.” (Elman, 2000: 266) 
8 The eight-legged essay was something of a cross between the stylistic 
requirements of a contemporary five-paragraph essay and a classical sonnet. The term 
“leg” actually refers to couplets, with each couplet consisting of two legs. Each essay 
consisted of four couplets, or eight “legs” (Lee, 1995: 113). The form of the essay was 
very rigid, with two sentences assigned to a discussion of the title of the essay, and then 
an elaboration of that discussion (which had to be either “negative” if the opening 
discussion was “positive” and vice-versa). All this would then be followed by the essay 
itself, which had to be “written in a dialectical sequence: beginning, extension, antithesis, 
synthesis,” each part punctuated by the four couplets (1995: 113-14). Elman notes that 
surviving examination essays all contain “numerous small circles marking exactly the 
balanced and antithetical clauses in each leg of the essay” (Elman, 2000: 394).  
9 Unlike the imperial exams, which had eliminated poetry and “belles-lettres” 
during the Ming, the Hanlin academy continued to require it on their exams (Elman, 
2000: 163), and by 1800 it was a fairly common feature of the curriculum at most private 
academies (2000: 550). 
10 From this time it became customary to include among the i sheng (ritualists) 
aborigine students who failed to obtain the sheng yüan degree. The i sheng served as 
musicians and performers in the solemn ceremonies school temples conducted each 
spring and autumn to honor Confucius; among their privileges was exemption from labor 
service (Shepherd, 1993: 374). 
11 Scholars were required to serve the government outside of their home province, 
as a means of controlling corruption. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CARROT AND THE STICK: CONSENT AND COERCION IN THE 
FORMATION OF TAIWAN’S LANGUAGE MARKETS 
 
Introduction 
Speakers of Taiwan’s local languages suffered under repressive monolingual policies for 
fifty years, from 1937 to 1987. First, under Japanese military rule during World War II, 
Japanese had been the National Language ੣დ (kokugo in Japanese). Then, when the 
KMT arrived at the end of the war, Mandarin Chinese became the new National 
Language (guóyǔ). It still is, but with the end of martial law in 1987, restrictions on local 
language use in the media were lifted and local language instruction was allowed in the 
schools, even becoming part of the official primary school curriculum in 2001. These 
changes symbolize an important shift in how Taiwanese come to think about “nation.” 
Both the Japanese and the KMT viewed Taiwan as only part of a larger nation. The use of 
the language of Tokyo or Beijing as the official language of Taiwan was intended to 
drive this point home. But the end of martial law did not end the dominance of Mandarin 
in Taiwan. In part, this reflects the continued dominance of the Mainlander elite in 
national politics, but it also reflects the complexity of linguistic and ethnic relations in 
Taiwan. Although over seventy percent of Taiwan’s population claims Hoklo1 as their 
mother tongue, the large number of Hakka speakers as well as presence of a significant 
Aborigine population makes it politically unfeasible to simply replace Mandarin with 
Hoklo. Moreover, despite the symbolic importance of local languages, they are all in 
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decline, although it is only the Austronesian languages which are in danger of dying out 
completely, and it is unclear that current policies will do much to reverse this trend (Tsao, 
2001). Not only is the existing linguistic hierarchy firmly entrenched, but Taiwan’s 
precarious political status, as well as its dependence on international trade, have further 
complicated the language situation. Mandarin is no longer simply the language of 
Taiwan’s elite, it is also the language of its largest trading partner. Local languages must 
also increasingly compete with English, the “global language” (Crystal, 1997). 
 Taiwan’s language situation raises two important questions. The first is why the 
end of martial law did not spell the end of Mandarin’s dominance in Taiwanese society? 
The second is why, even during the most repressive years, the state was unable to prevent 
the continued and persistent use of local languages, especially Hoklo, as the language of 
business and of the marketplace? For while the state was successful in raising a 
generation of Mandarin speaking Taiwanese who had only limited proficiency in their 
mother tongue, they were unable to stop the widespread use of local languages by the 
native speaking adult population. I argue that it is only possible to answer these questions 
if we understand language markets to be a byproduct of the process of state formation, a 
process whose primary goal is the formation of a stable historical bloc between the ruling 
class and various subordinate groups, and whose secondary goal is preventing the 
emergence of alternative historical blocs (see Chapter 2).  
 The forces which created a powerful rural gentry class in Taiwan (see Chapter 3) 
continued to operate during the Japanese era, and thorough into the early years of KMT 
rule when large scale land reforms were implemented. Even then, this class only became 
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stronger by their full scale entry into the global marketplace as owners of small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Despite the continued strength of this class, it is only 
in the last thirty years that they have finally secured a leadership position within the 
ruling bloc, and even now that position remains unstable. In each era, Qing, Japanese, 
and the early years of KMT rule, the ruling bloc has alternated between conciliatory 
gestures and the full scale repression of the gentry classes. The vital role played by this 
class in the Japanese war time economy ultimately undermined more repressive 
tendencies. The brutal suppression of local elites by KMT soldiers after the February 28, 
1947 uprising ʆʆʊ՗έ  (èrèrbā shìjiàn) destroyed any short term hopes for 
legitimacy, and the establishment of normalized diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in the 1970s further undermined their legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
the KMT was able to hold on to its power by relying upon the power structures that had 
been initially established during the Qing era, and solidified during the Japanese colonial 
period. These included alliances with various subaltern groups, including workers at state 
owned companies, farmers and Aborigines, as well as the educated elite who depended 
upon state patronage. Coercion continued to play an important part in state policy, 
thousands “disappeared” during the White Terror 白色恐怖 (báisè kǒngbù) which 
lasted until the 1980s, but it is impossible to rule a country by coercion alone. The 
government sought to impose its own ideology of Chinese nationalism upon the country 
and even, pressured by its ally the United States, instituted reforms such as local elections 
and land reform, both of which would pave the way for the collapse of the existing 
historical bloc in the eighties (see Chapter 6). 
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 In this chapter I argue that the continued strength of Taiwan’s local languages 
reflects the strength of the rural gentry class, and the inability of the ruling historical bloc 
to completely suppress the power of this class. This is true of both the Japanese and the 
early KMT periods. At the same time, it is important not to equate the imposition of 
official languages (Japanese or Mandarin) with coercion. Language policy is 
fundamentally ideological, and as such it serves to mask coercion by imbuing those who 
control the official language with greater legitimacy. At the same time, however, only by 
understanding the continuity in the ruling historical bloc under both the Japanese and the 
KMT can we see that the transition form Japanese to Mandarin as Taiwan’s official 
language did not mark a fundamental transformation of the nature of hegemony in 
Taiwan. 
 
The Construction of Linguistic Markets During the Japanese Era (1895-1945) 
Japanese Language Policy 
Early on, the Japanese devoted considerable effort to teaching Japanese to their new 
colony. The first Japanese Language Institute was established in 1895, under the direction 
of Izawa Shuji Φጏࡹʆ, whose battle for Western-style public education had fallen on 
deaf ears in Japan, and who saw a chance to implement his ambitions policies in the new 
colony (Tsurumi, 1984: 13). Izawa saw the role of the Japanese colonial government as 
that of patient educators who could uplift the Taiwanese by example, not unlike the views 
of that other famous colonialist, Thomas Macaulay (Macaulay, 1952). For Izawa, “Japan 
was to guide Taiwan in a ‘teacher-student pattern’” (Heylen, 2001: 136). Unfortunately 
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for Izawa, in January of 1896, while he was away in Japan recruiting teachers rebels, 
rebels attacked the school in Shisangan ڦʲד  (Zhīshānyán), killing six teachers 
(Tsurumi, 1977: 15). While the event was later used by the KMT to symbolize Taiwanese 
resistance to the Japanese, under the Japanese it was to become a symbol of the sacrifice 
and devotion of the teachers who died. On the first anniversary of the event, six of the 
former students “including the only female, Ke Qiujie - cut off their Qing-style queues 
before the teacher’s tombs” (Fong, 199: 140). While the symbolism of this event would 
be resurrected during the wartime Kominka movement, it was too late for Izawa, who 
was forced to resign in face of differences over his assimilationist goals (Tai, 1999: 512). 
The Kodama 䤼΃ກʩࡈ administration, which assumed control in 1898, replaced the 
Language Institutes with “with common schools (kogakko) [公學校], providing a 
six-year course elementary education” (Heylen, 2001: 136). But these schools were a far 
cry of Izawa’s dream of universal public education. There was practically no government 
funding for the schools, and “all school expenses except the salaries of Japanese teachers 
were charged to the local school district” (Heylen, 2001: 140; Tai, 1999: 512; Tsurumi, 
1984: 280-81).  
 Initially, the Japanese common schools were unable to compete with the 
traditional Chinese private schools (shōbo 書房 in Japanese) to which many of the local 
elite still sent their children. In 1898, attendance at shōbo outnumbered that of common 
schools 29,941 to 7,838,2 numbers which are all the more striking when compared with 
only 17,000 students in the shōbo the previous year (Heylen, 2001: 137)! The continued 
popularity of the shōbo can be partially explained by the fact that, even though the 
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traditional Confucian examination system had been dismantled by the Japanese, the local 
elite were not convinced that Japanese rule would last for very long (2001: 137; Tsurumi, 
1984: 283, n. 20). The popularity of the shōbo, and the fact that funding for the common 
schools depended upon the generosity of the local elite, created a situation where the 
Japanese were forced to offer classes in the Chinese classics in order to lure students 
away from the shōbo.  
During their first four years in common school, children worked their way 
from the Three Character Classic primer up to the Analects of Confucius 
under the eagle eye of a native scholar. Only in the fifth and sixth grades 
did they learn to read these texts in tortured Japanese “upside-down” 
fashion. Most attention was given to written and spoken Japanese, but 
Confucian ethics were inculcated with the Japanese written syllabary and 
pronounciation system (Tsurumi, 1984: 283). 
When the Education Bureau completed the seven year process of creating new textbooks 
for the common school system in 1906, the texts made extensive use of Hoklo 
translations3 for the purpose of teaching Japanese (Heylen, 2001: 142-43). The Japanese 
policies were effective, and by 1918, Shōbo attendance was insignificant compared to the 
large number of students at common schools (2001: 149).4 By 1920, a quarter of 
Taiwan’s school aged population was in school, and nearly forty percent of school-aged 
boys (Tsurumi, 1984: 286). 
 Despite the educational gains signified by the slow advance of public schooling, 
upward mobility was severely restricted for Taiwanese students. Students were frequently 
denied admission to the more prestigious primary schools on the basis of “Japanese 
language backwardness” (1984: 289). But when the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, 
Japan sought to integrate its colony more closely into the empire. The Kominka 
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movementߘͻˣ – literally, a movement for the “imperialization of subject people” - 
aimed to create greater loyalty to the emperor through a number of policies, including 
language and education reforms (Tai, 1999: 517). Most significantly, public education 
was expanded, and by 1942 nearly sixty-five percent of the school aged population, and 
more than half of the females, were in school (Friedman, 2002; Tsurumi, 1984: 291). 
 Japanese efforts to promote the Japanese language under Kominka seem to follow 
Bourdieu’s dictum that pedagogy is about establishing the “legitimacy of the dominant 
culture” (i.e. creating consumers of culture) as opposed to actually providing the skills 
necessary to participate in the production of that culture (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 
38-41). As of 1920, the colonial government’s statistics show only 2.86 percent of the 
population as able to understand Japanese (Chou, 1991: 63). It was not until 1929 that a 
program was established to teach Japanese to those outside of the common school 
system: 
These programs were generally called “Japanese study programs” (kokugo 
koshojo [國語講習所]). The Taiwanese aged between 12 and 25 who did 
not speak Japanese were eligible for enrollment. The programs did not 
charge any tuition; the minimum number of schooling days was 100 days 
a year and 2-3 hours of study each day. One could finish the program in a 
period ranging from 1 year to 4 years. Yet, because of budget shortages 
and the need to accommodate the peasant’s farm work schedules, the 
government offered a compromised version of this language study 
program, with a shorter study period (60 days a year) for people over 25. 
Schools of this sort were referred to as “basic Japanese study programs” 
(kan’i kokugo koshojo [簡易國語講習所]). There outreach programs 
expanded quickly. By April 1937, there were 2,812 “Japanese study 
programs,” with 185,590 students, and 1,555 “basic Japanese study 
programs,” with 77,782 students (1991: 64-65). 
109 
The impact of these programs is questionable. In 1940 one man reported that his mother, 
who had been in such a study program for a full year, was unable to speak “even a word 
of Japanese” (1991: 66). 
 While there was a rapid expansion in basic schooling in Japanese at the very end 
of the Japanese period, Kominka era language policies were primarily inducements for 
elite families to adopt Japanese manners and speech. The two most important campaigns 
were the “National Language Family” (੣დࣂࣙ) program started in 1937, and the 
“Name Changing Campaign” (ӣֽϐ) started in 1940 (1991). It was only at this late 
date (1937) that Chinese was banned from the newspapers and Chinese courses were 
eliminated from the common schools, who no longer had to compete with the shōbo 
(1991: 69). (Although, as I discuss below, there still was some limited Chinese allowed in 
the newspapers.) The National Language Family program did not originate at the national 
level, but at the level of the local prefecture government in Taihoku (now Taipei), and 
was subsequently copied by other prefectures (1991: 73). Importantly, the designation of 
a family as a one that spoke the national language was a privilege, not a requirement. The 
Japanese colonial administration dolled out this particular form of Japanese cultural 
capital as a means of buying off the elite. Gramsci pointed out that the use of corruption 
is typical of those situations where “it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and 
when the use of force is too risky” (Gramsci et al., 1972: 79, n. 49).5 It carried a number 
of significant benefits. In addition to a certificate, a medal, and a plaque that was placed 
on the outside of the house, there were a number of other privileges to induce families to 
get certified: 
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First, the children of such families would be allowed to enter an 
elementary school were the majority of students were ethnic Japanese ... 
Second, their children would enjoy favorable consideration when they 
were trying to enter a high school. Third, the members of such families 
would be given priority over others for employment in government 
offices ... and in public organizations. Fourth, the members of such 
families enjoyed better chances of getting certain business licenses. ... 
Apart from these specific benefits, they were to “enjoy convenience and 
receive special favor whenever possible” (Chou, 1991: 78) 
But the conditions for gaining certification were quite stringent: “Officially there were 
two conditions to meet. (1) The condition of being a Japanese-speaking family... (2) The 
condition of showing enthusiasm to cultivate the Japanese spirit ... if its members 
selflessly devoted themselves to war-time donations or voluntary labor” (Fong, 1993: 
120). And there were even more conditions that were attached at the prefectural level:  
(1) the extent to which family members communicate in Japanese, taking 
into consideration their motives, efforts, and duration, (2) the extent to 
which they had been Japanized in religion, clothing, and daily life, and (3) 
the extent to which they had become true citizens by paying taxes, 
interacting with the metropolitans, and involving in community service 
(Fong, 1993: 121). 
The difficulty of getting certified meant that only a small portion of families were able to 
do so. “By April 1942, there were 9,604 such families, involving 77,679 individuals, 
constituting about 1.3 percent of the total population of Taiwan” who had managed to be 
certified as National Language speaking households (Chou, 1991: 80). Although the 
standards varied from district to district, with some districts only requiring “people who 
understand Japanese,” and others with much more stringent requirements (1991: 77). 
 In 1940 the government changed the rules so that it became possible, for the first 
time, for families to legally adopt Japanese names (1991: 113). The requirements to 
qualify for name changing were similar to those for becoming a National Language 
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speaking family, although less stringent. The use of the Japanese language at home was 
required, but not to the same degree, as was “enthusiasm” about “Japanization” (1991: 
115-17). Even though far more people adopted Japanese names than had sought 
certification as National Language speaking households, those who changed their names 
still represented a small portion of the total population. They were mostly the educated 
elite: government employees, such as “policement, primary school teachers, local 
government staff,” or merchants, doctors, and other professionals (1991: 131-34). 
Although there were a burst of name changes in the last months of Japanese rule, after the 
government eased restrictions in 1944, by 1943 only 17,526 families (or 126,211 
individuals out of a population of over six million) had changed their names (1991: 128; 
population estimate from Huang, 1995: 32).  
 Some of the resistance to name changing derived from rules which prevented the 
Japanese name from being easily derived from the Chinese name. This was especially 
troubling for Chinese who have a strong proscription against same-surname marriages 
(1991: 143). Similarly, the Japanese names were also not supposed to reflect the place of 
origin of the family, as was the case with Chinese names. This was an obvious attempt to 
undermine the place-of-origin based alliances among the Taiwanese population, which 
had caused so much havoc during the Qing era (1991: 148). Nonetheless, Taiwanese 
creatively found many creative ways around such restrictions, and it was often possible to 
guess from the Japanese name what the Chinese name had been (1991: 140). 
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Resistance and Alternative Language Markets Under Japanese Rule 
To a certain extent, the Japanese succeeded in creating a generation of elite Taiwanese 
who identified with Japanese language, and culture. But it was only after the start of the 
Sino-Japanese War that they began to fully embrace the idea of the assimilation of the 
local population. During the early years of Japanese rule, assimilation was seen as a 
threat to the authority of the Japanese colonial elite. This can best be seen by the quick 
reaction to the Taiwanese “Assimilation Society” created in 1914, under the leadership of 
Count Itagaki Taisuke ؼܖਃѫ (Chen, 1972: 478-80; Fong, 1993: 79; Heylen, 2001: 
170-71). Because of Itagaki’s high stature in Japan (he had been a prominent figure in the 
Meiji Restoration), the government waited for Itagaki to leave the country in 1915, before 
launching attacks against Japanese members of the society in the local papers, causing its 
collapse (Chen, 1972: 480; Fong, 1993: 79). Despite this setback, many Taiwanese 
continued to try to work within the system, fighting for Taiwan and Taiwanese to have 
greater autonomy within the Japanese Empire. Most notably was the Taiwan Parliament 
Petition Movement ͔ᝰᙰ๢௏໰ቂᘟར੃ (Táiwān yìhuì shèzhì qǐngyuàn yùndòng) 
established in 1920 in response to the reinforcement of the much hated 1896 law, “law 
number 63,” which, while it made steps towards encouraging assimilation, “preserved the 
legislative power of the government-general and thus continued to hinder Taiwanese 
legal assimilation” (Tai, 1999: 513, see also: Chen, 1972: 484; Heylen, 2001: 225). Such 
efforts were not to succeed until the very end of the Japanese era when, in 1945, 
Taiwanese won the right to limited representation in the Japanese Imperial Diet (Kerr, 
1965: 35). 
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 During the last years of Japanese rule, more and more Taiwanese were able to 
gain access to higher education. While their options in the colony were restricted to 
medical and teaching academies, many were able to gain admittance to the top 
universities in Japan. There, they were exposed to the latest teachings on nationalism, 
socialism, and other ‘subversive’ ideas. One of the central forces behind the Parliament 
Petition Movement was the New People’s Society ๙ͻ๢ (Xīnmín huì), founded by 
Taiwanese students studying in Tokyo in 1920 (Chen, 1972: 482; Chou, 1991: 20). Soon 
after their founding, the organization started a bilingual (Japanese and Chinese) journal 
called Tai-Oan Chheng Lian ͔ᝰۍϷ (Taiwan Youth, Táiwān qīngnián in Mandarin), 
which eventually transformed into “the only Taiwanese owned daily newspaper” the 
Taiwan New People’s News ͔ᝰ๙ͻై (Táiwān xīnmín bào) in 1932. It was in the 
pages of these papers that the Taiwan Nationalist Movement ͔ᝰͻ૰ར੃ (Táiwān 
mínzú yùndòng) can be said to have first taken shape (Heylen, 2001: 236). 
 While the kominka movement had banned the local languages from the schools 
and newspapers, and seemingly made Taiwan more Japanese, a small number of elites 
were developing the seeds of a new Taiwanese nationalist culture, grounded not in 
classical Chinese, but in the languages of ordinary Taiwanese. Influenced by the 
vernacular writing, or baihua Ώ༽  (báihuà), movement in China, Taiwanese 
intellectuals debated whether it would be better to use Chinese characters or a Romanized 
orthography to preserve the Hoklo language spoken by most Taiwanese (Fong, 1993: 
174; Friedman, 2002). 1920 was the year that vernacular Mandarin Chinese was first 
114 
introduced into the primary schools in Republican China, using the newly devised 
orthographic system, the National Phonetic Symbols (ٍࡗ୸༚ zhùyīn fúhào) (Heylen, 
2001: 326). At the same time a “nativist literature” was growing in China and Japan, 
which also influenced the Taiwan Youth writers (2001: 377). While there were strong 
advocates for creating such a literature in Hoklo, much of these debates was actually 
carried out in written Mandarin vernacular (2001: 281). According to Ann Heylen, the 
“Written Taiwanese movement was not intended to create a separation from Han cultural 
identity,” but sought to maintain those connections by “defining their own place within 
the Chinese language” (2001: 383). This has not stopped contemporary writers from 
seeing this movement as an incipient Taiwanese nationalist movement (2001: 383).This 
was not so easy to do. Already, “proponents for a Written Taiwanese were confronted 
with a dilemma”: 
On the one hand, they had to provide solid arguments that Taiwanhua 
[Hoklo] was not a dialect, and on the other hand, they had to find a means 
to show that the creation of a written Taiwanese was not trying to break 
away from the tradition of a unified language for the Chinese nation. 
(2001: 426) 
One solution to this dilemma was to demonstrate the rich heritage of existing Hoklo 
vernacular culture. Between 1934 and 1936, the Taiwan Literary Association (Ⴉᝰ̂ᗠ
ᑸຽ Táiwān wényì liánméng) published several anthologies of “popular literature, 
which included folksongs, nursery rhymes and legends,” and even riddles (2001: 433).  
 The publication of such materials up until the start of the kominka movement in 
1937 raises the important question of why the colonial authorities tolerated such 
publications? Especially considering the reaction of the government to earlier expressions 
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of Taiwanese autonomy. Heylen points out several reasons: (1) the publications were 
censored, (2) the government used such journals as an important source of information, 
and (3) the readership represented “the new colonial elite, which formed one of 
indispensable backbones in the economic development of the colony” who bought the 
many Japanese products advertised in the pages of these papers (2001: 439). The 
Government even officially sponsored several publications on Taiwanese language and 
culture, and a “burgeoning” Japanese entertainment industry promoted songs and movies 
in Hoklo (2001: 442). While Heylen’s reasoning makes sense, it is important to put this 
flourishing of Taiwanese culture within a wider context. The period between 1919 and 
1936 was one in which Taiwan was under civilian, rather than military 
Governor-Generals. This greater liberalism in Japanese colonial policy corresponded to a 
period of greater liberalism within Japanese politics as well (Peattie, 1984: 20). However, 
when Japanese liberalism was pushed aside with the start of the Sino-Japanese war, it 
was not possible to completely reverse the effects of the policies of the liberal era. This 
was due, in part, to war time political-economic developments which served to strengthen 
Taiwan’s landowning elite.  
 
The Formation of Historical Blocs under the Japanese 
Desiring for the colony to be both profitable and to supply the mainland with much 
needed raw materials, much of Taiwan’s agricultural land was given over to sugar 
production. While the norm for colonial sugar production is a plantation style economy, 
the strength of the small-renter class in Taiwan prevented the Japanese from proceeding 
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along the same lines (Ka, 1995: xvii, 100). In 1909, the one major attempt at forcing the 
sale of land to the sugar company resulted in a violent uprising and ended with the 
resignation of the civil affairs bureau chief (Ka, 1995: 95). Instead, the Japanese were 
forced to increase local productivity through agricultural technology and attempt to force 
sugar cultivation through control of the local markets. The result was as impressive as 
anything accomplished by the post-war Green Revolution. Government investment in 
irrigation projects, fertilizers, and training increased productivity over eighty-one percent 
by 1938 (Friedman, 2002; Ka, 1995: 61)! Despite inroads in state control of the 
agricultural sector, rice subsidies for Japan’s farmers in the 1930s had the effect of 
raising prices and greatly increasing the profitability of growing rice as opposed to sugar. 
As increased productivity made this class ever stronger, the Japanese countered by 
strengthening tenant’s rights and organizing farmer’s cooperatives (Ka, 1995: 174-75) 
(Friedman, 2002). Still, the living standard’s of Taiwan’s peasants, and the power and 
autonomy of its landowning farmers, increased dramatically (1995: 144). 
 The tenant’s associations formed by the Japanese were an attempt to stifle any 
incipient class consciousness emerging among the tenants: 
It is interesting that, despite the diversity of peasant grievances and issues, 
only one area - that of landlord-tenant relations - was chosen by the 
Japanese for remedial efforts. ... Class interests could not be allowed to 
develop ... The choice rested with the formation of landlord-tenant 
associations (Gyodenkai) modeled on those in existence in Japan. They 
were quasi-governmental, quasi-private bodies (Wickberg, 1976: 572). 
Although these organizations never included more than one percent of Taiwan’s rural 
population (1976: 573), they laid the institutional groundwork for how the KMT would 
work with local farmers (see Chapter 6). Equally important were local irrigation 
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associations, which had been important even before the Japanese period, but which were 
heavily subsidized by the Japanese. “84 percent of the irrigated area came under the 
supervision of semi-official irrigation associations” (Ka, 1995: 61).  
 It was also during the Japanese period that elections were implemented at the 
local level in Taiwan. In the thirties, in response to political activism on the part of the 
Taiwanese elite, and at a time that the Japanese government felt the need to rally support 
for the oncoming war, limited local elections were allowed for the purpose of choosing 
half the members of local assemblies (the rest being appointed by the Japanese).  
The franchise for these early elections was extremely limited: only men 
over the age of 25 who paid more than five yen in taxes each year could 
vote, and voter rolls and campaign materials were subject to police 
approval. In 1935, 187,000 persons were qualified to vote, comprising 
14.6 percent of Taiwan's Japanese residents and 3.8 percent of the 
Taiwanese population (Rigger, 1999: 36).  
Although franchise was limited, the symbolic importance of these elections must not be 
underestimated. They established democratic traditions in Taiwan, even if they did not 
develop substantive democracy. It served the interests of the Japanese by “dividing local 
elites, encouraging ambitious Taiwanese to develop individual political bases instead of 
joining organized movements” (1999: 37-38). It also socialized Taiwanese into the rituals 
of electoral politics, with nearly 300,000 Taiwanese registered to vote by 1939 (1999: 
37-38). This would have important long term consequences when the KMT crushed 
Taiwanese dreams of democracy after World War II. But, by the time that elections had 
started to become a regular feature of Taiwanese life, Japan was drawn into World War II, 
and military authorities shifted the colony to wartime footing, putting an end to these 
democratic experiments. But the precedent was set, and all of these institutions: local 
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elections, semi-official local associations, etc. would be adapted by the KMT to solidify 
their legitimacy in Taiwan. 
 
The Poetry Societies 
Before proceeding to discuss the transformation of Taiwan’s political economy under the 
KMT, it is first necessary to take a moment to explore a lingering division within the 
Taiwanese elite. At the end of the Qing era, those who had embraced the Confucian 
education system either fled the country or embraced the Japanese (see Chapter 3). These 
bureaucrats, beholden to the state, were allowed to keep their Classical Chinese cultural 
capital throughout the Japanese era. Not surprisingly, they were not supporters of the new 
vernacular Hoklo culture. They had invested heavily in the cultural capital of Classical 
Chinese for hundreds of years, and were not about to let it go. Those who had remained 
in Taiwan after the Japanese arrived were not much of a threat to the Japanese regime, 
and in addition to providing Classical Chinese education in the common schools, they 
also encouraged the continuation of the poetry societies.  
The formation of local poetry societies, construction of garden estates and 
artistic accomplishments, such as painting and calligraphy during 
Qing-Taiwan are clear manifestations of the integration of the Taiwanese 
frontier society into the Chinese cultural sphere. This development did not 
occur until the beginning of the 19th century (Heylen, 2001: 74). 
These societies continued into the Japanese era, but not without changes. Under the 
Japanese the membership was much younger, and “consisted of propertied gentry cut off 
form the traditional method of joining the government, which was by passing civil 
service examinations” (Fong, 1993: 167). Over time they lost their literary focus and 
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became dues-collecting social clubs with regularly scheduled meetings (Heylen, 2001: 
152-53). While they may initially have been a forum for expressing nationalist sentiment, 
they were quickly appropriated by the Japanese regime, which gave them official support 
(Fong, 1993: 167). Heylen points out that the continuation of these societies should not 
be seen as a form of resistance to the Japanese regime: 
An examination of the membership of these three poetry societies shows 
that its leading members all came from wealthy and prominent families, 
and were in regular contact with the Japanese colonial authorities. More 
importantly, a relatively large number of them had adapted to the changes 
brought about under colonial rule. Some of them openly supported the 
Japanese educational policy and criticized the incompetence of Qing 
scholarship (Heylen, 2001: 154). 
The poetry societies offered young Taiwanese an avenue for advancement within colonial 
social life. The societies would hold contests, and the poems of the winners would be 
published in the newspapers - an activity much decried by the advocates of vernacular 
Hoklo culture(Fong, 1993: 17; Heylen, 2001: 333; Hsiao, 1990). Most revealing is that 
when Chinese was banned from the newspapers in 1937, the printing of poetry society 
poems was allowed to continue (Fong, 1993: 168). 
 
Consent and Coercion after Retrocession 
Disappointment and rebellion. 
Having already won some concessions from the Japanese colonial administration during 
the 1930s, the Taiwanese had every reason to believe that they could expect their new 
Chinese rulers would create an even more equitable society in which ethnic identity 
would not be a barrier to social advancement. There was reason to believe that the large 
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state enterprises and the huge tracts of land they had owned under Japanese rule would be 
distributed to the Taiwanese people and that there would be a significant movement 
towards even greater local autonomy and political self-determination. But it would be 
wrong to consider these beliefs as the embodiment of an incipient Chinese or Taiwanese 
nationalism. By the 1930s few Taiwanese believed that unification with China or 
independence were serious possibilities, and most were resigned to their fate as part of 
the Japanese empire, worrying only about the degree of autonomy Taiwan might expect, 
as well as overcoming the ethnic barriers instituted by the Japanese. Yet, as Fong 
Shiaw-chian has shown, cultural identification of Taiwanese with Japan was only skin 
deep (Fong, 1993). With a few exceptions (Aborigines, in particular, had come to identify 
with the Japanese), the Taiwanese were quite happy to shed their Japanese identities as 
soon as they were once again under Chinese rule. But there was reason for people to 
believe that the modernist project which Colonialism had forcefully imposed upon them 
would continue; that the institutional norms which had been legitimated by Japanese 
nationalism would continue under a different brand name. Because the most apparent 
form of inequality under Japanese colonial rule was racially based, it seemed entirely 
likely that Chinese rulers would provide a fairer and more equitable form of rule. 
 These hopes did not last long. The KMT viewed Taiwan as an asset in the 
Chinese Civil War. They viewed the population with suspicion, considering them too 
Japanese,6 as well as potential Communist sympathizers. Not planning to stay in Taiwan 
for long, they were happy allow officers and soldiers to plunder the local resources for 
the war effort as well as for their personal enrichment. The 30,000 soldiers who arrived in 
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the months after the Japanese surrender were paid very little, and were “were expected to 
fend for themselves on Formosa as they did on the mainland, and here they did very 
well” (Kerr, 1965: 98). From petty theft to wholesale plunder of Taiwan’s industrial 
legacy from the Japanese era, looting was the economic policy for the first years of KMT 
rule. Governor Chen Yi ௿ᄮ (Chén Yí) even dignified it with the title Necessary State 
Socialism (੣ࣂڋ๢̠໴ guójiā shèhuìzhǔyì) (Kerr, 1965: 97-98) Grain reserves, and 
even the island’s youth were appropriated for the war effort (1965: 104, 107). Rather than 
relief from the kind of war time expropriation of people and resources that the island’s 
population had endured under the Japanese, it soon looked only as if things would get 
worse.  
 It was only a matter of time before matters came to a head. In anticipation of the 
oncoming confrontation, Chen Yi sought to undermine the authority of the local elite by 
establishing an Anti-hoarding Campaign in which prominent local men were put in 
charge of rice-collection and then blamed for the shortages. Gangsters were brought over 
who “were used to incite riots and raids on private warehouses,” protected by a general 
amnesty “anyone who broke open private buildings and revealed hoarded stocks” (1965: 
108). 
the Governor's anti-hoarding campaign appears to have been one of his 
earliest moves to discredit and destroy the educated, middle class which 
had begun to emerge in the late years of the Japanese era. These were the 
gentry, small, independent landholders who also had modest investments 
in shops and small industries in the towns. They represented the articulate 
Opposition. The Nationalist Government, Party and Army were 
responsible for food shortages and the threatened crisis, but measures 
taken to cope with the situation were clearly designed to set Formosans 
one against another (1965: 109). 
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For the local elite, one of the most troubling developments was the matter of property 
which had been jointly owned between locals and Japanese. Under Japanese rule local 
businessmen had been forced to take on Japanese partners, now the KMT called this 
“collaboration with the enemy” and used these partnerships as an excuse to confiscate all 
such jointly held property (1965: 122). These were all confiscated by the government, 
either directly, or though financial trickery that tied up local assets in large denomination 
bills, only to declare a freeze on all assets in such large denominations (1965: 125).  
 All of Taiwan’s major industries were quickly reorganized either under the direct 
control of the state, or into companies owned by Chen Yi and his commissioners (1965: 
139-40). The new Taiwanese government existed for the welfare of the mainland 
refugees: 
In due course there were to be found on Formosa about 1600 generals, 
nearly 200 admirals and enough bureaucrats to govern the whole of 
mainland China. Room had to be made for all of them, and all had to be 
fed by the Formosan people (1965: 367). 
Meanwhile, unemployment had become a grave problem for the once prosperous 
Taiwanese. Local industries which had once employed nearly 50,000 people could no 
longer support even 5,000 (1965: 141).While heavy taxes, corruption, looting, etc. are 
often mentioned as the precipitating causes of the February 28th uprising, it should be 
noted that it was in the beginning of February that Chen Yi announced his plans for the 
distribution of confiscated Japanese properties. Plans that clearly excluded the local elite 
(1965: 243-44). 
 Local frustrations exploded in an island wide rebellion on February 28, 1947. The 
reaction was swift, and brutal. With reinforcements from the mainland, the KMT brutally 
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crushed the rebellion, and began a systematic forty year campaign against the local elite, 
many of whom were killed, imprisoned, or simply “disappeared” in what is known as the 
White Terror.7 Martial law was established,8 and dissent was stifled. Elections were 
allowed on the local level to placate the Americans who renewed their support of the 
KMT in the wake of the Korean War, promoting Taiwan as a bastion of democracy 
against the onslaught of Communism (1965: 396), but the only opposition parties were 
those who had been officially sanctioned. It is arguable that these early elections helped 
pave the way for Taiwan’s eventual transition to democracy (see Chapter 6) but Taiwan 
was still far from living up to its “Free China” moniker.  
 Central to the maintenance of military rule was the KMT’s strict control over the 
local media. Starting in 1951 only the thirty one officially approved newspapers were 
granted permission to publish, with the number of sanctioned papers remaining fixed 
until 1988, after the lifting of martial law (Rigger, 1999: 73). Most radio and television 
stations were directly owned by the KMT (1999: 73-74). 
 As I have shown, the KMT was brutal in its suppression of the population’s desire 
for self determination, bloodily eliminating many of the local elite, restricting the 
expression of divergent opinions in politics or the media. This is important to keep in 
mind as we now turn to the ideological means by which the KMT sought to win popular 
consent, for no matter how brutal, no dictatorship can survive without some degree of 
legitimacy. Yet even its efforts to gain legitimacy were backed by a culture of fear: fear 
of the party, as well fear of the Communist “bandits,” against whom the KMT were 
ostensibly fighting long after the civil war had ended. 
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Defending Culture 
While the fiction of democracy may have been important in maintaining the support of 
the United States, within Taiwan legitimacy was maintained by the notion that the 
Republic of China (ROC 中華民國 Zhōnghuá mínguó), in the body of the KMT party 
and its leaders, was the last bastion of “traditional Chinese culture.” 
Traditional Chinese culture was ultimately a "political" culture in the 
general sense of embracing the entire polity and in the specific sense of 
representing the various institutions in power, that is the Nationalist 
government, Nationalist party ideology, a Nationalist community bound 
by a single language, history, and civilization. (Chun, 2000: 11) 
The official ideology was embodied in the study Sun Yat-sen’sࢾන̬ (Sūn Yìxiān) 
Three Principles of the People (ʓͻ̠໴ Sānmínzhǔyì). This text “was not a formal 
treatise written by the author but a collection of essays compiled and edited 
posthumously, then credited to him” (Chun, 1994: 61). Perhaps even more important than 
Sun’s contribution, for the application of his ideas to the creation of a national ideology, 
were “the two supplementary chapters on the principle of livelihood appended by Chiang 
Kaishek [ሣ˓Ε (Jiǎng Jièshí)]” (1994: 61). These tied together political ideology and 
Confucian values, “narrowly defined” in terms of filial piety, which naturally extended 
toward the party and its leaders (1994: 63).  
 The education system was the central means of promoting this ideology. Starting 
in 1953, the national curriculum included textbooks on the Three Principles of the People, 
and “In 1968, the curriculum was revised more or less permanently, with courses at the 
elementary level focusing upon 'life and ethics' and courses at the secondary level 
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focusing upon 'citizenship and morality'” (1994: 63). This was embodied in the concept 
of Spiritual Education精神教育 (jīngshén jiàoyù which was aimed “not only to help 
bolster Taiwan’s defenses in case of a PRC military attack, but also to protect young, 
impressionable students from falling prey to communism itself” (Strawn, 1999: 111). The 
military and cultural battle against Communist China were linked together through the 
introduction of military training into the schools. The importance of this program cannot 
be understated, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuoሣ໪੣ (Jiǎng Jīngguó) was 
the directory of both the Youth Corps ˁ੣ۍϷ૥੣࿌  (Zhōngguó qīngnián 
jiùguótuán) which was in charge of student military training (1999: 110). Within the 
schools a special position was created, that of the military training instructor (教官
jiàoguān). 
These figures were on campus 24 hours a day, and were required to be 
KMT members. They taught military training class, made sure student 
obeyed rules about clothing and apperance, made sure daily rituals such as 
flag-raising went smoothly, and organized periodic military drill and song 
competitons. They were also expected to keep order in the schoolyard. 
Keeping order was part of protecting national security and included … 
making sure students and school staff did not engage in treasonous or 
anti-KMT sentiment. (1999: 113). 
After graduation from school, “Two years of mandatory military service for young men 
offered a venue for even more intensive indoctrination in the KMT's ideology and 
mission” (Rigger, 1999: 72). There was also moral education for the family and 
community through a variety of civic organizations, such as women’s groups who handed 
out prizes to model citizens on national holidays (Chun, 1994: 58). 
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Historical Blocs under the KMT: Land Reform 
The KMT’s legitimacy rested not only on ideology and fear, but eventually on the 
tremendous success of Taiwan’s economic development. However, the KMT’s economic 
policies, especially those associated with land reform, served to bolster the status of the 
ruling historical bloc while undermining the powerful rural landowning class. It was only 
with Taiwan’s transition to an export oriented economy in the seventies that this class 
would reemerge as a political power house. Nonetheless, while Taiwan remained poor 
throughout the fifties, reforms implemented during that time were to have a spectacular 
effect on Taiwan’s later development, which was truly “miraculous” in both its depth and 
in the equitability of its effects: 
Between 1960 and 1980, per capita GNP increased from US$130 to 
US$2,100. Taiwan's GNP growth rate from 1960 to 1982 averaged 8.4 
percent per year. At the same time, income distribution remained 
relatively egalitarian9 (Rigger, 1999: 70) 
Much of the credit for the Taiwan “miracle” goes to the successful implementation of 
land reform during the fifties (Gold, 1986, Krugman, 1994).10 While there is no doubt 
that land reform did help relieve class tensions, and stimulated the economy by moving 
wealthy landowners into the industrial sector, it is easy to make too much of land 
reform’s impact on Taiwan’s political economy. For one thing, as we have shown in our 
discussion of land ownership under the Qing (Chapter 3), and during the Japanese era 
(above), land reform was already relatively equitable before the imposition of reforms. 
While the existing system of tenant farming was tremendously exploitative, it was 
necessitated in part by the economic unfeasibility of the small plots of land owned by 
Taiwan’s numerous landowners.  
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Prior to implementation of the “land to the Tiller” policy in June 1952, 
only 0.82% (5,051 households) of all households owing private farmland 
held over 10 chia (Bain, 1993: 30, n. 5) 
So, when the Land-to-the-Tiller program was implemented in 1953, “the holdings of a 
vast number of small-scale landlords [were] redistributed to the tillers” (1993: 30). 
Before the reforms more than half (55%) of all farm households were comprised of 
tenants, accounting for 38% of all privately-owned farmland. After the reforms the 
percentage of tenant farming households was reduced to 26%, accounting for only 15% 
of privately-owned farmland (1993: 29). However, because of the large number of 
landowners who owned small plots of land11, the recipients of the Land-to-the-Tiller 
program were stuck “operating uneconomic holdings”12 (1993: 30). Moreover, officially 
these new owner-operators were actually still tenants, with the state as their landlord. 
Over the following ten years, “inflation and low agricultural prices” made it difficult for 
many farmers to repay (1993: 32). Was this as Bain states, citing Hill Gates (Gates, 1987: 
50), “a deliberate policy to force impoverished workers off farms and into poorly-paid 
factory employment” (Bain, 1993: 34)? Perhaps not, Bain argues that there were real 
constraints “imposed by population density on the availability of land at that time” (Bain, 
1993: 34). Nonetheless, this was the net effect of policies that failed to take these 
constraints into account. 
 The traditional model holds that payments to landlords allowed them to move out 
of unproductive agricultural work and become successful capitalist entrepreneurs. There 
is some truth to this, but the nature of the actual compensation offered to landlords must 
be taken into account. Bain argues that too much is made of the entrepreneurial successes 
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of a few landlords, arguing that they were the exception, not the rule (1993: 33). They 
were offered bonds and shares in state owned enterprises, many of which proved to be 
worthless: 
A survey of landlords made following the rent reduction phase of land 
reform in 1949 … suggests that commentators who recorded the 
successful transfer of landlord capital were generalizing from the 
experience of a few larger landlords. Village-level investigation during the 
1960s into the effects of the reform caused one research to comment that: 
“Until the bond problem is solved the land reform will remain successful 
only on one side.... As to what actually happened it was rather unfair to the 
majority of landlords” (1993: 33) 
The biggest problem was, as noted, very few of the landlords owned substantial amounts 
of land. Thus, their compensation was also negligible. But many of the state-owned 
enterprises in which they received shares were “economically unstable”  
 “I received a letter stating that the company was in financial difficulty 
and sought to solicit further support form me. I gave my shares to my 
sister as they were of no use to me” … Many landlords throughout Taiwan 
liquidated their bonds (1993: 33) 
Does this history support Gates’ contention “that the program was designed as much to 
destroy the emergent middle class … as it was to aid the landless peasant” (Gates, 1996: 
221; Kerr, 1965: 420)? Perhaps not, but it does seem to have that effect upon the large 
number of landlords who did not own substantial amounts of land.  
 
Language policy after Retrocession 
The promotion of Mandarin as the National Language 
As we have seen, during the martial law years, the entire repressive apparatus of the state 
was largely devoted to enriching state coffers and repressing the development of the local 
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bourgeoisie. Large state enterprise was favored over the petty-commodity production 
engaged in by the native elites (Gates, 1996: 215). During these years, ethnic differences 
between Taiwanese and Mainlanders, divided society. Even Taiwanese who were 
successfully able to convincingly adopt the habitus of the Mainlander elite were “gently 
but incessantly reminded of [their] origins” (Gates, 1981: 254). In 1974, even though 
Mainlanders accounted for only 12 percent of the population, they accounted for nearly 
half (49 percent) of government officials and school employees (1981: 255). 
 Political repression during the martial law years was accompanied by cultural 
policies which simultaneously repressed local languages and cultures, as well as those 
associated with the Japanese era, 13  and promoted a nationalist Chinese identity 
associated with the culture and history of mainland China and the Mandarin Chinese 
language. KMT party members and Chiang Kai-shek loyalists were granted all the 
positions of power in the new government, yet the legacy of Japanese technology and 
institutions forced them to rely heavily upon Japanese educated Taiwanese who could 
read existing technical manuals, government records, etc. (Gates, 1996: 212, 16). As late 
as the 1970s, very few of the Japanese era documents had been translated into Chinese 
(1996: 216, n. 3)! Such dependence, however, was kept relatively secret, as all vestiges of 
the Japanese language were officially banned from public discourse, newspapers, 
magazines and classrooms in 1946 (Friedman, 2002; Hsiau, 1997: 306). English language 
classes had also flourished during the period of transition between Japanese and KMT 
rule (Kerr, 1965: 206-07). Bombarded with U.S. propaganda during the last years of 
Japanese rule, the Taiwanese had every reason to expect the U.S. to put an end to military 
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rule and grant them greater local autonomy. There were even several small English 
language newspapers published during this period, encouraging people to study English 
(1965: 210-11). The KMT sought to undermine the growing desire for American-style 
democracy called for by American propaganda and local English-language publications 
alike (1965: 216,19). Accordingly, “Governor Chen's office began a campaign to 
undermine Formosan trust in the United States Government and people, and the United 
Nations”:  
He therefore launched a new English-language journal, the New Taiwan 
Monthly with a dual purpose. It could be used as a vehicle for 
anti-American propaganda within Formosa, and it could be used abroad as 
a counterfoil to the popular Formosan Youth Magazine and Liberty. Since 
the new journal could be printed and circulated at Government expense, it 
could smother the struggling Formosan papers (1965: 225). 
During the February 28 uprising it was reported that “anyone who spoke English 
reasonably well, or who had had close foreign connections, was being seized for 
‘examination’” (1965: 300). The hunt for English speakers naturally excluded the KMT 
leadership, many of whom had been trained at English-medium Christian schools and 
colleges on the Mainland (Sommers, 2003). Scott Sommers has argued that KMT 
education policy, with its focus on grammar-and-translation style English language 
instruction and testing, deliberately sought to undermine the teaching of effective English 
language skills, even as many KMT elite continued to send their children for study 
abroad in the United States (2003). 
 Official KMT language policy came under the aegis of the “Taiwan Provincial 
Committee for the Promotion and Propogation of the National Language” (CPPNL͔ᝰ
ߞ੣დ૖нֵ࢝๢ Táiwānshěng guóyǔ tuīxíng wěiyuánhuì), established in 1946 (Tse, 
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1986: 25).14 The CPPNL set forth a six-point plan for the promotion of Mandarin (the 
new National Language): 
(1) to recover the Taiwanese dialect so as to enable the public to learn the 
NL by comparison between the dialect and the NL; (2) to emphasize the 
standard pronunciation; (3) to eradicate the influence of Japanese as 
reflected in the daily speech of the people; (4) to promote the Contrastive 
study of morphology, so as to enrich the NL; (5) to adopt the National 
Phonetic Symbols so as to promote communication among people of 
different races and origins; (6) to encourage the intention of learning the 
NL so as to facilitate the teaching of it” (1986: 26). 
Although the first point in the plan seems to suggest a tolerant and forward-thinking 
attitude towards local languages, the actual implementation of the plan was rigidly 
monolingual. (Hsiau, 1997: 306). All schooling was conducted in Mandarin, and in 1956 
it was forbidden for students to speak local languages in school (1997: 307). Students 
were punished by corporal punishment, having to wear a hat or placard around their neck, 
and later by having to pay a fine (Huang, 1995: 57-58; Sandel, 2003: 530). Even those 
caught speaking their mother tongue off of school grounds were sometimes punished 
(informant, 2001). Moreover, television and radio programming in Hoklo was heavily 
regulated – limited to sixteen percent of broadcast time (Hsiau, 1997: 307). In the 1970s 
many popular “Taiwanese operas and puppet shows on television were forced to use 
Mandarin” (1997: 308). In addition to language instruction, the entire school curriculum 
emphasized a universal Chinese identity over local cultural and linguistic traditions. 
Students studied Sun Yat-sen’s nationalistic tract, the “‘Three Principles’ of the People,” 
for the college entrance examinations (Strawn, 1999), and geography lessons included the 
memorization of train stations in mainland China (Friedman, 2002). 
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The persistence of local languages under martial law 
Despite rigid monolingualism, concentration of political (and pedagogic) power, and 
ethnic barriers which divided society, local language and culture still continued to survive 
throughout Taiwan. As we have seen, even though the use of Hoklo by the mass media 
was limited, it was not eliminated altogether. Moreover, it is important to remember that 
many of the two million Mainlanders who came over were male soldiers, who were either 
single, or permanently separated from their families. This meant that many of the 
Mainlanders married local women. That local women wanted to marry Mainlander men 
highlights the value ascribed to their cultural and political capital. In one study of 722 
mixed marriages in Taipei, “nearly 92 percent were between mainlander men and 
Taiwanese women” (Gates, 1981: 266). Even though national identity cards used by the 
state defined ethnicity in terms of the father’s place of originᙘௗ (jíguàn), the result of 
such intermarriages was that the second generation of Mainlanders included a large 
number of families with local roots on the mother’s side.  
 One of the major factors in the decline of local languages was the choice of many 
parents to speak to their children in Mandarin in order to ensure their success in school 
(Sandel, 2003: 533-34). But such choices were tied to families’ expectations about social 
mobility. Regional and class differences had important effects on the extent to which 
Mandarin was used. One study, conducted in the early 1980s shows that Mandarin 
accounted for 53 percent of the conversation observed in department stores in Taipei, but 
only 20 percent in the southern city of Tainan (Van Den Berg, 1986: 102). Even more 
striking is the difference between department stores in Taipei and the vegetable market, 
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where Mandarin only accounted for 19 percent of the conversation (Van Den Berg, 1986: 
100)! 
 Indeed, Gates has convincingly argued that class divisions within local ethnic 
categories came, during this period, to be more important than divisions between the 
ethnic groups themselves. At the time of her study, 68 percent of the 500 most important 
business leaders in Taiwan were Taiwanese (Gates, 1981: 256). While the percentage of 
Mainlanders (32 percent) are still disproportionate to their numbers, the statistics show 
that a large number of Taiwanese were still able to succeed quite well under KMT rule, 
especially outside of the official domains of government agencies and education. One 
important caveat to this picture is the Aborigine population. With only 125 Aborigines in 
graduate school in 2001 (Government Information Office, 2003a), and only 23 
Aborigines having obtained Ph.D.s since World War II (Wu, 2004), it is arguable that 
“the aborigines in Taiwan are the only group of people whose ethnic boundary coincides 
with a class boundary” (Chao and Johnson, 2000: 170). For Austronesian languages the 
martial law period was far more damaging, as forced dislocations, migration, 
intermarriage, etc. affected impoverished Aborigine populations far more than it did the 
speakers of local Chinese languages (see Chapter 5). At the same time however, this was 
also a period of extensive missionary activity, which entailed an important linguistic 
component, with missionaries (both Catholic and Protestant) producing religious texts (in 
some cases having to invent new orthographies for this purpose) in Austronesian 
languages (Stainton, 1995: 156-57) (Wang, 1995). Although the government tried to 
suppress the production of native language bibles, such interventions were sporadic and 
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of limited effectiveness (Stainton, 1995: 156). As had been the case during the Japanese 
era, assimilationist policies were in some ways most effective amongst the Aborigine 
population, with the exception that those Aborigines who had learned Japanese. In fact, 
many Aborigines continued to use Japanese in Church, for it was only in that language 
that many were literate: “A newspaper report on 1984 reports in shocked tones that some 
evangelists even go so far as to use Japanese Bibles in the church” (1995: 105)! 
 
The Iron Ballot Block: Local Institutions Under the KMT 
That the political concessions of the Japanese years continued to shape the political 
relations of the KMT era is best demonstrated by the continued importance of two 
interrelated institutions: local elections and farmers’ associations. The utility of these 
institutions for controlling the ambitions of the local elites were clear to the KMT, who 
allowed elections for local and regional posts early on, even as they continued to ban 
opposition parties. In addition to co-opting the local elite into a system in which they had 
little power, elections served to prop up the legitimacy of Taiwan on the international 
stage, where its allies liked to refer to it as “Free China” (Rigger, 1999: 81).  
 Shelly Rigger has argued that form of local elections the KMT adopted from the 
Japanese was particularly well suited for the KMT’s purposes, she calls it “the colonial 
era’s most significant political legacy” (1999: 39). Referred to by its acronym SVMM, 
which stands for “single, nontransferable voting in multi-member districts,” the 
Taiwanese voting system promoted both clientelistic cooperation and competition for 
limited resources. This is because SVMM is not a winner-take all system in which only 
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one candidate can win an election. Instead, all the candidates are “ranked according to the 
number of votes each receives, and those with the largest number of votes, up to the 
district magnitude, are elected” (1999: 39-40). Because there is no redistribution of votes, 
candidates only need as many votes as are necessary to win a place amongst the winners, 
and any extra votes above that number are wasted. This problem of “wasted” votes 
requires party members to work together to allocate the proper proportion of votes to 
each candidate. This was often done with the help of a local political operator known in 
Hoklo as tiau-a-ka ݾ̦ༀ (pillars) (1999: 42). As a result, “it is possible to win many 
Taiwanese elections merely by capturing the votes of people to whom one is personally 
connected, or to whom one's close followers are connected” (1999: 43). Because all tax 
revenue is distributed by the central government, and then redistributed to the community 
through the municipal government, the entire system encourages the formation of 
clientelistic chains in which local candidates are supported in exchange for favorable 
government contracts (1999: 42). 
 The SVMM voting system resulted in the creation of local factions who compete 
for patronage by promising their votes to a given candidate. Factions are an entirely local 
phenomenon, their power never extending beyond a particular county or city (1999: 84). 
The KMT leadership rewarded the factions for their loyalty by rarely choosing 
“candidates from outside the local factional milieu,” but at the same time sought to limit 
the power of any individual faction by alternating between local factions each term 
(Bosco, 1994: 134; Dickson, 1996: 96; Rigger, 1999: 85). Up until the late 1980s, 
factions were forbidden from forming “vertical or horizontal alliances,” and if any faction 
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leader succeeded in gaining a position in the national government, they “had to cut of 
their ties with factional followers” (Kuo, 2000: 95). 
 The other colonial legacy at the local level were farmer’s associations. As we saw, 
these were originally set up by the Japanese in order to balance the emerging power of 
local landowners (see Chapter 4). Under the KMT these organizations became even more 
important, serving the state by collecting “rice as payment for fertilizer, taxes and land 
purchased under the Land Reform Program,” as well as being able to choose which 
farmers could “participate in pilot programs” such as growing “profitable export crops,” 
not to mention overseeing local construction project and bureaucracies which offered the 
“possibility of patronage employment” (Rigger, 1999: 79). Especially profitable was (and 
still is) the association’s credit department which oversee sizable loans (1999: 79; Tsai, 
2002b). Because of their tremendous power at the local level, Farmer’s associations 
developed close relations with local factions: 
Local factions benefited especially from certain national regulations 
concerning loans that did not apply to the credit departments of the 
agricultural associations. Local factions were in an excellent position to 
take advantage of the discrepancies between interest rates and loan terms 
offered by banks and those offered by the farmers' associations. At the 
county-city level, the state gave local factions ownership of various 
natural monopoly businesses, such as bus transportation systems, credit 
cooperative banks, and natural gas corporations. The state also set aside 
some positions in the local administrative system for local factions to feed 
their political networks. (Shiau, 1996: 217) 
It is not surprising then to learn that in 1970, “the Farmers’ Association was involved in 
84 percent of townships experiencing factional strife” (Rigger, 1999: 79-80). Yet 
whatever tensions may have existed at the local level, until the end of Martial Law, all 
factions and all of the Farmers’ Associations were firmly in the control of the KMT. 
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Along with public employees and soldiers, these local groups were considered to be one 
of the KMT’s Iron Ballot” constituencies (1999: 141). As Shelly Rigger informs us, out 
of all of these groups, only one group was truly independent of the KMT’s local 
“mobilizational networks”: “independent entrepreneurs” (1999: 141). And even they 
could often be co-opted by the tiau-a-ka (1999: 141). 
 By the 1980s this system started to fall apart. Taiwan’s economic success began 
to affect the careful controls by which the KMT had managed to limit the impact of local 
factions at the national level. A surge in real estate values around this time made it 
possible to get rich quick through land speculation, or what was referred to locally as 
“frying land” ٮϚΐ (chǎodìpí) (Chin, 2003: 145). As the financial stakes in local 
elections became higher, more and more money was spent trying to secure votes, which 
were now often sold to the highest bidder. As the links between politics and business 
grew stronger it was no longer possible to prevent factions from expanding outside of 
their district, especially as they “no longer wholly relied on KMT-sponsored local 
business opportunities,” but were developing independent business networks of their own 
(2003: 145). It is not surprising that many Taiwanese associate democratization with the 
introduction of Black Gold෩ۂ (hēijīn) politics, or corruption. 
many local factions recruited gangsters into their networks, thus 
transforming the nature of their organizations. The gangsters recklessly 
got involved in fighting for pillars, vote buying, and establishing entry 
barriers so that opponents could not campaign in their areas … Nowadays, 
according to several subjects I interviewed, there is a good chance that city 
and county councilors affiliated with local factions are either heidao [෩ཤ 
(hēidào)] members or on familiar terms with the underworld. (2003: 145) 
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As political reforms opened up the political process, factions became even more 
important to secure votes in an increasingly competitive environment. In the 1992 
legislative elections, “fifty-nine percent of KMT nominees had connections to local 
factions,” more than ever before, and “another third of the ruling party's candidates were 
sponsored by the military” (Rigger, 1999: 165). Political reform served to more closely 
ally the KMT with its Iron Ballot constituents than ever before. 
 
Reforming Taiwanese Politics 
Against a background of structural changes threatening the legitimacy of the KMT, such 
as the recognition of the PRC by the United States, and the changing power relations 
undermining the KMT’s control of local factions, the KMT also had to shoulder the 
burden of internal power struggles over the succession of Chiang Ching-kuo to his 
father’s post when Chaing Kai-shek died in 1975. Not all members of the KMT old-guard 
were pleased with the idea of Chiang Ching-kuo assuming leadership of the party. It is 
reasonable to assume that at least some of the reforms implemented by the younger 
Chiang were intended to secure his position within a party dominated by elderly cadres 
from the mainland (Dickson, 1996: 48). Chiang revitalized the KMT leadership, bringing 
in leaders who were more educated and who had strong local ties, many of them native 
born Taiwanese (1996: 53). 
At the provincial level, cadres with a college education increased form 
53.4 percent to 76.7 percent; at the county level form 38 percent to 64.9 
percent; and among district-level cadres, from 40.2 percent to 85.3 percent. 
(1996: 55) 
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Taiwanese were only slowly allowed into the central party bureaucracy, but there was an 
immediate jump in the number of Taiwanese holding district level positions in the KMT.  
In 1955, only 78 of 360 district secretaries (21.7 percent) and 385 of 883 
district level cadres (43.6 percent including both secretaries and aids) were 
Taiwanese… As a result of Taiwanization, the proportion of Taiwanese 
among district cadres rose to 56.6 percent in 1975 and to 73.3 percent in 
1985 … (1996: 54-55) 
Even as Chiang Ching-kuo continued the policies of the White Terror, there was a more 
lenient attitude towards certain forms of dissent, especially the reform oriented opposition 
journals. In the 1970s these journals were still banned, but rather than arresting the 
editors, the publishers were punished financially, and Journals were able to get around 
bans by re-opening under “slightly different names” (Rigger, 1999: 25).  
 Chiang Ching-kuo also sought to limit the growing influence of money politics 
which had strengthened local factions and given them increased independence from the 
KMT as new sources of non-government revenue became available to them from 
prominent businessmen. In the mid 1980s, Chiang Ching-kuo was able to punish 
politicians implicated in a scandal involving the Cathay Plastic group, one of Taiwan’s 
largest companies (Shiau, 1996: 219). The situation would change radically in just a few 
years when, under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo’s hand-picked successor, the 
Taiwanese born Lee Teng-hui, Finance minister Wang Chien-shuan ̚ ݀ Ⓢ 
(Wángjiànxuān) was forced to resign after proposing a popular “tax reform bill that 
would control land speculation and tax windfall profits” (Chu and Lin, 1996: 89). 
Wang's departure was immediately followed by that of another 
nonmainstream cabinet member, Chao Shao-kang [ყ˳જ  (Zhào 
Shàokāng)], who complained that as head of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, his tough stance on environmental protection polices was 
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undermined by influential businesspeople close to the president. (1996: 
89) 
Chiang oversaw Taiwan during a transition period, when military rule allowed for 
internal reform of the party by recruiting a new generation of local technocrats to 
top-level positions while still reigning in the power of local factions. But these same 
reforms would eventually undermine that balance, increasingly transforming the KMT 
“from a coalition of a mainlander state elite and collateral native politicians to one of 
socioeconomically conservative state elites, local factions, and big business” (1996: 88). 
 
The Revolt of the Iron Ballot Bloc 
One of the most remarkable phenomenon associated with the rise of identity and issue 
based protest politics in the late 1980s is the that of the 17 movements described by 
eminent the Taiwanese sociologist Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (Hsiao, 1990), at least 
four are groups that were traditionally thought of as members of the KMT’s Iron Ballot 
constituency: Aborigines, Hakkas, workers, and farmers. More than any other indictor, 
this revolt revealed the crisis facing the KMT, and the historical bloc which had 
maintained the status quo for the past three decades.  
 The Aborigine Human Rights Promotion Association ͔ᝰࢎфͻᛲѧۚ඲๢ 
(Táiwān Yuánzhùmín quánlì cùjìnhuì), established in 1983, was started by the educated 
Aborigine elite, many of whom had close ties to the Presbyterian Church (see Chapter 5) 
(Hsiao, 1990: 169). In addition to land related issues, one of the rallying cries of this 
movement was a change in how Aborigines were referred to in government documents 
and in textbooks  
141 
On anthropological advice, they created the new pan-ethnic name 
'Aborigines' (Yuanzhumin [ࢎфͻ]), that was supposed to replace the 
government-term 'mountain compatriots' and the commonly used terms 
'savages' and 'mountain people', and defined a set of symbols and special 
rights that should apply to all Taiwanese Aborigines equally, including 
rights on ancestral land, use of vernacular languages in 
schools, revitalization of individual Aborigine names as well as 
autonomous cultural and political institutions. (Rudolph, 2002) 
The DPP gave these new Aborigine elites strong support, urging them on in their desire 
to replace those Aborigines who had been complicit in the KMT’s assimilationist policies 
(2002). Their political protests received widespread support throughout the population; 
however, due to lack of strong grassroots support among the Aborigines themselves, they 
were unable to unseat the established KMT backed Aborigine leaders in the 1989 
elections (2002). 
 The Hakkas were another ethnic group who had long been closely allied with the 
KMT, and yet in December of 1988 over thirteen thousand Hakkas marched in Taipei in 
what is known as the Return My Mother Tongue movementᒿӎͺდར੃ (huán wǒ 
mǔyǔ yùndòng) (Huang, 1995: 59). “They asked for increased Hakka language programs 
on radio and television” (Hsiao, 1990: 176). At the time only one television company was 
allowed to air programming in Hakka, and this was restricted to a 30 minute news 
segment broadcast once a week, early Sunday morning (Ryan, 2004). Moreover, native 
language programming on the radio, also severely restricted, was scheduled to be 
decreased over time. The march resulted in the eventual lifting of restrictions as well as 
the emergence of a lasting political movement based on Hakka identity politics. 
 The DPP has never particularly been a pro-labor party, especially considering its 
strong ties to the entrepreneurial class, and as employees either directly of the state, or of 
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state-owned companies, most workers have traditionally been strongly supportive of the 
KMT; however, in 1986 two DPP candidates were voted into office with strong labor 
support. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao sees this not so much as a result of any ties between 
the DPP and labor, but simply reflecting the growing autonomy of labor as a result of the 
breakdown of the traditional system of alliances (Hsiao, 1990: 171-72). The KMT 
quickly responded “by establishing a new Labour Commission in the central 
government” (1990: 171). Labor unrest also came from a different sector of society – 
teachers. The Teacher’s Rights Promotion Association ૦ࣗʇᛲۚ඲๢  (Jiàoshī 
rēnquán cùjìn huì) was founded by some high school teachers in 1987 and quickly grew 
into a nation-wide movement, with support from the academic elite (1990: 173-74). One 
of the central issues was the policing of teachers for ideological purity and the presence 
of jiaoguan, or military training instructors, within the schools. University professors also 
sought greater “input into administrative policy-making” (1990: 173-74). 
 None of these movements shocked the establishment as much as the riots of May 
1988, which was one of the most dramatic outbreaks of public violence in recent 
Taiwanese history. What made it so shocking was that the protest was organized by 
farmers, a group whom had long been regarded as the bedrock of the KMT’s Iron Ballot” 
coalition.  
Protests were mobilized through Associations of Farmers’ Rights 
established around the island by a faction of the fledgling opposition 
Democratic Progressive Party. 15  In the capital, a kilometer-long 
procession of 2,000 protesters sought redress of the grievances first from 
the Legislative Yüan and then from KMT Party headquarters. They called 
for universal farmer insurance, lower fertilizer prices, increased 
government rice purchase, reversion of the Farmers’ and Irrigation 
Associations to farmer control, establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture 
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and liberalization of agricultural land transfer. All grievances were of 
long-standing. Receiving no official response and barred by police, the 
crowd vented its frustration by tearing down the Legislative Yüan 
name-board and smashing windows. Violence escalated throughout the 
night and by dawn approximately 200 protesters and police had been 
injured and over 100 marchers arrested. (Bain, 1993: 1) 
As a result of these protests, Lee Teng-hui, whose dissertation Intersectoral Capital 
Flows in the Economic Development of Taiwan, 1895-1960, had been on Taiwan’s 
agricultural economy (Lee, 1968), was picked to chair the Council on Agricultural 
Development ཡ ֵ ๢  (Nóngwěihuì). The government soon implemented “a 
province-wide farmer insurance scheme” and made changes to allow farmers’ 
associations greater autonomy from the state (Hsiao, 1990: 172-73). 
 
Conclusion 
KMT rule was both a continuation of the Japanese era and a radical break with it. In 
many ways the breaks are easier to see than the continuities: Japanese was replaced with 
Mandarin as the official language. Emperor worship was replaced with Sun Yat-sen’s 
Three Principles of the People. And, perhaps most importantly, the new state was 
legitimated by an appeal to a shared Chinese culture. Yet the two-tiered ethnic system of 
the Japanese era continued with the Mainlanders replacing the Japanese in all the most 
favorable jobs and government positions. The suppression of local linguistic and cultural 
expression was perhaps even stronger than it had been under the Japanese (with the 
exception of the few years that the Kominka movement was at its height). Even land 
reform, one of the most profound changes of the early KMT years can arguably be seen 
as a continuation of the tensions that had existed since the late Qing, which had 
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developed a large, powerful, and fairly equitable rural gentry class, and an even larger 
population of tenant labor. The Japanese had simply formalized this arrangement, and 
under the KMT the state, rather than the gentry became the landlord with large numbers 
of farmers still cultivating uneconomic plots.  
 The continuity can be seen in terms of the development of local language markets. 
Local languages continued to be used in the markets and in much of the more rural areas 
of the country. There even emerged, at the end of this era, a nativist literature which 
glorified the rapidly disappearing rural lifestyle (see Chapter 6). Despite this continuity, 
however, long term trends slowly were to have their effect. The existence of a strong 
centralized education system was the most effective means the KMT had of promoting 
the official language and the official ideology. An entire generation of parents spoke to 
their children in Mandarin to ensure their success at school. (Many Taiwanese remarked 
to me that their parents used their native language as a secret code between each other 
when they did not wish the children to understand, although, of course, some did.) Only 
with democratic reforms in the 1980s would this system begin to unwind. The motivation 
for these reforms is discussed in Chapter 6, but first, it is important to look at the separate 
history of Aborigines during this early period. Under the Japanese this population had 
been largely separated from the rest of the island, and it was only during the KMT years 
that they were integrated into the population as a whole. Unfortunately, this integration 
would be into the lowest rungs of society. 
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Notes
 
1 See Chapter 2 for explanation of ethnic and linguistic terms, and charts on 
language distribution. 
2The latter figure includes 290 girls (Heylen, 2001: 137). 
3“The pronunciation resembled the Zhangzhou pronunciation, rather than the 
Quanzhou variant of Southern Min. Tomita Akira has explained that this was because of 
the location of the Education Bureau and the Taiwanese contributors, such as Ke Qiujie 
and Chen Taoying who were from the region. One other explanation is that the compilers 
of textbooks relied on the rhyming glossary and the missionary works, which were in the 
Zhangzhou pronunciation” (Heylen, 2001: 143). In either case, it is likely that this 
contributed to the standardization of local Hoklo pronunciation. 
4 The end of the imperial examination system in Mainland China, in 1905, also 
served to reduce the importance placed on Classical Chinese education (Heylen, 2001: 
282). 
5 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of Gramsci’s theory of corruption. 
6 Of course, the KMT leaders themselves had close relations and had continued 
to do business with the Japanese throughout the war (Kerr, 1965: 53-54) 
7 According to Hung-mao Tien, "An estimated ten thousand cases involving 
civilians were decided in military trials from 1950 to 1986" (Rigger, 1999: 71). 
8 “Martial law first went into effect in mainland China in 1934. It was extended 
to Taiwan in 1949 and enshrined in law in 1950. The job of implementing martial law fell 
to the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC), a branch of the military” (Rigger, 1999: 70). 
9 “The GINI Index averaged 0.298 during these years” (Rigger, 1999: 70). 
10 Land reform came in three stages: the Sale of Public lands ˚Ϛ؟ᄚ (gōngdì 
fàng lǐng) in 1949, the Rent Reduction Program ʓʂˊ೛঎ (sānqīwǔ jiǎnzū) of 1951, 
and the Land-to-the-Tiller program of 1953 ভڗЊյΊ (gēngzhě yǒu qí tián). Only the 
last one is discussed here. The sale of public lands was “a farce” since “the KMT was not 
about to give up one of its most valuable resources, especially after it had successfully 
quashed dissent in the wake of the 1947 uprising” (Bain, 1993: 26). And while the Rent 
Reduction Act made an immediate and important difference in the quality of life for 
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Taiwan’s tenant farmers, “The cuts in profits, together with the knowledge that more 
radical land reform programs were in the offing, caused many landlords to start selling 
their land … In some cases, even forcing their tenants to buy land they could ill afford” 
(Gallin, 1966: 96).  
11 “While it is true that many landowners hid the true extent of their holdings by 
registering under the names of relatives, Bain argues that this is ‘not sufficient to explain 
the small number of landlords recorded as having large holdings’” (Bain, 1993: 30, n. 5) 
12 “A JCRR survey in 1954 ‘revealed many discouraging problems’, among 
which was the uneconomic size of holding (JCRR 1954 in 1965:91). Of some 790,000 
landowners in June 1955, 73% owned less than 1 ha, 18% between 1 and 2 ha, 5% owned 
22-3 ha and only 4% more than 3 ha (JCRR 1955 in 1965:106). JCRR considered that 
purchasers operating less than 1 ha could ‘not be expected to make both ends meet’” 
(JCRR 1954 in 1965:85). (Bain, 1993: 33-34) 
13 During the February 28th, 1947 uprising, when the opposition gained control of 
the radio station, announcements were made in Japanese. 
14 Taiwan was officially considered to be a “province” of China, rather than 
synonymous with the entire country. This fiction resulted in a certain amount of 
redundancy in the government, with both National and Provincial governments governing 
the same island. 
15 While Bain states that the movement was mobilized by the DPP, Michael 
Hsiao insists that the “protest was a spontaneous one initiated and organized by farmers 
themselves” (Hsiao, 1990: 172) 
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CHAPTER 5 
LOCAL CULTURE, GLOBAL LANGUAGES 
 
Historically, the relative illegibility to outsiders of some urban 
neighborhoods … has provided a vital margin of political safety from 
control by outside elites. A simple way of determining whether this 
margin exists is to ask if an outsider would have needed a local guide (a 
native tracker) in order to find her way successfully. If the answer is yes, 
then the community or terrain in question enjoys at least a small measure 
of insulation from outside intrusion. (Scott, 1998: 54) 
 
Globalization vs Localism 
Although Taipei is not lacking in small, twisting, side streets, the overall layout of the 
city is the height of the type of modernist panoptic (Foucault, 1979: 195-228) 
transparency associated with the creation of modern cities, such as Haussmann’s Paris 
(Scott, 1998: 73). This is a legacy of the Japanese colonial era, when the walls of the old 
city were torn down and large thoroughfares were laid out on a grid (Allen, 2000). Under 
the KMT era, the street names were renamed after cities and regions of China, as well as 
historic events and moral values associated with the official Chinese nationalism 
promoted by the KMT. The streets were even provided with Romanized transliterations 
for foreigners who cannot read the Chinese characters. Yet, despite the presence of 
transliterations, and streets laid out along a modernist grid, Taipei retains a degree of 
“relative illegibility to outsiders” which Scott argues is a necessary to provide “a vital 
margin of political safety from control by outside elites” (Scott, 1998: 54). This can be 
seen most clearly by the one street with an English derived name: Roosevelt Road, one of 
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Taipei’s main streets. Any attempt by an American tourist to query most Taiwanese about 
the location of “Roosevelt Road” will result in blank stares. The American pronunciation 
sounds little like the Chinese, ᗙಢၱཕ (Luósīfú lù) written above it on the street sign. 
It is exactly this sort of confusion which the Harvard educated KMT mayor of Taipei, Ma 
Ying-jeou ਡࠢʄ (Mǎ Yīngjiǔ) wishes to eliminate. Accordingly, he has implemented 
two changes. The first is to replace the idiosyncratic Taipei Postal System ඵݭϸݟࡗ 
(Yóuzhèngshì Pīnyīn) orthography used on street signs with the international standard, 
Hanyu Pinyinျდݟࡗ (hànyǔ pīnyīn). The second is to provide the main thoroughfares 
with numbered names, such as “1st Avenue” which will be posted alongside the existing 
street names. Ma’s goal is to make Taipei an “international city”, attracting global 
investment and tourism. 
 Ma’s moves embracing globalization are different than those taken by his 
predecessor, current President Chen Shui-bian. As mayor of Taipei, Chen implemented a 
phonetic system unique to Taiwan, the Tongyong Pinyin௣Έݟࡗ (tōngyòng pīnyīn) 
system. While similar to Hanyu Pinyin, there is enough difference that it would take a 
few hours training to become familiar with Tongyong before someone lacking Chinese 
literacy could correctly read a street sign. Of course, no orthographic reading of the street 
signs would ever be completely sufficient, since the lack of diacritical marks in the 
implementation of both systems means that critical phonological information is missing. 
But the symbolism of choosing a system which is close to the international standard, but 
sufficiently “Taiwanese” to confuse a visitor is a clear statement of the ambiguity of the 
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DPP’s stance towards globalization. Similarly, in 1996, (then) mayor Chen renamed 
Chiehshou Road ˓࿖ཕ (Jièshòu lù), so named in honor of Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday 
(it means “long life” and is short for “Wishing a long life to Chiang Kai-shek on his 
Birthday” ߻׮ሣ˓Ε࿖ቁڅ˓࿖ཕ Jìniàn Jiǎng Jièshí shòudàn de Jièshòu lù), 
“Ketagalan Boulevard” 凱達格蘭達道 (Kǎidágélán dàdào) after the Aborigine ethnic 
group located in the Taipei region (Lu, 2003b). But there is an important difference 
between the indigenization symbolized by naming Taipei streets after local Aborigine 
groups, and the adoption of a uniquely Taiwanese form of Chinese orthography. The 
former fits with the concentric circle conception of national identity adopted in 1990 at 
the National Affairs Conference (NAC, discussed in Chapter 2), while the latter openly 
challenges it by viewing the integration of Taiwan into the global sphere as taking place 
independently of the Chinese cultural sphere, rather than nested safely within it like a set 
of Russian dolls.  
 The current situation in Taiwan is very fragile, globalization, as well as political 
pressure from Beijing continually pushes Taiwan toward greater and greater integration 
with mainland China, Taiwan’s largest trading partner (Huang and Schuman, 2004). At 
the same time, Hoklo ethnic nationalism can never fully reveal itself without danger of 
backlash, forcing nationalist elements to at least give lip service to localism and 
multiculturalism. Moreover, while the DPP gives lip service to “Taiwanese 
independence” sentiments, it is precisely their economic base, owners of SMEs, who are 
most actively engaged in the export-oriented economy which is pushing Taiwan closer to 
the mainland. Cultural policy serves to mask these realities rather than as a surrogate for 
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them. And not just any aspect of cultural policy, but language policy in particular. For no 
other aspect of Taiwanese cultural policy so clearly links Taiwan to the rest of the world 
than the languages Taiwanese are required, or encouraged to learn. 
 Outside of its political context, it hardly makes sense for Taiwan to be having a 
debate over orthography. Most Taiwanese I met are fairly inept at using the orthographies 
they studied in grade school, since once basic Chinese literacy is mastered, most 
Taiwanese rely upon Chinese characters alone. While it is possible to buy dictionaries 
organized orthographically, most Taiwanese adults use dictionaries arranged by 
frequently repeated components of characters called “radicals” ௱࡜ (bù shǒu) as well 
as the number of strokes following the radical. Orthography is used only for four 
purposes: First, to teach basic literacy to children in primary school. Second, for maps 
and road signs throughout Taiwan, targeted at foreigners who cannot read the characters. 
Third, on official documents, such as passports. In the same category I would group 
academic databases which can sometimes be searched orthographically instead of with 
characters. And, fourth, occasionally used with obscure characters (for instance, in proper 
names) to clarify the pronunciation. As I will discuss below, until recently, Taiwan used 
different orthographic systems for the first and fourth use than they do for the second and 
third. It was only when the target audience was foreigners that the Latin alphabet was 
used. It is probably for this reason that foreigners observe so many inaccurate spellings. 
But it is also because orthography is the tie between Taiwan and the non-Chinese 
speaking world that it is such an important issue politically. In terms of Pierce’s semiotics, 
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orthography is an “indexical” sign (Irvine, 1989: 251), in that its use of the Western 
alphabet serves to also make it a symbol of Taiwan’s relationship to the global sphere. 
 After discussing the current orthographic debate in more detail, I turn my 
attention to an even more explicit example of Taiwan’s linguistic link to the rest of the 
world: English language education policy in Taiwan. In fact, one of the main motivations 
for switching from the current orthography used in schools to Tongyong Pinyin is that it 
will better prepare students to study English. The status of English as a global language 
has led to its displacing Chinese as the most valued form of linguistic capital in Taiwan, 
one that in the classic Bourdieuian sense is directly translatable into other forms of capital, 
such as pay raises for employees who pass standard business English exams. In the 
sphere of English education the positions of Ma and Chen are similar to those on 
orthography, with Ma wholeheartedly embracing English as a means to modernization 
and globalization, and Chen remaining more ambivalent. For the DPP English is an issue 
closely associated with the class aspirations of middle class Taiwanese, and the policy 
seems to be as much devoted to creating a more equitable distribution of linguistic capital 
as it is to promoting English education per se. This is most clearly seen in the closing of 
private bilingual kindergartens under the new government. 
 
The Phonetic Debate 
The decision of the DPP led government, in 2002, to adopt the Tongyong Pinyin system 
as Taiwan’s official orthography for representing Mandarin, Hoklo and Hakka is one of 
the most politically controversial decisions of the past decade (Luo, 2003: 49). Tongyong 
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Pinyin replaced two standards which had previously co-existed in Taiwan. Where the 
orthography functioned as a transliteration system targeted at a non-Chinese audience, 
such as on maps, passports, and street signs, Postal System Pinyin was used. This system 
was put into effect in 1906 at the Imperial Postal Joint-Session Conference ܺ੣ඵྑᑸ
ࣖ๢ᙰ (dìguó yóu-diàn liánxí huìyì) in Shanghai, and is based on the Wade-Giles 
system which was standardized in 1892 and remained the international standard for 
Chinese orthography until 1979 (Wikipedia contributors, 2004a; Wikipedia contributors, 
2004b).1 The Postal System Pinyin differs from Wade-Giles in the absence of diacritics, 
and the acceptance of spellings and pronunciations historically in use in the Western 
world (e.g. Peking for Beijing) (Wikipedia contributors, 2004a). This system, however, 
was not the one used in Taiwanese schools when teaching Mandarin. The ROC 
government had developed the National Phonetic Alphabet੣ࡗϫͺ (guóyīn zìmǔ) as 
part of its effort to standardize Chinese pronunciation, and had introduced it to schools in 
1920 (Heylen, 2001: 326). Commonly referred to as Zhuyin Fuhaoٍࡗ୸༚ (zhùyīn 
fúhào), these symbols are based on a unique shorthand script developed by the scholar 
Zhang Binglin ఉ޶ᝉ (Zhāng Bǐnglín) and do not look at all like the Roman alphabet 
(e.g. ɔ ,ɕ ,ɖ ,ɗ ) (Wikipedia contributors, 2004d). In fact, they bear a striking 
resemblance to Japanese katakana̖㿀ϐ (e.g. ヮ,ヌ,コ,ヒ), which developed around 
the same time, but was not officially adopted by Japan until after World War II 
(Wikipedia contributors, 2004h). Zhang Binglin lived in Japan for a while, where he met 
Sun Yat-sen (Wikipedia contributors, 2004e). The anti-colonial feelings of the early ROC 
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government certainly influenced the decision to choose a non-Roman orthography, but 
the necessity of communication required the use of the Roman letter based Postal System 
Pinyin.  
 There had been several previous attempts to establish a new official orthography 
for Taiwan, most notably Mandarin Phonetic Symbols II੣დٍࡗ୸༚୷ʆϸ (MPS II, 
Guóyǔ zhùyīn fúhào dìèrshì), established in 1986, but its use remained limited to official 
government publications (Wikipedia contributors, 2004f). MPS II retains many of the 
characteristics of Zhuyin Fuhao, but uses the Roman alphabet. Outside of Taiwan, 
Wade-Giles had remained popular but, by 1979, the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) adopted the Chinese orthography which had been used in the PRC 
since 1958, Hanyu Pinyin (Wikipedia contributors, 2004g). This system soon became the 
standard for teaching Chinese to non-native speakers, and was eventually adopted by the 
U.S. Library of Congress in 2000 (Luo, 2003: 49; Wikipedia contributors, 2004h).  
 It was in this context that Yu Bor-chuan ћјޜ (Yú Bóquán), a professor at the 
Institute of Ethnologyͻ૰ዖߨԦ؀ (mínzúxué yánjiùsuǒ) at Academia Sinicaˁ͛ߨ
Ԧਗ (Zhōngyāng Yánjiūyuàn), Taiwan’s premier research institute, has long been 
closely associated with the DPP. At the end of the current president’s, Chen Shui-bian, 
tenure as mayor of Taipei (1994-1998) he began implementing Yu’s Tongyong system on 
street signs (Sui Noi, 2000). So it was not a big surprise that the DPP would seek to 
promote Tongyong Pinyin with Chen as president. However, when the Minister of 
Education Ovid Tzeng ಬӇओ (Zēng Zhìlǎng), a professional linguist, decided to reject 
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the advice of an advisory council that he adopt Tongyong Pinyin, it created a national 
scandal (Lin, 2000), and led to his being replaced after the next election (Tsai, 2002a). 
 Supporters of Tongyong Pinyin over Hanyu Pinyin, assert that the system better 
utilizes Roman letters to represent Mandarin phonology; but, as Luo Jing points out: 
“Phonetic accuracy is not an essential concern with respect to a phonological system” 
(Luo, 2003: 58). Rather, the primary appeal of Tongyong is clearly ideological: First, it 
claims to be able to represent all of Taiwan’s Chinese languages. There were attempts to 
use it for Austronesian languages as well, but these have been largely abandoned in favor 
of either the system developed by developed by Paul Jen-kuei Liө˭ߖ (Lǐ Rénguǐ), a 
professor of linguistics at Academia Sinica specializing in Austronesian languages as 
well as, in some cases, Church romanization already in use in some communities. What 
this means, when the same symbols have different phonological values in each system is 
not entirely clear. Presumably there is some advantage to minimizing differences between 
orthographies, especially for learning purposes; however, it is more likely that the 
concept of such a unified system serves the political purpose of promoting a unified 
Taiwanese identity which is distinct from that of Mainland China. This interpretation is 
bolstered by the second claim made by Tongyong Pinyin supporters, namely that it is 85 
percent similar to Hanyu Pinyin (Staff, 2002).2 This claim seems to support Tsai 
Chih-hao’s assertion that Tongyong Pinyin is “best described as an attempt to achieve 
internationalization without adopting hanyu pinyin” (Tsai, 2004). 
 Most ordinary Taiwanese I spoke with over my three years in Taiwan, including 
teachers, academics, and young professionals, were not particularly concerned about the 
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orthography debate. Educators were mostly concerned that the Ministry of Education 
pick a standard, so that they could plan accordingly. Some expressed dismay at the cost 
of reprinting textbooks and street signs every time the government changed its mind. 
However, the story remains politically controversial. An important reason for this is that 
the process of decentralization to the local level, one of the concessions won by the DPP 
when they were an opposition party, now works against them as the ruling party. 
Decisions about which system to use for street signs remain the decision of local 
governments, and Taipei’s KMT Mayor, Ma Ying-jeou, has stuck with his decision to use 
Hanyu Pinyin instead of Tongyong Pinyin for Taipei’s street signs (Huang, 2002). The 
use of Hanyu Pinyin, together with alternative names in English, is part of Ma’s vision of 
Taipei as an “international city,” but it dovetails with traditional KMT advocacy of 
eventual re-unification with mainland China. Other municipalities, such as TaiChong and 
HsinChu台中 (Táizhōng) 新竹 (Xīnzhú) have also adopted Hanyu Pinyin, resulting in a 
patchwork of various orthographic systems throughout Taiwan. 
 In an article on orthographic debates in Haiti, Bambi Schieffelin and Rachelle 
Doucet write: 
Why is the issue of the kreyòl orthography so important to Haitians? The 
matter is not simply whether to write, for example, the kreyòl word for 
bread (/pɛ̃ /) with e (pen) or i (pin) or ain (pain) like in French pain. The 
underlying issue is about representations of self (“Haitianness”) and the 
representations of the nation. (Schieffelin and Doucet, 1994) 
Clearly the decision as to whether to represent the initial sound in the word for heart 心 
(xīn) [ɕ] with an x (Hanyu Pinyin) or a si (Tongyong Pinyin), is equally about Taiwanese 
representations of self and nation. Since the compromise of 1990 NAC, a policy of 
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localism has served to incorporate local elites into the state, finesse ethnic relations 
between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, and allow for limited ethnic nationalism without 
angering China. However, Tongyong pinyin is important because it represents an effort to 
define the local in opposition to the concept of a greater China, rather than as nested 
neatly within it. However, the compromises made in 1990 also led to the decentralization 
of state power over cultural norms. In order to promote Tongyong Pinyin the DPP must 
enforce rules at the national level, overriding local preferences. Moreover, integration 
into the global economy has made international norms, such as ISO endorsed Hanyu 
Pinyin of greater importance. As of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO in 2001, Mainland 
publishers are now able to compete directly with local publishers. The adoption of 
Tongyong Pinyin is an effort to smooth Taiwan’s integration into this global marketplace, 
while still retaining a unique identity, but because it goes against the hegemonic concept 
of identity agreed upon in 1990, it is very threatening to the Mainlander elite. It remains 
to be seen if the introduction of Tongyong Pinyin as the national standard marks the 
beginning of the end of the current historical bloc, or simply a renegotiation of the terms 
of the alliance. 
 
English, the Global Language 
One of the most practical reasons for adopting Tongyong Pinyin is to facilitate the study 
of English. By having students learn Chinese literacy using a Roman orthography, they 
will already be familiar with the symbols when learning English later on (Yu Bor-chuan, 
personal communication, 2001). As I discussed above, Zhuyin Fuhao, which was used 
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until 2001 to teach basic Chinese literacy, was deliberately designed around non-Western 
symbols. This shift in orientation, from East to West, comes at a time when Chinese 
hegemony in the region is beginning to eclipse that of the West (Perlez, 2004). But it also 
reflects changing class relations within Taiwan. Higher education was for a long time the 
provenance of only a select few. In the 1970s there were only 13 public and 19 private 
institutions in Taiwan, a number which, by 2001 had grown to “57 universities, 78 
independent colleges, and 19 junior colleges” (Government Information Office, 2003a). 
The reason for this growth is, in part, the fact that so many Taiwanese were driven 
overseas to receive higher education. Despite Taiwan’s small population, up until the 
1987-1988 school year Taiwan was the number one source of foreign students at 
American universities, at which point it was overtaken by China (now India is number 
one) (Institute of International Education, 2004). That year was also the year that martial 
law was lifted, and the beginning of educational reforms opening up alternatives within 
Taiwan. But, as I discuss below, English education has been highly politicized since the 
first years of KMT rule. 
 One of the consequences of Chiang Ching-kuo’s efforts to increase the number of 
cadres who had advanced degrees was a marked increase in the number of government 
officials who had studied abroad in the United States. In Taiwan I often heard the joke 
that more members of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan had Ph.D.s from American universities 
than did members of Congress! While a humorous exaggeration, it does reflect on the 
importance that American education had for members of Taiwan’s elite, and by extension, 
on the importance of learning English. And not just for the KMT, for during the White 
158 
Terror, many prominent Taiwanese intellectuals went abroad as well. During the 60s and 
70s Taiwanese politics was played out in the United States as much as in Taiwan.3 Yet 
during this same period, English education for the majority of Taiwanese reached new 
lows (Sedlak, 1976: 60). 
 From the 1970s onwards, Taiwan's students consistently scored lower on the 
English sub-section of the JCEE than they did in most other subjects (Sedlak, 1976: 60;  
Wang, 1996), directly affecting their chances of gaining access to higher education.  
The vast majority of students, taking the 1974 JCEE as an example, scored 
lower than 50 out of 100 for the English section. Just the opposite is true 
in Chinese literature, for which the mean score is around 70, or in the 
Three Principles of the People, for which the mean score is around 80. 
(Sedlak, 1976: 60) 
The curriculum established in 1972, and in effect through the early 80s, introduced 
English education in middle school for two or three hours per week. The number of hours 
was extended during the third year to between four and six, but English became an 
elective (Chen, 2003: 64). This situation led many parents to seek alternative means to 
improve their children's English scores. These strategies include: bilingual kindergartens, 
after-school attendance at cram-schools, or bushiban ༪ஒक़  (bǔxíbān), and even 
receiving primary education abroad in the United States. 
 David Crystal has referred to English as a “global language” (Crystal, 1997), and 
there is no doubt that Taiwan’s shift towards an export-oriented economy in the seventies 
significantly increased the importance of English education. Chen Su-chiao argues that at 
this time “English became a tool to evaluate one's competence in the job market due to its 
instrumental value in science, technology, commerce and modernity” (Chen, 2003: 103). 
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English is closely associated with competence at work and with modernity in the minds 
of most Taiwanese. It is even used in evaluating pay raises – seemingly proving 
Bourdieu’s dictum that linguistic capital can be exchanged for real capital (Bourdieu, 
1977: 659); however, what is less clear is whether or not the competence of most 
Taiwanese workers actually depends upon their English ability. University students do 
need to be literate in English to read the latest texts in certain specialized fields which 
have not yet been translated into Chinese, and people directly involved in international 
trade need to master “business English” (Jones and Alexander, 2003), but most 
Taiwanese are actually able to do quite well without English, at least as far as work is 
concerned. 
 The spread of English is not uniform throughout Taiwan. English is far more 
important in urban areas, especially Taipei, than it is in rural ones (Chen, 2003: 77-93). In 
1993, the Taipei government began implementing English language education as an 
elective in the fifth grade, and as of 1998 it has been required starting in the third grade 
(2003: 163). Competition began between municipalities, with others offering it a year or 
two earlier than Taipei, while some rural areas decided against any English education in 
primary school (2003: 103). Efforts to equalize English education throughout the country 
with the introduction of English in the third grade in the new 9-year Curriculum failed 
since Taipei then changed its policy to introduce English even earlier, in the first grade 
(2003: 164). 
 An even greater problem than the inequality between urban and rural areas is that 
within the same school between students who receive additional English training outside 
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of school, having perhaps attended a bilingual kindergarten, or who attend bushiban 
classes, and those who do not. This results in tremendous disparities within the classroom, 
and makes it difficult to implement a uniform curriculum for all the students. The 
government has responded with a number of initiatives designed to lessen dependence on 
private schooling, both by beginning an initiative to hire large numbers of native speakers 
to teach in the school system, and most recently by attempting to ban bilingual 
kindergartens altogether. The reliance on native speakers as teachers seems to be a 
uniquely East Asian phenomenon (Sommers, 2001), moreover it is one that does not have 
a particularly good track record of success, but Taiwanese parents have come to expect it 
for their children because of the widespread use of native teachers in the bushiban. Both 
of these actions have been widely seen as part of the general politicization of language 
education over the past two decades. 
 Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou has sought to bring greater prestige to Taipei by 
establishing it as an “International City,” and a central part of his plan is to make Taipei 
more accessible to English speaking visitors. The city’s rapid transit system already 
makes stop announcements in “English” (in quotes since many of the stops are actually 
Chinese names pronounced as an English speaker with no knowledge of Chinese might 
guess the pronunciation), as well as Mandarin, Hoklo and Hakka. Mayor Ma has 
introduced a plan to provide a secondary naming system for the city’s main streets which 
would provide them with English names, such as “1st Avenue” in addition to their 
existing Chinese names, to make it easier for foreigners to navigate (Diedrichs, 2000). 
Finally, he has also implemented a plan to teach English to people “from all walks of 
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life” including “taxi drivers, hotel and restaurant attendants, ticket sellers and sales 
persons at scenic or recreation areas, police officers, and phone operators” (Chen, 2003: 
164). The national government has since implemented a similar plan, which will 
eventually be expanded to include English lessons in community centers throughout 
Taiwan (Chen, 2003: 165). The parallels between this plan and Japanese era language 
programs aimed at adult language learners (see Chapter 4) is quite striking, and probably 
not accidental, although they differ in that English is a second language, meant primarily 
for communication with foreign visitors, rather than the official national language.  
 In August of 2004, the Ministry of Education announced that it would no longer 
allow the operation of bilingual kindergartens (Sommers, 2004a). Bilingual kindergartens 
in Taiwan are not bilingual in native language and Mandarin, but in Mandarin and 
English, the two most valued languages in Taiwan’s scholastic market. The question is 
why would the DPP led government seek to limit access to private English education? 
Part of the answer can be found in a study done by Scott Sommers, who found that 
Taiwan’s foreign English teachers (mostly Canadians, Americans, and South Africans), 
are heavily concentrated in Taiwan’s wealthy urban professional neighborhoods and are 
almost exclusively in Taiwan’s three largest cities (Sommers, 2004b). Sommers points 
out the irony of the fact that the law being used by the DPP led government to close 
bilingual kindergartens is precisely the same law that establishes Mandarin, rather than 
Hoklo, as the only official language used for education (Sommers, 2004a). It is possible, 
as Sommers seems to suggest, that this is a political strategy to essentially blackmail 
Taiwan’s elite into allowing a more flexible language policy in Taiwan’s schools. 
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Another explanation might be that the DPP, to gain support of Taiwan’s rural population 
and middle classes, are seeking to end the exclusive monopoly on English linguistic 
capital held by Taiwan’s elite. Another DPP sponsored plan involves bringing native 
English speaking foreign teachers into Taiwan’s schools on a massive scale which would 
(symbolically, at least) end the exclusive access to such teachers (Sommers, 2004c). 
 
Conclusion 
The spread of English is often discussed in terms of “imperialism” (Phillipson, 1992), 
and clearly its present dominance as a “global language” (Crystal, 1997) owes much to 
both British and American colonialism, as well as to America’s cultural hegemony in the 
age of globalization. However, just as economic theories of dependency (Amin, 1973) 
and globalization (Appadurai, 1996) tend to overstate the importance of the colonial 
metropole, and understate the importance of individual nation-states in shaping economic 
relations (Weiss, 1997), so too do theories of linguistic imperialism and globalization 
tend to overlook the importance of nation-states in shaping their own linguistic markets. 
Political economic approaches to the study of language policy, such as that of James 
Tollefson (Tollefson, 1993), rectify this situation by placing the focus squarely on the 
study of local power relations. However, I believe that Tollefson moves too far in the 
other direction. By equating language status with the status of elite groups he both 
overlooks the important relations between groups within the society, as well as the ways 
in which national and global ideologies interact.  
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 Before the Spring 2004 presidential elections in Taiwan, a group of intellectuals, 
activists, and artists, including the renowned filmmaker Hou Hsiao-Hsien۔ҩ቗ (Hóu 
Xiàoxián), formed the Alliance for Ethnic Equality૰໶ͧയн੃ᑸຽ (zúqún píngděng 
xíngdòng liánméng) to protest what they saw as the polarization of ethnic identity by DPP 
supporters of Chen Shui-bian’s reelection. In an interview published in the New Left 
Review, four members of the alliance expressed their concerns about raising ethnic 
tensions (Hou et al., 2004). Writer Tang Nuo࢒ᎁ (Tángnuò), explained why they had 
started the group: 
No guesswork was needed to anticipate that ethnic conflict would be 
whipped up again this time. It happened in each previous election, so we 
had a lot of experience of this. Chen Shui-bian, running for re-election as 
president, was at quite some disadvantage when the campaign started, and 
he supposedly represents the Minnan [Hoklo], the largest ethnic group in 
Taiwan. It could only benefit him if the issue of ethnicity became a major 
election topic, so it could be expected he would make a lot of play of it. In 
fact, it looked as if this might be the most serious case of identity politics 
ever in Taiwanese elections. (Hou et al., 2004: 19) 
It is not surprising that several members of the Alliance have Mainlander, Hakka, or 
leftist roots.4 The former feel excluded by Hoklo nationalism, while the latter feel 
betrayed by the emphasis on ethnic rather than social issues. 
 That the DPP leadership is seeking to promote Taiwanese nationalism over 
localism is suggested by some other recent developments. Most notably, a small storm 
erupted in 2003 when some questions on the national civil service examination˚ੁʇ࢝
Щ༶  (gōngwù rényuán kǎoshì) appeared in Hoklo (Ko, 2004). Leading Hakka 
lawmakers strongly criticized the inclusion of these questions on the exam (Chen, 2004), 
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and in September of 2004 the Examination YuanЩ༶ਗ (kǎoshìyuàn), the body in 
charge of determining the content of the examinations, declared that exam content would 
not be in Hakka, Hoklo, or the Austronesian languages (Ko, 2004). This of course left 
Mandarin as the official language of the exams without explicitly declaring it as such 
(Editorial Board, 2004). The English language paper of one of Taiwan’s largest 
newspaper chains editorialized,  
So what language is to be used for exams? Well, the very one which 
almost no native used in Taiwan until it was imposed upon Taiwanese by 
their foreign overlords in 1945 and ruthlessly promoted during the decades 
of colonial government that followed -- namely, Mandarin Chinese. So 
amid efforts to raise a national consciousness, exams for the civil service 
must be taken in the language of Taiwan's former oppressors and current 
enemies. It is hard to think of anything more crass. (2004) 
The level of vehemence, on both sides, sparked by this decision was further aggravated 
when the head of the civil service exam committee announced in October that he would 
change the “civil service exams to test applicants on the history and geography of Taiwan 
only,” removing questions about mainland China (Staff, 2004).  
 Hou Hsiao-hsien worries about this trend: 
Since we have Chen as president, a chairman of a meeting may give a 
speech in Minnan [Hoklo]. If anyone in the audience questions this, he 
will be upset. But no-one has decided to make Minnan the official 
language of the island yet. Such confusions now arise everywhere. For 
example, Minnan has suddenly appeared in the examinations for the civil 
service. But most applicants cannot understand it, since Taiwan has now 
experienced quite a lengthy period of economic growth and urbanization, 
producing a new social mixture in the cities. Mandarin has been taught in 
our schools for a long time, but now all of a sudden Minnan is required in 
national exams, with questions people often cannot understand, let alone 
answer. In this sense, so-called localization is simply Minnanization, 
excluding everything else. This is a programme of 'de-Sinicization', as 
some of its supporters term it, which continuously appears in each domain, 
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and arouses strong repugnance. Since it got under way, we have had a 
more or less serious sense of being threatened. (Hou et al., 2004: 21) 
Hou’s comments elide an important difference between localization and Taiwanese 
nationalism. Localization was implemented under KMT rule, and many of the policies 
implemented during the first term of Chen Shui-bien’s presidency were simply the 
continuation of KMT policies that had been agreed upon earlier. Of course, these policies 
were a response to widespread anti-KMT sentiment sparked by the opposition 
movements of the 1970s and 80s, but as I argued in the preceding chapters, the policy of 
localization served to enhance the status of the native elite within the KMT by offering 
new ways to cement their client-patron relationship with their traditional base, through 
the construction of local cultural tourism, community centers, etc. The ideology 
underlying this campaign was one in which Taiwanese identity was seen as a series of 
concentric circles radiating outwards from the local community to encompass, first 
Taiwan, then the larger Chinese cultural sphere, and finally the world. But the DPP wants 
to break that alliance by opposing the ideology of localization with a more strident 
Taiwanese nationalism rooted in Hoklo cultural identity. The primary means of doing this 
is to challenge the concentric circle model of identity with one in which Taiwanese 
identity is not embedded within the Chinese cultural sphere, but exists on equal terms 
with it inside the larger global sphere. It is for this reason that the question of eventual 
“unification” with the PRC remains such an important part of Taiwanese politics. There 
can be no doubt that external pressure from the PRC has been an important factor, but 
many Taiwanese believe that it is, in fact, local politics which keeps the unification 
question on the national agenda. As Tang Nuo says, 
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When Lee Teng-hui took over as the first Taiwanese president, the 
opposition lost much of its raison d'être because an islander was already in 
power. From that time on, the 'ethnic' question started to change character, 
in a dynamic culminating in the 2004 presidential election. It was no 
longer an opposition between islanders and mainlanders, but between 
Taiwan and the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] in Beijing. Nationalism 
increasingly became a convenient way of avoiding social realities, 
problems in the economy, education and culture. It was also, of course, the 
best instrument for battling against the KMT. (Hou et al., 2004: 22) 
It is too early to tell whether or not the DPP can rule without the support of some of those 
KMT Iron Ballot Bloc constituents who came over to bring them to power, including the 
Hakka and Aborigine groups. What little support the DPP had managed to win amongst 
Aborigines was severely threatened when Vice President Annette Lu ѼԤሞ  (Lǚ 
Xiùlián) called for moving typhoon victims from Taiwan’s mountain regions (most of 
whom are Aborigine) to Central America in order “to give them a new start,” a message 
she later repeated even after criticism (Lin, 2004). 
 The current situation in Taiwan is very fragile, globalization, as well as political 
pressure from Beijing continually pushes Taiwan toward greater and greater integration 
with mainland China, Taiwan’s largest trading partner (Huang and Schuman, 2004). At 
the same time, Hoklo ethnic nationalism can never fully reveal itself without danger of 
backlash, forcing nationalist elements to at least give lip service to localism and 
multiculturalism. Moreover, while the DPP gives lip service to “Taiwanese 
independence” sentiments, it is precisely their economic base, owners of SMEs, who are 
most actively engaged in the export-oriented economy which is pushing Taiwan closer to 
the mainland. Cultural policy serves to mask these realities rather than as a surrogate for 
them. And not just any aspect of cultural policy, but language policy in particular. For no 
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other aspect of Taiwanese cultural policy so clearly links Taiwan to the rest of the world 
than the languages Taiwanese are required, or encouraged to learn.  
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Notes
 
1 Herbert Giles standardized his system in his A Chinese-English Dictionary ൢ
ࠢϫն (Huá-Yīng zìdiǎn), published in Shanghai in1892, and in London in 1912 
(Wikipedia contributors, 2004c). His system was in turn based on earlier work by 
Thomas Wade done in the mid-19th Century (Wikipedia contributors, 2004b). 
2 Tsai has pointed out that while there may be only a 10% difference between the 
orthographies, when combined into word forms, these differences have a huge impact, 
resulting in “48.84% of the 111,415 word types had different spellings” (Tsai, 2004) 
3 For instance, broke out between pro-KMT and opposition supporters at little 
league baseball games in Williamsport, Connecticut in 1969, 70, and 71 (Morris, 
2004:183-185).  
4 Hou Hsiao-Hsien refers to himself as a “mainland Hakka,” a Hakka family who 
came over in 1947 (Hou et al., 2004: 29), the novelist Chu Tien-hsin’s mother is Hakka, 
and architecture professor Hisa Chu-joe calls himself a “leftist” (2004: 32). 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ABORIGINE ETHNICITY: LAND, LANGUAGE, 
EDUCATION AND THE STATE IN TAIWANESE HISTORY 
 
Aborigine Ethnic Formation 
In Chapter 3 I discussed the history of Taiwanese ethnic formation, looking at how the 
Aborigines on the western plains had either assimilated and intermarried with the Han 
Chinese migrant population who arrived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or 
else had migrated to the East. I also, following Harrell (Harrell, 1990), argued that a 
unified Hoklo ethnic identity emerged after years of factional violence once the system of 
land ownership crystallized and elites turned their attention from vying for power at the 
local level to currying favor with the state bureaucracy. Another factor in the decline of 
factional violence was, beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, a concerted effort 
to colonize the remaining Aborigine lands in the mountains and on the remote East coast. 
Before discussing, in Chapter 7, the fieldwork I conducted in a small, rural, 
predominantly Aborigine village in Eastern Taiwan, it is first necessary to explain the 
unique history of Taiwan’s mountain regions and the East coast. Because these were the 
last regions to be penetrated by the state, and the most recent to be colonized by Han 
Chinese, the history of this region is significantly different from that of the rest of Taiwan. 
More importantly, there were significant differences between how each of these regions 
(the mountains and the eastern plains) were colonized, resulting in differences in how 
mountain and plains Aborigines were integrated into the state.  
170 
 I argue that these historical differences between the mountains and the eastern 
plains account for some of the ethnic differences observable between mountain and plains 
aborigines. Specifically, during the Japanese era, policies towards both land and 
education differed radically in each region. Mountain Aborigines were moved off land 
which was required for camphor cultivation, and were educated at police outposts, while 
plains Aborigines had long owned and cultivated land, and were sometimes even able to 
attend public schools. Both groups suffered from the development and opening up of the 
region during the KMT era, when new roads and new policies resulted in significant 
losses of land. Despite these hardships, deprived of alternative sources of social power, 
Aborigines remained closely tied to the state in both eras. As discussed in Chapter 4, they 
remain an important part of the KMT’s political power base. In this chapter I trace their 
alliance with the state to the Japanese era, but also show how Christianity has offered 
Aborigines an alternative to embracing official nationalism. 
 The link between land and education in Taiwanese history, referred to in the 
subtitle of this chapter, is crucial for my argument. State policy towards Aborigines has 
been both policy towards the land owned by Aborigines as well as policy towards the 
Aborigines themselves. It is precisely differences in both land and education policy that 
have shaped the unique histories of Mountain and Plains Aborigines. Moreover, it is 
because of land policies that a third category of Aborigines, the Ping-pu or Plains 
Aborigines1 ͧࢩ૰ (Píngpǔzú) of the West coast, ceased to be (at least as far as the 
state is concerned) a separate ethnic group a hundred years ago. Unlike the west coast, 
where the state remained fairly hands-off in its policy towards land ownership and 
171 
settlement, in the east coast and mountain areas, tremendous economic and military 
resources were expended on the settlement of Aborigine territory. This chapter starts with 
the beginning of state interest in these areas, and ends in the 1950s and 60s when the 
region began to take on its current ethnic and geographic configuration under KMT 
supported development and settlement of the region. 
 
The Mudanshe Incident 
Before 1874, most attempts by Han Chinese to settle in the Rift Valley ended in disaster. 
Disease and Aborigine hostility ensured that only a few small settlements were able to 
survive, and these only around the coastal ports of what are now present day Hualian and 
Taitung. One group of settlers were only able to survive by working as laborers for the 
Amis in Xiugulan Ԥָᛮ (Xiùgūluán) (Thorne, 1997: 97). All that was changed in 1874, 
when an international incident brought this remote region to the attention of the top 
officials of the Qing dynasty. Three years earlier an Okinawan boat had sunk off the 
shore of southeast Taiwan. When the sailors came ashore at the Aborigine village of 
Mudanshe ԗ˃ڋ (Mǔdanshè), they came into conflict with the local Aborigines, who 
killed 54 sailors. Japan responded by sending a force of 3,000 soldiers to occupy the east 
coast of Taiwan, supposedly to punish the Aborigines responsible for the killings, 
although it is likely that the Japanese were already interested in acquiring a territory that 
would protect their important trade routes. “Only after China signed a treaty agreeing to 
compensate both the families of the Okinawan victims for the deaths and Japan for the 
cost of its military expedition did Japan withdraw its troops at the end of October 1874” 
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(Chou, 1991: 13). This was a wake up call, leading to a full scale transformation of Qing 
policy towards Taiwan as well as towards the Aborigine territories. 
 Before 1874, the Qing had sought to prevent Aborigine unrest by limiting contact 
between Chinese and Aborigines. During the early years of Qing rule the local 
administration, often in response to rebellions, routinely ordered surveys of the boundary 
between Han and Aborigine settlement, as well as the construction of huge earthen walls 
to mark the limits of permissible Han settlement (Shepherd, 1993: 16-18). Each time the 
surveys simply acknowledged the previous boundary transgressions as a fait accompli, 
and did little to halt future movement across the boundary. Accordingly, when settlers did 
seek to move into Aborigine territory, they did so without any official support from the 
state (Harrell, 1990: 113). After Mudanshe, however, all that changed towards a policy of 
military occupation and official support of Han settlement in the Aborigine territories. 
 With the support of troops from the mainland, the Rift Valley was forcibly opened 
up. Three overland trails were opened up through the mountains to the west coast, and 
garrisons were established in stone forts “to promote settlement in the areas where the 
roads emerged from the mountains.” Han Chinese were offered a package of inducements 
(including draft animals, agricultural implements, and a three year exemption on 
taxation) to further encourage them to settle in the area (Thorne, 1997: 29). Fountainhead 
Primary School was built on the site of one such a fort, guarding the entrance to a 
mountain trail used during the Qing era. 
 The attempt by the Qing to settle the region was not entirely successful. Over the 
next twenty years (in 1877, 1878, 1888, and 1895) there were a series of Aborigine 
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uprisings against Qing rule in the Rift Valley. Many of these started with action by one 
Aborigine village from one ethnic group, but often grew to involve many different 
Aborigine groups, and even the Hakka. The Qing attempted to reward “compliant” 
villages by offering them seed and agricultural training. Such villages would appoint a 
village leader, or “toumu” ᏄΒ (tóumù, tomok in Amis), who would be responsible to 
the state for the behavior of the village, and village men would have to cut their hair in 
the Qing style. After suppressing the third rebellion in 1888, which required naval forces 
to be sent from the mainland, these chiefs were taken on a tour of the large Han cities of 
the east coast and the mainland in order to impress upon them the power of the Qing. By 
the end of the period the Amis were seen as slowly becoming Sinicized, and were even 
used to help fight against the Toroko and Bunun who were still raiding from the 
mountains (Thorne, 1997: 111-13). 
 Tension between the plains dwelling Amis, Paiwan ૜ᝰ૰ (Páiwānzú), and 
Puyuma ֆ۸૰ (Bēinánzú) on the one hand, and the mountain dwelling Bunun and 
Truku ˰ክᄍ૰ (Tàilǔgézú) on the other was exacerbated when, in 1885, Taiwan 
became a full province and was placed under the command of “an aggressive governor 
with a military background, Liu Ming-ch’uan” (Shepherd, 1993: 360). Central to Liu’s 
rule was a policy of “entering the mountains to rule the aborigines” (Harrell, 1990: 118). 
This policy was similar to the one that had been established a decade earlier in the Rift 
Valley, in that it used forced military occupation to open up Aborigine territories to 
settlers. However, it was different in two important respects: First, in addition to Qing 
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military forces, the mountain campaigns also involved local Han Chinese militias. Liu 
was thus able to channel the communal violence that had riven the increasingly 
overpopulated immigrant communities on the west coast against a common enemy (see 
Chapter 3). Secondly, while early Dutch expeditions had failed to find gold on the east 
coast, the camphor trees that grew in Taiwan’s mountains were almost as valuable as 
gold, especially since it was a key ingredient in celluloid, a commercial plastic invented 
in 1870 (Stainton, 1995: 86), in addition to a host of other cosmetic, pharmaceutical, and 
military uses (it was used in gunpowder) (Richardson, 1972: 104). Liu hoped to use the 
state camphor monopoly to help fund his expensive reforms. “During the years 1891-95 
Taiwan exported 30% more camphor than all of the rest of the world” (Thorne, 1997: 
125). 
 The net effect of Liu’s mountain campaigns was to push the Bunun and Truku 
Aborigines further into the Rift Valley, exacerbating tensions between Aborigine groups 
who had a history of mutual antagonism. Liu’s economic reforms also affected the 
Ping-pu Aborigines on the west coast, accelerating a process which would lead towards 
the elimination of Ping-pu designation altogether.  
 Land ownership in Qing Taiwan was divided between “large-rent” owners and 
“small-rent” owners. Although the large-rent owner was the official owner of the land, it 
was the small-rent owner who actually had power over the land and who profited from it. 
Some large rent owners were absentee landlords who had financed the settlement of the 
land as an investment. Others, however, were Ping-pu Aborigines who sold the rights to 
farm the land in exchange for cash and technical knowledge. Many such Aborigine 
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large-rent holders had already lost all rights to their land in exchange for continued loans 
from the small-rent holder (Chen, 1999: 138-39; Harrell, 1990: 117). Under Liu, who 
desperately needed cash to fund his ambitious modernization of Taiwan, this system was 
reformed. Whereas before only the large-rent holder had paid taxes, now the burden was 
shifted to the small-rent holder. This was advantageous because large-rent holders had 
often been unwilling to register land that they would have to pay taxes on, and a new land 
survey served to quadruple the area of land that was taxed by the government. But to 
compensate the small-rent holder for their greatly increased tax burden, Liu lowered their 
rents to the large-rent holder. Although Han Chinese absentee land owners were relieved 
at their lower tax burden under the new system, Aborigine large-rent owners had 
previously been exempt from paying taxes, so the changes meant “a direct reduction in 
plains aborigine incomes” (Shepherd, 1993: 361). When even these reduced rents were 
eliminated by the Japanese in 1904, “the only legal distinction between Pingpu and other 
Taiwanese disappeared, and there was no instrumental reason for the assimilated Pingpus 
to maintain a separate ethnic identity” (Stainton, 1995). The Pingpu Aborigines were to 
cease to be a distinct ethnic group in the eyes of the state until the category was revived 
by identity based political movements in the 1980s. 
 
Aborigine Education under the Qing 
When the Qing army forced open the Rift Valley to settlers in the wake of the Mudanshe 
incident, they put forth an ambitious proposal to assimilate the Aborigines. An Aborigine 
who had fully assimilated was referred to by the term Guihua ᔐˣ (guīhuà), a term 
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which “which at the same time describes the process of enculturation and the status of 
those being enculturated” (Martin, 1994: 47). Assimilation meant education, and plans 
were made to open forty-four schools on the east coast, although only seven were ever 
opened, and most were closed within ten years due to poor attendance. The curriculum at 
these schools included the 1875 textbook, Proverbs for the Instruction of Savages ৱഒ
ۤԶ (xùnfānlǐyán) and focused on Confucian morality and language instruction. The 
schools seem to have had some success, for, according to reports at the time, “after two 
years in these schools the majority of students could speak the [Hoklo] dialect” (Thorne, 
1997: 114-115). 
 The emphasis on Confucian morality is consistent with Qing educational policies 
towards indigenous peoples elsewhere in the empire. In this respect Qing education 
served many of the same functions as did missionary work during the earlier Dutch 
period. Like the Dutch, the Qing were concerned about promoting “household 
proprietorship of agricultural land” which was seen as a basic feature, not only of 
morality, but also of “civil law” as well as “fiscal accountability” (see Chapter 3, Rowe, 
1994: 425). However, the Qing lacked an independent clergy devoted to such missionary 
activities. Nor was there any state funding for public education. “Rather, periodic 
campaigns to set up schools were launched either by the few vigorous reforming officials 
or in reconstruction efforts following major disturbances when lack of education was 
always identified as contributing to social disorder” (Shepherd, 1993: 373). Accordingly, 
funding for Aborigine schooling was especially forthcoming after major rebellions or 
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after pacifying new territory, such as the east coast, and it was rarely continued after 
things had quieted down. 
 The same pattern had been established in Taiwan over a hundred and fifty years 
earlier, when forty-eight schools were established in Aborigine areas in 1735, after the 
suppression of 1731 Dajiaxi Rebellion ʩΌпڋഒ෪ (Dàjiǎxīshè fānluàn). As with the 
schools established in the Rift Valley, these schools were “to instill in the aborigines 
Chinese values and concepts of moral and social order” (Martin, 1994: 47). And it would 
be repeated again when Liu entered the mountains at the end of the nineteenth century. 
He established schools which would: 
“Gradually instill filial piety, brotherly harmony, loyalty, honesty, 
propriety, righteousness, modesty, and shame, as well as (the senses of) 
utility, community well-being and rules in order to restrain savage hearts 
and bring about control of the self.” (1994: 51) 
Was all this exposure to Confucian values successful? In the plains at least, there is some 
evidence that it was. When a group of Aborigine villages signed a compact to settle the 
P’u-li basin in 1823, they used “Confucian terms” to express “their loyalty to the 
Confucian state” as well as to “complain bitterly of their treatment by Han settlers” 
(Shepherd, 1993: 382). They were thus able to use the official discourse to petition the 
state to recognize their claims for the territory. Moreover, there are records of Aborigine 
women being honored for remaining widows in the Chinese fashion, and of Aborigines 
keeping “Chinese-style ancestor tablets and god statues” in their homes (1993: 383,385).  
 It seems that efforts at sinicization were more successful on the west coast. Not 
only because of the much longer period of contact with Han Chinese, but also because the 
education that the Ping-pu Aborigines received was modeled directly upon that of the 
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community schools in the villages: “As was customary, it began with the Trimetrical 
Classic and the Thousand-Character Classic and then proceeded to the Sacred Edict and 
the Four Books. Emphasis was at first on character recognition and calligraphy and then 
on recitation and memorization of the texts” (1993: 372). Still, it was not enough to 
compete in the examination system with the children of officials who frequently hired 
private tutors or ran private schools for their lineage (Elman, 2000). In order to ensure 
that this did not create resentment amongst the Aborigine elite the Qing found other ways 
to reward failed candidates for the exams: 
From this time it became customary to include among the i sheng 
(ritualists) aborigine students who failed to obtain the sheng yüan degree. 
The i sheng served as musicians and performers in the solemn ceremonies 
school temples conducted each spring and autumn to honor Confucius; 
among their privileges was exemption from labor service. (Shepherd, 
1993: 374)2  
But there was always some tension between Aborigine and Confucian social values. Even 
when they adopted Chinese surnames, it was often done in a very non-Chinese way, such 
as the adoption of Chinese surnames, which were then transmitted matrilineally, or 
changed at will (1993: 384). Moreover, it seems that the marginalized position of plains 
Aborigines made them receptive to nineteenth century Christian missionaries who came 
to the island in the 1870s, leading to mass conversions to Christianity (1993: 382). The 
Protestant Mission had arrived in 1865, and by 1886 there were 1,584 adult members 
among the plains Aborigines on the west coast (Richardson, 1972: 33).  
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The Rift Valley in the Japanese Era 
Early attempts by the Japanese to settle the Rift Valley in 1906 failed, but government 
sponsored development soon made the region much more accessible. By the early thirties, 
three thousand Japanese had settled into three villages, at a cost to the Japanese 
government of nearly ¥5,000 per family (at a time when that much money could have 
bought roughly eight hectares of irrigated paddy land on the east coast). Much of this 
expense was due to the disaster-prone nature of the Rift Valley which is home to regular 
typhoons, floods, and earthquakes (Salter, 1970: 64).  
 During this same period, large numbers of Han Chinese were encouraged to move 
into the region with the opening of two large sugar factories. The first, near Taitung, was 
built in 1913, and the second in the north was built in 1920 (Salter, 1970: 65; Thorne, 
1997: 113). The Taitung Exploitation Corporation was established in 1920 with the goal 
of bringing in 1,300 settlers within the next four years. These settlers entered into 
contracts with the sugar corporation which guaranteed the factories a steady supply of 
raw materials and the farmers a guaranteed market for their produce, as well as technical 
assistance and fertilizer. The settlers were also expected to take part in military 
campaigns against the Aborigines (Salter, 1970: 64-65). 
 Most of the military campaigns were against the Mountain Aborigines, but 
Japanese land policies also caused friction with the Amis. The Japanese had declared that 
all land not under cultivation was officially state property (Stainton, 1995: 95). Because 
much of the land that had belonged to the Amis during the Qing era had not been 
converted to paddy land, and because there existed no written documentation to prove it 
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belonged to the Amis, much of it was taken by the state. Even though the Japanese had 
offered the Amis a chance to register their land starting in 1915, many Amis were 
reluctant to do so because it would then require them to pay taxes on the newly registered 
land (Stainton, 1995: 95-96; Thorne, 1997: 130). 
 While settlers were coming from Japan and the west coast, the Japanese were also 
forcibly moving mountain Aborigines into the area along the outer edges of the Central 
Mountain Range, which included the periphery of the Rift Valley.  
Between 1903 and 1939 some 23% of the total Aborigine population 
moved. Since Pangcah3 formed the largest single Aborigine group, and 
since they were relatively unaffected by forced removal, the percentage of 
the mountain population which was displaced must have been very much 
higher (Thorne, 1997: 129, n. 79). 
There had long been conflict between the Plains and Mountain Aborigines, and the forced 
contact between the two groups exacerbated these tensions. Moreover, the newly settled 
Mountain Aborigines did not take well to wet-rice agriculture (1997: 129). This transition 
was deeply disruptive to the entire social organization of the Bunun, since it introduced 
the concept of private ownership of land, thus undermining traditional patrilineal 
relationships (Stainton, 1995: 100).  
 Goto Shimpei ݉ᗣ๙ͧ, who held the post of civilian administrator from 1898 
to 1906, held a social Darwinian view of ethnic relations, but he opposed those who 
believed that the Aborigines should simply be placed in a “a permanent reservation for 
them ‘until they died out.’” Instead, he argued that gradual assimilation was possible. 
Indeed, he did create a large reservation4, one which occupied almost half of the island, 
but he also set up an assimilation program to train young Aborigines (Thorne, 1997: 
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123-124). However, just five years after Goto’s departure, his gradualist policies were 
overturned in favor of a more aggressive military intervention that would allow for state 
and private companies to profit from the exploitation of both the forests (for camphor) 
and “possible mineral wealth” in the Aborigine territory (1997: 125). By 1915, resistance 
in all but 122 mountain Aborigine villages had been squashed. The long war had cost the 
Japanese colonial forces nearly 10,000 lives, while an untold number of Aborigine lives 
were lost through both warfare and starvation (1997: 126-127).  
 
Aborigine Education Under the Japanese 
Even as the Japanese violently incorporated the Mountain Aborigines into the state, the 
manner of their inclusion served only to heighten differences between them and the Han 
Chinese, not to mention the Plains Aborigines in the East. The Mountain Aborigines were 
taught at police stations around the guard line that kept them out of the region where 
Hakka workers were growing camphor. Police were the primary contact Aborigines had 
with the Japanese state, and the police fulfilled many important administrative functions. 
In 1931, over 5,000 patrolmen (nearly half of the entire police force) were stationed in 
Aborigine areas, most of these were Chinese guards (keitei) who did not have the same 
status as Japanese policemen (Chen, 1984: 229).  
 Police run schools in Aborigine areas were still rather insignificant before the war. 
For the most part they did little more than teach the Japanese language to children of the 
Aborigine leaders (Thorne, 1997: 134). In the early 1920s, when Taiwan’s first civilian 
Governor-general temporarily scaled back the role of the police force, there was a brief 
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spurt during which over thirty primary schools were established for the mountain 
aborigines, but by 1935 there were only five remaining (Chen, 1984: 217; Thorne, 1997: 
134). In the 1930s, however, police run schools grew significantly is both size and 
number: 
The number of children attending the police-administered and -taught 
schools increased from 6,887 in 1931 to 10,355 in 1942, and the 
percentage of school-age children registered in all schools, including about 
50 regular primary schools which had slightly more than 7,000 aboriginal 
pupils, rose from 60.23 percent to 86.35 percent. (Chen, 1984: 230) 
The curriculum at these schools continued to consist of little more than Japanese 
language classes, some arithmetic, “and perhaps music, manual training and agriculture” 
(Thorne, 1997: 134). Like the Dutch and the Qing before them, the Japanese believed that 
an lifestyle devoted to agriculture would result in less violence, and to that end they 
sought to encourage the Aborigines “to switch from firearms to peaceful agricultural 
implements.” The Japanese had a fair measure of success at promoting the shift to wet 
rice agriculture. “Under police direction, the aborigines tripled their rice yield and more 
than doubled their acreage in seven years, from 1924 to 1931” (1984: 229). 
 Japanese efforts at instilling Japanese cultural values through education were not 
limited to Aborigine children, a number of programs also targeted the adult population. 
Social groups and evening language classes were organized to reach adults, purportedly 
with some success (1984: 230). In many ways Aborigines, at least in official wartime 
discourse, were to become the ideal Japanese subjects and to serve as a model for 
Taiwan’s Chinese population. Some even claimed that the “aborigines were more 
Japanized than were the Chinese” (1984: 229)! 
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 While mountain aborigines received only the most basic education from the 
police, some Amis were able to attend full fledged schools that had been set up in the 
valley. As it had been under the Qing, attendance was a problem, and by 1907 only 
around 100 students had managed to graduate from these schools. And like similar 
initiatives in the mountains, there was a burst of new schools built during the 1920s, 
when there were “as many as thirty Aborigine schools, with 46000 pupils.” Unfortunately, 
the similarities did not end there, “by 1935 only five of these were left” (Thorne, 1997: 
134-135).  
 The massacre of 134 Japanese by Atyal Aborigines on October 27, 1930, in what 
is now referred to as the Wushe Incident ᘚڋ՗έ (Wùshè shìjiàn), deeply upset 
Japanese who were proud of their success in assimilating the Aborigines. The leader of 
the rebellion was Mona Rudao னՋክཤ (Mònà Lǔdào), who was one of many 
Aborigine leaders who had been taken on tours of Japan in order to impress them with the 
power and superiority of the Japanese state (Stainton, 1995: 102-103).5 Equally shocking 
was the suicide of “two distinguished aborigine police, Dakkisnobin [؂֯ಢêᎁ૩] and 
Dakkisnaui [؂֯ಢêՋܪ] … who were lauded as symbols of Japanese colonial 
benevolence and tutelage” who took their lives rather than “forewarning the authorities or 
persuading the rebels to surrender” (Ching, 2000: 798). The practice of taking Aborigines 
on tours of Taiwan and Japan, a continuation of Qing era policies, was regularly done 
whenever Aborigine groups had been defeated in battle (Thorne, 1997: 138). But it was 
ended in 1930, soon after the Wushe incident (Stainton, 1995: 103).  
184 
 The Wushe incident was the last major uprising against the state. For the most 
part, the Japanese could count on the cooperation of local leaders. Amongst the Amis 
they continued to count upon the role of the village headman (tomok, ᏄΒ, tóumù in 
Chinese) that had been created under the Qing. “The job of tomok was made a lifetime 
one and he was given great authority within the village to carry out the will of the police” 
(Thorne, 1997: 132). The tomok were also picked to go on tours of Japan. In exchange, 
the tomok were responsible for the behavior of the people in their village, in a way that 
was similar to the Japanese re-implementation of the Qing era baojia systemۙΌտܿ 
(bǎojiǎ zhìdù, hoko in Japanese) in the Han areas. This included a form of courvée labor 
that was regularly expected of the Aborigines. But despite their power at the local level, 
the Aborigine elite were not able to get the same degree of education as Taiwanese did at 
the same time. By 1940, only eighteen Aborigines had graduated from secondary school 
in Taiwan (1997: 135). Although there were limitations on the ability of Han Chinese to 
attend post secondary school, there were still a large number that managed to become 
teachers, doctors, or to even attend university in Japan. 
 Christianity did not yet play an important role in the mountains or the east coast 
during the Japanese era. Even though missionaries were allowed to continue their 
activities after the Japanese gained control of the island in 1895 (at least up until the start 
of World War II), they were unable to make any headway into the Aborigine territories. 
Warfare, and probably a desire to keep outsiders from observing the treatment of 
Aborigines, led the Japanese to restrict missionary access “on the grounds that they did 
not want the missionaries to interfere with the aborigine ‘primitive beliefs’” (Richardson, 
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1972: 161). Even so, there were a few Aborigine converts from the cities on the west 
coast who were able to “spread the faith” on their own in areas unreachable by western 
missionaries (1972: 162). This limited exposure, together with the experiences of 
Aborigine prisoners of war who were exposed to Christianity, would make Aborigines 
even more receptive to foreign missionaries in the fifties and sixties. 
 
Aborigines Love the Emperor Too! - The Kominka Era 
The lack of a shared writing system and different naming practices presented obstacles 
for Japanese bureaucratic rule over the Aborigines. To deal with the problem, Japanese 
authorities assigned transliterated names using the katakana ̖ਫϐ (piànjiǎmíng in 
Chinese) script (Chou, 1991: 152-153). But during the early years, Aborigines were not 
encouraged to adopt Japanese names. This changed as the war approached and the 
Japanese sought to ensure the loyalty and cooperation of their Taiwanese subjects 
through the Kominka ߘͻˣ movement (literally to “transform into the Emperor’s 
subjects,” huángmínhuà in Chinese) (1991: 1). Unlike other state imposed name 
changing movements throughout history (Scott, 1998), which tend to more closely 
resembled the earlier assigning of transliterated names to the Aborigines, name changing 
under the Kominka was more of a privilege than a bureaucratic convenience (Chou, 
1991: 152-153).  
 To be allowed to adopt a Japanese name (and thus assume certain privileges6 
associated with it) Han Chinese had to apply as a family group, registered under the name 
of the family-head. Furthermore, the family had to be a “family in which the national 
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language was frequently used,” and they had to have demonstrated an enthusiastic 
commitment to becoming Japanese (1991: 115-117). For Aborigines however, name 
change was adopted on an individual, rather than family basis, making it much easier for 
educated Aborigines to meet the requirements (1991: 153-154). In some cases it seems 
that all that was required, was for the Aborigines to be able to read their Japanese names, 
as in the collective name-changing of 12,000 young Aborigine men in 1942 (1991: 154). 
There were, however, some restrictions placed on the Aborigines, at least at first, whose 
“Japanese Names” were only allowed to be quasi-Japanese as they were forbidden to use 
common Japanese surnames (Fong, 1993: 120). The Han Chinese, on the other hand, 
were allowed to take Japanese surnames as long as they were not the names of 
“emperors,” “famous personalities” (historical or contemporary), or “surnames indicating 
the geographical origins of former Chinese names” (which was feared to promote 
place-of-origin based ethnic rivalries like those in the nineteenth century) (Chou, 1991: 
123-124). 
 As the war progressed, Taiwanese were mobilized to help fight. At first 
Taiwanese were not put directly into armed service, but starting in 1938 they were 
encouraged to volunteer to be porters, interpreters, and agricultural workers (1991: 171). 
Some enthusiastic volunteers signed declarations in blood declaring their desire to serve 
the Emperor, at least two of these Blood Pleas were written by Aborigines (1991: 
168-170). Three years later, an island-wide Military Volunteers Programఀ࠼॑ѥӇᘟ
Ѣ (Lùjūn tèbié zhìyuàn bīn) was established, and the response was so overwhelming that 
by 1942 425,921 Taiwanese had applied for only 1,000 available posts (1991: 178). 
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Those selected had to pass written tests in Japanese language, Japanese history, and even 
mathematics (1991: 177). It was believed by the Japanese that Aborigines were 
particularly well suited for jungle fighting, and special Aboriginal Volunteers Corps ਣ
ߧ໴۳෋ (Gāoshā yìyǒng duì) were organized for this reason. By 1943, six such groups 
had been organized and sent to fight in the jungles of Southeast Asia (1991: 195-196). 
 The sacrifices Aborigines were willing to make for the Japanese emperor were 
encapsulated in the tale of one young girl. In 1938, Sayon, a “seventeen year-old 
aboriginal woman” from eastern Taiwan, lost her life while carrying three large suitcases 
on her back as she helped an officer departing for the war to leave the mountains (Ching, 
2000: 810).  
In the spring of 1941, after learning of Sayon’s good deed (zenko), 
Governor- General Hasegawa Kiyoshi presented the Ryohen settlement 
with a bell inscribed with the following phrase: “The Bell of the Patriotic 
Maiden Sayon.” The commemoration reverberated throughout the island, 
especially among the aborigines, and generated a media sensation with a 
number of paintings of Sayon, a popular song, and eventually a film based 
on her story. (2000: 810) 
Leo Ching argues that the power of Sayon’s story lies not in a Pocahontas-like narrative 
of assimilation, but in Sayon’s “extraordinary dedication to die performing her duty as an 
ordinary subject of the empire” (emphasis in original, 2000: 812). However, after finally 
gaining some limited recognition as Japanese subjects, the turning over of Taiwan to 
Chiang Kai-shek’s forces after the war was to set back any gains made by these 
sacrifices.  
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Hualian Under the KMT 
At the end of the war, the impoverished east coast was still relatively sparsely populated. 
In 1950 the combined population of Hualian and Taitung counties was only 286,368, just 
slightly more than it had been ten years earlier. However, the construction of a 
cross-island highway, completed in 1959, and a new artificial harbor in Hualian in 1962, 
together with a government policy of encouraging demobilized mainlander soldiers to 
settle in the region, resulted in the doubling of the population to 454,249 by 1960 (Salter, 
1970: 73; Stainton, 1995: 183; Thorne, 1997). Urban growth was even more stunning. 
Hualian went from 17,872 in 1940 to 80,533 in 1967, with similar growth in Taitung as 
well (Salter, 1970: 166). Because almost all of these new settlers were either Mainlander 
soldiers, or Hakka and Hoklo settlers from other parts of Taiwan, the end result was to 
dramatically reduce the percentage of Aborigines in these counties. Under KMT policy, 
ethnicity accrued to the father, resulting in an even more dramatic decrease in the official 
Aborigine population, since many Aborigine women married the retiring soldiers and 
other Han settlers (Stainton, 1995: 135). Suddenly the majority of Aborigines were 
minorities in their own counties. 
 Over two million mainlanders (both soldiers and civilians, although mostly 
soldiers) came to Taiwan in 1949. By the late fifties, early sixties, many of them were 
reaching the age when they should be decommissioned, posing a serious problem for the 
government which needed to find a way to integrate these former soldiers into civilian 
life (Chu and Lin, 2001: 118). One solution was to hire them for public works projects. 
The heavily US subsidized cross-island highway was one such project (Salter, 1970: 151). 
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The other solution was to give them land. Much of the land in the Rift Valley had 
belonged to the Japanese corporations that ran the sugar industry. The KMT assumed 
ownership of all land that had been owned by the state during the Japanese era, and 
failure to redistribute this land back to the Taiwanese was one of the sparks of the bloody 
uprising of February 28th, 1947. On the east coast much of this land was turned into 
farming cooperatives (Bain, 1993: 135). “In Hualien Hsien forty government-organized 
cooperatives distributed some 4,000 hectares of land. By 1950, however, these had been 
almost totally reconverted to private ownership, with only seven of the initial forty 
remaining intact” (Salter, 1970: 74). 
 In some cases the Aborigines were displaced to make room for the newly settled 
Mainlander communities (Stainton, 1995: 138-139). Much of this was done under the 
East Taiwan Land Development Bureau (ETLDB) which started a number of projects to 
create new arable land using mainlander labor (Salter, 1970: 105,115). The new owners 
ended up using less than one third of the land, favoring more lucrative opportunities in 
the urban areas or on the forested slope land (1970: 117). Rules restricting the farming of 
forested slope land were not strictly enforced at this time7 and many settlers moved into 
areas which had never been properly claimed by the Aborigines (1970: 76). Also, cash 
poor Aborigines lost a large portion of their land during this period through debt. “A 
1978 study found that 34.4% of Plains Mountain farmers had no land of their own” 
(Stainton, 1995: 136). Most of the non-mainlander settlers to come over were farmers 
from the southwest where extensive property fragmentation made it unprofitable to stay 
on the land (Salter, 1970: 88).  
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 Meanwhile, in the mountains, it was crucial for the KMT to quickly establish a 
policy towards the 65% of Taiwan which had been inside the Japanese-era guard line. 
The importance of this was driven home by the February 28th uprising and its aftermath. 
Some Aborigines had participated in the rebellion, and some Taiwanese leaders fled to 
the mountains after it was over - but were quickly caught thanks to the help of Aborigine 
leaders who had been paid off (Kerr, 1965: 344; Thorne, 1997: 155-156). The next year 
(1948) the KMT established their Mountain Reserve Policy ͔ᝰߞώፐʲϚۙॢϚၹ
୏᎘٘  (Táiwānshěng gèxiàn shāndì bǎoliúdì guǎnlǐbànfǎ) which marked both a 
continuation and a transformation of Japanese era policy towards the mountains. On the 
one hand, the mountain territory continued to be property of the state, and movement 
continued to be restricted in these areas; however, whereas under the Japanese Aborigine 
movement had been restricted in order to allow free movement of Han laborers in the 
camphor plantations, now the Han were restricted from entering the mountains but the 
Aborigines who lived there were given freedom of movement. Missionaries were also 
allowed in, as I discuss below.  
 In the Mountain areas the duties of the Japanese era police force was replaced by 
the Peace Preservation Corpsۙϰ෋ (Bǎoānduì): 
a “specialized (police) force of semisecret elements” with “universal 
duties” to deal with “subversion” in Taiwan, was created; part of these 
duties consisted of guarding and controlling access to the mountain areas, 
which were not only ideal guerrilla territory but were also to contain secret 
KMT military installations over the course of the following decades. 
(Thorne, 1997: 158-159) 
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The Mountain Reserve Policy was more than just a security measure, it also entailed 
economic and social elements. Aborigines living in the mountains were not required to 
pay taxes and Aborigines were encouraged to engage in sedentary agricultural production 
(1997: 158-159). “This continued the Japanese programme of paddy rice promotion and 
movement of villages to more accessible areas” (Stainton, 1995: 109). Forced relocations 
to “lower” and “more accessible” regions of the mountain area also had a profound effect 
on the Aborigines who often ended up in segregated rural ghettos without any resources 
to speak of. 72 villages were thus relocated between 1945 and 1964 alone (Thorne, 1997: 
159). Betelnut was one such village. The remains of the Japanese-era police-run school 
are still visible up the mountain from the current village, which, because of limited 
available land, is actually spread out over several kilometers along the valley at the foot 
of the mountain. The villagers still own property at the top of the mountain, but 
government policy severely restricts what kinds of crops they can grow on it, even as an 
illegal Betelnut plantation run by Han Chinese is allowed to function on the same 
mountain slope. 
 
Aborigine Education Under the KMT 
The banning of Japanese had serious consequences for Taiwan. In one stroke, the cultural 
and political capital of the island’s elite had been eliminated (Gates, 1981: 264). Japanese 
had provided a common language for all of Taiwan’s ethnic groups, and had been 
especially important for the previously isolated and illiterate Mountain Aborigine 
populations. They had gone from being the ideal Japanese subjects of the “Bell of Sayon” 
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to being merely unassimilated Chinese. As early as 1946, the government issued a plan to 
provide technical training for Aborigines, as well as to grant them equal opportunity to 
compete for universities and government posts (Thorne, 1997: 158-159). Needless to say, 
it would be some time before most Aborigines were ready to compete as equals. 
 The fifties saw the government adopt a series of policies aimed at the Sinification 
of the Aborigine population. In addition to changing their agricultural habits, and settling 
Mountain Aborigines into the lowlands, two other aspects of the “Mountain Reserve 
Policy” were aimed at Sinification: (1) Political Education, which included 
“anti-communist propaganda, wiping clean the remnant poison of Japanese thinking, 
forbidding the use of Japanese language, correcting mistaken ideas of freedom, teaching 
the concept of rule by law,” as well as (2) Mandarin Language Education, which was 
part of a larger campaign to teach Mandarin to all Taiwanese (Stainton, 1995: 110). As 
with all other local languages, Austronesian languages were banned as well.  
 The government considered Aborigine beliefs to be “superstition” that needed to 
be wiped out. Campaigns aimed at improving the economic conditions of Aborigines also 
sought to end such “superstitious” beliefs which were seen as holding Aborigines back. 
The three-stage Regulations Governing the Improvement of the Aborigines’ Living 
Conditions ͔ᝰߞʲϚʇͻ·ަӣ඲ར੃᎘٘  (Táiwān shāndì rénmín shēnghuó 
gǎijìn yùndòng bànfǎ) introduced in 1951, explicitly named the ending of “superstition” 
as one of its goals (Thorne, 1997: 159-160). During this period, the government did 
significant damage to Aborigine culture in the name of stamping out such superstition, 
for instance by their policy banning and destroying Aborigine artwork (Chiu, 2000: 119). 
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Aborigines were also required adopt Chinese names. Many had previously adopted 
Japanese names, but “while the Han Taiwanese were asked to restore their original 
Chinese names, the aborigines were requested to adopt Chinese style names. No 
transliteration was allowed” (Chou, 1991: 157). 
 The damage to Aborigine culture was accelerated, if not completely compensated 
for, by an increase in access to basic education. By 1951 there “there were said to be 144 
elementary schools for Aborigines with 17,734 children and 6,032 adults as students” 
(Thorne, 1997: 159-160). In many places it was the first time that Aborigines had access 
to the same national school system enjoyed by the rest of the population. However, in 
many cases these schools were staffed by retired Mainland soldiers who often had little or 
no training in education, a problem compounded by the fact that they often spoke 
Mandarin Chinese with strong regional accents that were hard for the students to 
understand8.  
 A third and profound change in the education of Aborigines was the lifting of the 
Japanese-era ban on missionaries in the mountain regions. The Chiang family had 
secured support in the US for their leadership of so-called “free China” with the help of 
Christian organizations who had long been frustrated in their dream of converting the 
Chinese (Kerr, 1965: 24,357). In less then ten years after the KMT arrived in Taiwan, 
there was a meteoric rise in the number of missionaries, from 30 in 1950 to “seven 
hundred in 1957” (Kerr, 1965: 413)! As with earlier efforts missionary activity in Taiwan, 
the missionaries found the Aborigine population much more receptive to their message 
than the Han Chinese population. Most likely, the Aborigines looked to an outside power 
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to protect them against the questionable motives of their new rulers (Thorne, 1997: 
167-68, n. 41). Christianity also provided Aborigines with an alternative path to 
modernity, one which allowed them to claim both equality and difference simultaneously 
(Stainton, 1995: 210-211). But there was a more immediate incentive as well, which was 
the provision of food and medical supplies by the missionaries to regions that had been 
hard hit by the war. Many Aborigine families would send one child to the Protestants and 
one to the Catholics in order to maximize their returns (Thorne, 1997: 171-172). 
 Whatever the reasons, the results were quite remarkable. “The number of 
Protestant Aborigine Christians grew steadily to 26,597 in 177 churches in 1954, then 
jumped to 59,239 in 366 churches by 1959” (Thorne, 1997: 166, n. 40). And that is not 
counting the sizable number of Catholics, who accounted for thirty-four percent of the 
Aborigine population in 1977, by which time it was estimated that about seventy percent 
of the Aborigine population was Christian (Stainton, 1995: 170-171). When compared to 
the fact that only about seven percent of the entire population of Taiwan is Christian (in 
1992), it becomes clear the extent to which Christianity has come to be associated with 
Aborigine identity (1995: 169). 
 The presence of the church has had a profound impact on Aborigine cultural and 
political life. As had been the case during the Dutch and Japanese eras, the missionaries 
continued to emphasize reading the bible in the local languages. Even the Catholic church, 
after the Second Vatican Council in 1962, embraced the use of local languages (Wang, 
1995: 7). This policy had two important effects: First, it raised the first generation of 
Aborigine leaders to be literate in their own languages. Secondly, it brought the church 
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into direct conflict with the government’s Mandarinization Campaign੣დར੃ (guóyǔ 
yùndòng), which had banned the use of local languages throughout Taiwan. In 1975 an 
international incident was sparked when Romanized bibles and prayer books were 
confiscated by the government (Stainton, 1995: 156-157). The Presbyterian Church 
played an especially important role in raising a generation of Aborigine political leaders. 
Most Aborigine office holders in Taiwan are associated with the Presbyterians, and are 
graduates of the church’s Yushan Theological Seminary, which was established outside 
of Hualian in 1959 (1995: 151-152). Graduates of the seminary have also became many 
of Taiwan’s leading Aborigine activists in the eighties and nineties (1995: 170, n. 19). 
 
Conclusion 
The history of Taiwan’s Aborigines is one of military conquest, and state sponsored 
colonization of their land by Chinese and Japanese settlers. But that history was not a 
uniform one. As we have seen, there are important differences between the policies that 
were conducted in the mountains and those in the plains of the east coast. In the next 
chapter I discuss my experiences in a small village on the eastern plains. There, I 
discovered a huge gulf between the plains Aborigines in the village where I did my 
fieldwork and mountain aborigine village just fifteen minutes away. I also observed how 
patterns of state patronage affected the production of Aborigine culture within the village, 
and the importance of the church as an alternative source of institutional power. 
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Notes
 
1 This term, which encompasses all of the assimilated Aborigine ethnic groups on 
the West Coast is not to be confused with the contemporary distinction between 
“Mountain” and “Plains” Aborigines. 
2 See Chapter 3 for discussion of alternative degrees used to reward the loyalty of 
both Aborigines and Han Chinese who were unable to pass the difficult examinations. 
3 “Pangcah” is another term for Amis. In the early eighteenth century the 
powerful Pyuma chieftain at Taitung declared his loyalty to the Dutch. This furthered the 
division between the Amis in the south of the Rift Valley, who were under Pyuma rule, 
and the Amis in the north of the valley who were not. The term “Amis” itself seems to be 
of Pyuma derivation, meaning “North” and refers to those southern Amis who were just 
North of the Pyuma, while the northern Amis are often referred to instead as “Pangcah” 
(Thorne, 1997: 25-26, n. 22). See introduction for an account of my choice of terms. 
4 Beginning soon after 1895, … the Japanese rulers progressively built an armed 
‘guard line’ around most of the central mountain core of the island and then, over a 
period of 20 years, moved the guard line inwards against the continual armed resistance 
of high-mountain Aborigine groups (Thorne, 1997: 123). 
5 From “1898 to 1929 there were 9 tours involving 337 people” (Stainton, 1995: 
103). 
6 In general, they were to be treated by policemen as the equals of ethnic 
Japanese. Educationally, their children were allowed to take the entrance examinations 
for high schools which formerly admitted only Japanese students. Economically, during 
times of rationing they were granted more food than their fellow countrymen who stuck 
to Chinese names (Chou, 1991: 157). 
7 Little has changed. The mountains are still covered with illegal betelnut 
plantations owned by Han Chinese. 
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8 During my fieldwork I was told many stories about the incompetence of such 
teachers, but I have not found any record of the actual percentage of retired soldiers who 
worked as teachers in Aborigine areas. The one retired mainlander primary school 
teacher I met was an energetic and talented teacher.  
198 
 
CHAPTER 7 
LEARNING TO BE “LOCAL”: CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY IN 
RURAL TAIWAN 
 
Choosing a Field Site 
I first came to Fountainhead Primary School in the Spring of 2000. I met the Principal, 
Chen, through a friend at the Ministry of Education (MOE). Principal Chen met us at the 
airport and drove us out to Fountainhead, forty five minute drive south of Hualian, in the 
narrow Rift Valley between the high Central Mountain Rangeˁ͛ʲ঻ (Zhōngyāng 
shānmài) and the smaller Coastal Mountain Rangeऻגʲ঻ (Hǎiàn shānmài) which cut 
the valley off from the Pacific Ocean. It was a clear day when I visited the school, and the 
bucolic view was refreshingly different from the overcrowded, polluted cities on 
Taiwan’s West coast. The slightly bitter wild vegetables we ate at an Amisۇࠁ૰ 
(Āměizú) restaurant that evening were also quite different from anything I had 
experienced before in Taiwan. It seemed to be everything I had been looking for in a field 
site: There was as strong Aborigine identity, with Amis accounting for nearly sixty 
percent of the school’s student body, but it was ethnically diverse with many Hoklo, 
Hakka, and Mainlander students as well. Principal Chen was Amis herself, and was 
committed to implementing reforms to teach Aborigine language and culture to the 
students. Or so I thought. I would learn later on that her motivations were quite different, 
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and that she was a sophisticated politician who was able to use interest in Aborigine 
culture to appropriate resources that would help her students succeed in the Taiwanese 
educational system. That is, she was more interested in what culture could do for her 
students than in the cultural policies in and of themselves. In the end this turned out to be 
even more interesting for me than the language and cultural policies I had come to study, 
but it did make it difficult for me during the first months of my fieldwork as I struggled to 
understand why the curriculum lacked the Aborigine language classes I had come to 
study. I knew that these would not be required by the new 9-year Curriculum until they 
were officially implemented in the 2001-2002 school year, but I did feel that I had been 
misled when I discovered that the limit of Aborigine language learning consisted of a few 
songs used during dances or in school cheers. Still, I chose to stay at my field site rather 
than move elsewhere because of the dedication of Principal Chen to helping Aborigine 
students and the unique access she provided me to a part of Taiwan even many of my 
Taiwanese friends in Taipei have never seen. Moreover, as I began exploring the valley I 
discovered two additional communities nearby, the primarily Bununͦཡ૰ (Bùnóngzú) 
Betelenut village, and the primarily Hakka Lucky Village. Visiting the primary schools in 
those villages gave me a broader perspective on the history of the valley, and the issues 
facing the region, but it was especially the differences between Betelenut and 
Fountainhead which interested me. 
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Three Primary Schools 
Although Betelnut Primary School is only a few kilometers away from Fountainhead 
Primary School, they are seemingly worlds apart. Betelnut Primary school is slightly 
above the valley floor on the side of a mountain whose slope (like most of those in the 
valley) is devoted entirely to the cultivation of betelnut, while Fountainhead Primary 
School is squarely in the middle of the paddy land that covers most of the valley floor. 
The differences do not end there. While the students at Betelnut Primary are almost 
exclusively Bunun Aborigines, many of whom must commute from scattered villages all 
along the lower perimeter of the same mountain, Fountainhead students are a mix of 
Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders, and Amis from both sides of the valley floor. But what is 
most striking is the vibrancy and wealth of Fountainhead village, where all the betelnuts 
are processed by Han (mostly Hoklo) businessmen, opposed to the desperate poverty of 
Betelnut village where nobody owns any of the natural wealth that surrounds the village. 
 In order to understand the differences between these two communities, I began to 
look at the history of Aborigine integration into each of the succession of states that ruled 
over Taiwan (see Chapter 6). Betelnut Village, it turns out, is on the other side of an 
invisible line that demarcates not only one district from the next, but also the categories 
of “Plains” and “Mountain Aborigines.” Although both districts are within the larger 
entity of Hualian County, the district that contains Betelnut Village belongs also includes 
the huge mountains looming over the narrow valley. Fountainhead Village, on the other 
hand, is in a district that extends across to the foot of the coastal mountain range on the 
opposite side of the valley floor. This is important because the Amis Aborigines who 
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make up fifty-eight percent of the students at Fountainhead Primary, are Plains 
Aborigines, while the Bunun students who make up almost the entire student population 
at Betelnut Primary are “Mountain Aborigines.” Although there are important cultural 
differences between Amis and other Aborigine groups who traditionally lived in the 
plains of the east coast, and between the Bunun and other Mountain Aborigines, the 
historical process of incorporation into the state has followed strikingly different patterns 
in these two regions. 
 The region immediately around Fountainhead Primary school, including the 
school’s catchment area with Fountainhead and three Amis villages, as well as two 
neighboring villages with their own schools was collectively known as Bell Valley, a 
name supposedly derived from the bell shaped mountain dominating the region, but 
which may have simply been a loanword from the original Amis name for the valley. 
Amis were the majority of the Bell Valley’s population, but the commercial hub was 
Fountainhead whose population was largely Hoklo, although there were some Hakka as 
well – including the mayor. The older generation were perhaps the most divided along 
ethnic lines. It was amongst the older generation that language issues continued to present 
the greatest barrier. I found that those over the age of sixty were the most likely to remain 
largely monolingual in their mother tongue, whether Amis, Hoklo, or Hakka. Especially 
amongst the farming families and Aborigines, where the grandparents were unlikely to 
have received much formal education. If they had received any it was from the Japanese, 
and some could still speak Japanese. Most could understand Mandarin, but only speak it 
with some effort. This, together with the tendency to live in ethnically segregated 
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communities, meant that there was a tremendous divide between communities that were 
separated by only a few minutes walk.  
 The schools were the greatest unifying force in the valley. Except for Lucky and 
Betelnut villages, everyone attended the same primary school in Fountainhead, although 
a small number of families arranged for their children to attend schools in Hualian, or one 
of the larger nearby towns. Lucky’s primary school was a giant new building, and it was 
largely empty. Like many rural schools its population had been declining steadily, and it 
was likely that in the near future the school would be closed and the students would have 
to go to Fountainhead as well. Betelnut village did not have this problem, due to the high 
birthrate in the village. Ethnic divisions seemed less important to the children than those 
of wealth. The children who owned fancy bicycles and listened to the same pop-stars 
would play together no matter which of the local communities they were from. Apart 
from the Church, which has always been active in Aborigine communities (see Chapter 
6), the only other local organization which played a significant role in the lives of these 
children was the school. There was also a middle school in Bell Valley, and it was here 
that all six villages came together, except for those students who tested well enough to go 
to a better middle school. Mark, a Bunun teacher who had grown up in Betelnut village 
told me that the first time he encountered racism was when he started attending middle 
school in Fountainhead, where he was teased for the darker color of his skin (field notes, 
March, 2001). (The Bunun tend to be slightly darker than other Taiwanese.) 
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Local Divisions 
On Christmas of 2002 I returned to Fountainhead Primary school for a follow-up visit. It 
had been nearly a year and a half since I had left this village, but little seemed to have 
changed. Principal Chen, had arranged a Christmas celebration for the grandmothers of 
the neighboring Amis village. These women had formed an Amis dance troupe and 
together with the principal and some students from the school, I had traveled with them to 
several dance contests and performances around the Island. I knew every single one of 
these grandmothers could sing, dance, and drink me under the table, so once the liquor 
started to flow I took my leave. Besides, they would be dancing and singing long into the 
night, and so it gave me time to visit some of my acquaintances in the village. I went to 
see Mr. Yang in his palatial home amidst the rice fields. While we were having tea, he 
showed me his latest project which was a handsomely published book of paintings by the 
women of Fountainhead. These Han Chinese (both Hakka and Hoklo) grandmothers had 
mostly been farmers in their youth and had only learned to paint under the tutelage of Mr. 
Yang, himself an accomplished painter (he had attended Taiwan’s premier art school). He 
gave me a copy of the book, and it was under my arm when I returned to the school 
where the drinking, singing, and dancing was still continuing as I had expected. Principal 
asked me about the book and I showed it to her. She made a face and looked at me and 
said: “Mr. Yang doesn’t like poor people.” 
 Not all the Amis were poor, nor were all the Han Chinese well off: some of the 
most dire poverty existed amongst the Han Chinese itinerant workers in Fountainhead, 
and some of the nicest homes were in the Amis villages; however, there can be no doubt 
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that the Amis were disproportionately afflicted by those troubles so commonly associated 
with poverty: broken homes, alcoholism, failure at school, domestic abuse, etc.  
 
Table 2: Life expectancy of Aborigines, compared with the rest of Taiwan 
 Aborigine 
Men 
Aborigine 
Women 
Other 
Taiwanese 
Men. 
Other 
Taiwanese 
Women. 
All Taiwanese1 
Men 
All 
Taiwanese 
Women 
19992  62 72 72 78 72.5 75 
20003 62.7 73 (no data) (no data) 72.7 75.3 
 
 
 
Table 3: Educational attainment of Aborigines, compared with all Taiwanese 
 2001 
Aborigines4 
All 
Taiwanese 
1999 
Aborigines5 
All 
Taiwanese 
 Female Male    
Primary school included 
and under (under 6 years) 
40.5 
(%) 
28.4 25.5 (no data) 27.0 
Junior high (equals to 9 
years) 
18.6 23.2 16.3 61 17.2 
Senior high (equals to 12 
years) 
28.7 37.6 33.7 (no data)  33.5 
Junior college (equals to 14 
years)  
8.2 6.8 24.56 
 
9 22.3 
University included and 
above (more than 18 years) 
4.1 4.0 (no data) (no data) (no data) 
 
 
 
The newly built homes in the Amis villages were largely empty, having been built on 
money sent home by family working in the large industrial towns on the West Coast. Few 
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Amis could find work near home, and as a result there were almost no young adults in the 
area. Children were raised by their grandparents, or just as often, the children themselves 
had to take care of both their grandparents and their younger siblings. The Han Chinese 
were more likely to own land in the valley, or at least some betelnut plantations along the 
lower edges of the mountains. As a result, they were more likely to remain together as a 
family. Although few among the younger generation worked in the vicinity of the village, 
the Han Chinese were more likely to be able to find work in the larger cities on the East 
coast, such as Hualian, allowing them to maintain a home in the village. The jobs on the 
East coast were more likely to be with the government, small businesses or in the service 
industry; jobs requiring credentials and perhaps some higher education. With lower rates 
of school completion, the Amis were more likely to end up working in low-end 
construction jobs, factory jobs, or perhaps in the Army or merchant marines – all jobs 
which would take them far away from their families. Some of the Han Chinese in the 
village were recent migrants from Taipei, attracted by the lure of a rural lifestyle 
supplemented by Taiwan’s thriving betelnut industry (Wu, 1997).  
 The very real ethnic segregation in the valley was rarely talked about, and yet 
shaped the ways in which “local” culture was constructed in each community. What 
struck me was how unconcerned most people were with local culture. Most people 
seemed to feel that culture was a divisive issue and were more concerned about practical 
matters such as the economy. However, this does not mean that culture did not play an 
important role in the community. In order to understand how culture came to be 
mobilized within the community I draw on Gramsci’s concept of “intellectuals” to 
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explore the ways in which two local figures implemented cultural policies: Mr. Yang and 
Principal Chen. Mr. Yang’s cultural production is focused on improving the image and 
economy of the region, as well as servicing the Hoklo and Hakka communities, while 
Principal Chen is primarily concerned with bringing economic resources to the local 
Amis population. For contrast, I then look at Mark, the Bunun teacher who eventually 
gave up teaching in order to serve the Bunun community through the Presbyterian church. 
His rejection of the cultural model for local intervention in favor of a religious one 
highlights the limits of cultural discourse. 
 
Global Culture and Organic Intellectuals 
Hualian county was one of the last regions of Taiwan to embrace the concept of “local” 
culture. The region’s Hakka, Aborigines, and retired Mainlander soldiers are considered 
reliable members of the KMT’s Iron Ballot constituency. Even the presence of the 
Presbyterian YuShan Theological College and Seminary ΃ʲইዖਗ  (Yùshān 
shénxuéyuàn), home to many of the leaders of the 1990’s Aborigine rights movement, 
has not had a significant impact on how most Aborigines vote. As a result, the region did 
little to implement local culture initiatives begun elsewhere in the 1990s, until it became 
national policy. Lacking a large concentration of any single ethnic group, there was also 
little desire to politicize ethnic identities in the region. However, once national identity 
was defined, from above, as grounded in the local, the region was more than happy to 
jump at the new opportunities to develop “local” culture. Isolated and relatively pristine, 
domestic tourism is one of the few growth industries in Hualian. Indeed, the version of 
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the local cultural curriculum textbook which the government had prepared, and which 
was in use when I arrived in the field, read more like a tourist guide than a primary 
school textbook. In addition to detailed and flowery descriptions of the regions scenery 
and ethnic diversity, it provided nostalgic descriptions of how Hualian city’s commercial 
quarter had once been the red-light district that entertained American soldiers during the 
Korean War! It was also no surprise that the academic department most responsible for 
the study of local culture at the region’s largest and most prestigious university, Tung 
Hwa University 東華大學 (Dōnghuá dàxué), was its Department of Tourism᝴δဘལ
ዜၹ୏ߨԦ؀ (guānguāng jì yóuqì guǎnlǐ yánjiùsuǒ)! Since I left the field in 2001, 
however, the university has opened a College of Indigenous Studies૰໶ᘖۣႪ̂ˣߨ
Ԧ؀ (zúqún guānxi yǔ wénhuà yánjiùsuǒ), headed by the former dean of YuShan 
Theological Seminary. 
 Thus, for most people in Hualian, the promotion of local culture was not about 
ethnic nationalism, but about promoting self-confidence and pride in one’s culture and 
community. One might argue that there is very little difference between the two, but for 
the people I met and spoke with during my time in the region, commercializing identity 
was fine, but politicizing it was not. Most of the teachers and educators I met felt that 
these were issues best left to the communities. There was very little of the anger at 
government suppression of local identities that I encountered in Taipei or cities along the 
West Coast.  
 This is partly due to the politics of patronage. Hualian remains a heavily 
agricultural region, and the Farmer’s Associations still control much of daily life. As 
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discussed in Chapter 4, these organizations have a long history of KMT (and Japanese) 
patronage. (Similarly for the Aborigine population.) James Soong, who had been 
provincial governor under the KMT (before that position was dissolved, along with the 
entire “provincial government”) claimed to have visited every Aborigine village in the 
country. It was joked that he left a school, community center, or firehouse behind in 
every one of them! And part of it has to do with the inability of the DPP to convince the 
Hakkas and Aborigines that they really had their interests at heart. When politicians 
speak in Hoklo it sounds like Hoklo nationalism, not like multiculturalism, no matter 
what the DPP might say. The politics of locality, on the other hand, fit easily into the 
patronage-politics that have dominated the region for so long, providing yet another 
avenue for the distribution of federal and state funds to local communities (see Chapter 
6). 
 Despite the regions reticence to embrace identity politics, there was no doubt that 
this is exactly what was resulting from programs aimed at developing local culture. One 
of the reasons that “local culture” works as a euphemism for Taiwanese identity politics 
is because the rural landscape is so ethnically segregated. What is special about a local 
community is precisely its ethnic and linguistic traditions. At the same time, the model 
effectively subordinates heterogeneous local culture to the larger “imagined community” 
of the Taiwanese nation (Anderson, 1991), a concept which is conveniently left 
undefined. On the one hand, if Taiwan is the sum of its parts, then it localism presents a 
multicultural patchwork in which no one language or culture can be dominant; however, 
some languages and cultures exist in many more localities than others! Moreover, the 
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concentric circles radiating outward from the local level embed Taiwan within the greater 
Chinese cultural sphere, whether or not this is openly admitted. And beyond the sphere of 
Chinese language and culture exists that of global culture, which is a euphemism for 
American cultural hegemony.  
 The end result of these concentric circles in the creation of a cultural hierarchy in 
which, despite all the rhetoric praising the local, the local is effectively subordinated to 
national and global cultural markets. 
..the ‘real’ universality of today’s globalization through the global market 
involves its own hegemonic fiction (or even ideal) of multiculturalist 
tolerance, respect and protection of human rights, democracy, and so 
forth; it involves its own pseudo-Hegelian ‘concrete universality’ of a 
world order whose universal features of the world market, human rights 
and democracy, allow each specific ‘life-style’ to flourish in its 
particularity. So a tension inevitably emerges between this postmodern, 
post-nationstate, ‘concrete universality’, and the earlier ‘concrete 
universality’ of the Nation-State (Žižek, 1997: 40-41) 
The new “concrete universality” of the global market allows for multicultural tolerance 
precisely because the threat of cultural universality is subsumed by its being forced to 
play by the rules of the market. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate, as 
Žižek does, the continued importance of the state in shaping national markets (Weiss, 
1997). The Nation-State is not some holdover from the modernist age which survives 
only as an anachronism in this “postmodern” era. The extent to which global cultural 
forces are allowed to compete with local ones (and local cultures with one another) is 
negotiated at the level of the state, and the state also plays a significant role in the 
production of local and global cultures as commodities.  
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 In Gramsci’s framework, the nexus between state and local culture takes the form 
of “intellectuals,” a category which included everyone from school teachers to priests to 
politicians. In fact, for Gramsci, “all men are intellectuals,” but he is careful to add that 
“not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci et al., 1972: 9). What 
exactly the function of intellectuals is remains rather vague. This is because Gramsci 
further distinguishes between different kinds of intellectuals on the basis of their function. 
“Organic” intellectuals articulate the interests of their own group (Salamini, 2002: 70). 
“Traditional” intellectuals, on the other hand, are groups who had, at one time, been 
organically linked to a particular social group, but through a process of rationalization 
and differentiation now “present themselves as independent and autonomous” (Salamini, 
2002: 77). The assimilation of such traditional intellectuals is a major struggle in the 
battle for hegemony (Greenberg, 2004: 152). It is in discussing traditional intellectuals 
that Gramsci uses the term “cosmopolitan,” for he felt that Italy’s traditional intellectuals 
saw themselves as part of a cosmopolitan class of European intellectuals, rather than 
“Italian” (Salamini, 1981: 75).  
 In Taiwanese terms, the politics of locality effectively created a new category of 
organic intellectuals who were indebted to the state, thus bypassing the growing class of 
cosmopolitan traditional intellectuals fostered by Chiang Ching-kuo’s KMT in the 1970s 
and 80s. This was the true secret to the success of Taiwan’s “passive revolution.” In 
Gramsci’s terms, people like Mr. Yang and Principal Chen are “intellectuals.” And, 
indeed, the new 9-year Curriculum, as well as national policies promoting local culture, 
treat school teachers and local cultural workers as intellectuals (Ministry of Education, 
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2004), and seek to empower them to play a greater role in shaping local identities. In 
Chapter 6, I discussed how teachers were resentful of being treated as intellectuals 
because of the extra work involved in having to research their own curriculum. Teachers 
complained that they were ill trained to take on such tasks, and that they still had to work 
hard to ensure that students learned the basic skills necessary to perform well on 
examinations. I suspect that teachers also resented having to sort out the politics of 
locality. Over and over again, whenever I asked teachers about teaching local languages 
and culture, I was told that it should not be the responsibility of the school, that such 
learning should come from the home and the community. Assuredly, when there was 
little support for such learning at home, the limited efforts of the school were likely to be 
wasted.  
 My research both confirmed and contradicted this assertion. It was true, as I saw, 
that students who failed to receive training in their local language at home were unable to 
get much out of the limited amount of time devoted to teaching these languages in the 
school. On the other hand, the very concept of community and culture was largely 
defined by intellectuals who were able to direct state funds towards local cultural 
programs. 
 
Mr. Yang and His Map 
The Cultural Worker 
Mr. Yang and his brother were born in Fountainhead, the children of a mainlander school 
teacher from Fujian province. He father was fortunate in that, unlike some other 
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mainlanders who were permanently separated from their families, his wife joined him in 
1948, before the border was closed. At the time his father had come the homes were still 
mostly made of traditional thatch, the roads were closed regularly due to flooding, and 
malnourishment was rampant due to the impossibility of farming during the war. His 
father had taught at the primary schools in both Fountainhead and Betelnut villages. Mr. 
Yang was well educated, having attended Taiwan’s top art school, the same one that the 
filmmaker Ang Lee өϰ (Lǐ Ān) (director of “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon,” who 
was also originally from Hualian) attended. His children were now in their teens, but they 
too had attended Fountainhead primary, and his nephew was a student while I was there. 
Mr. Yang made a living as a traveling salesman, selling items to small shops up and 
down the coast out of his small truck. I was told that he and his brother had inherited a 
significant amount of land from their father.  
 I had first met Mr. Yang at a conference on local history held at Tung Hwa 
University, where he had presented a paper on collecting local oral histories. He had done 
this as part of a national government project to collect oral histories and store them in 
regional archives. Since 1995 he had also been involved in working with the community 
center in Fountainhead. My first encounter with the community center was when they 
brought in a Chinese doctor to talk about bone scrapingվ≒ (guāshā). They drafted me 
to be a test candidate, and the doctor demonstrated on me. The next day the local papers 
ran the stories together with pictures. This event, like many other at the community center, 
was primarily targeted at the aging Han Chinese population in Fountainhead. At the age 
of 49 (in 2000), Mr. Yang was significantly younger than most of the village’s adult 
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inhabitants. Mr. Yang was also the editor of a monthly newsletter for Bell Valley, 
something he worked closely on with his friend Mr. Ho, a poet and filmmaker from 
Taipei who moved to Lucky Village where he lived in a large shed filled with books. Mr. 
Ho was also devoted to documenting local history and culture, although his own activities 
were more regional, involving putting on theater productions with the Bunun in Taitung, 
as well as making films about artists in Hualian. 
 
The Map 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the development of local history and culture in Taiwan is 
connected with the development of local tourism. Mr. Yang, together with other 
community members, put together a glossy brochure on the history of the village, 
identifying local landmarks and cultural sites, complete with a large tourist map, and 
color photographs. There is a state park in the valley, one of the few items of attraction 
that might actually draw tourists. While the whole valley is quite beautiful, there park 
itself does not offer much that is unique, and the park did not seem to be doing well. It 
had suffered damages from the last typhoon, and these had still not been repaired. Still, 
the map itself is a fascinating cultural document, and it is worth exploring in some depth. 
 It is perhaps unfair to make too much of the map’s iconography, since it seems to 
have been taken from a standard clip-art collection; but it is strange that the map is 
populated with what appear to be European tourists, marching around with backpacks 
and blond hair. Fountainhead Primary school is depicted with baseball players,7 while 
the middle school shows what appears to be a black basketball player. Two of the three 
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aborigine villages are marked with pictures of dancing indigenous peoples in traditional 
dress, but they do not seem to be Taiwanese Aborigines, rather they look Polynesian. The 
overall effect of these cartoon figures wandering around the map in cars, on bicycles and 
on foot is to convey an image of a tourist friendly region. The fact that the map is only in 
Mandarin Chinese makes it clear that it is intended only for domestic tourism, but I 
suspect that the map’s main purpose is defining the community and promoting civic pride. 
Fountainhead was not a major tourist destination, and was not set up to receive tourists, 
except for the dilapidated state park. 
 Each of the ethnic groups in the village is listed as a local attraction. The Amis 
and the Bunun are shown in their traditional dress. The Bunun are singing, and the Amis 
are dancing. The description of the Bunun, under the title “The Harmonic Singing of the 
Bunun: The sound of their society and their natural world” gives a general feeling of the 
style and manner of description: 
The Bunun live in Betelnut Village, on the north side of the river, at the 
base of the mountain. In 1939 they were forced to migrate over the 
mountains to this location. Their life is brimming with the wisdom of the 
jungle and the culture of mountain forests. Their eight-part harmonious 
singing is famous throughout the world, and is regarded as the sound of 
nature. Because our villages are closely linked together, the Bunun easily 
became a part of Bell Valley’s social circles. (Mr. Yang, 2001) 
Song was the local specialty of the Bunun, and I even have a CD of songs from the 
village presented to me by the Betelnut Primary school principal. It is also true (as 
discussed in Chapter 5) that the village was forcibly relocated to the valley in 1939. But 
the sad fact is that Betelnut village was an impoverished community and was largely 
segregated from Fountainhead. The principal of Betelnut Primary had, like Principal 
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Chen, complained to me that Mr. Yang never visited Betelnut when he was preparing his 
monthly newsletter, and did not organize any activities that included their village. 
 The description of the Amis was not much different. It tells us that they are likely 
to be Amis who migrated from the region bearing the same name as the largest village, 
and that one of the other villages is named after a plant commonly eaten together with 
betelnut by the Amis. Then it concludes with a discussion of the dancing during the 
harvest festival. The entire section is titled “The singing and dancing Amis”! and the 
accompanying pictures show them doing just that.  
 The Hoklo are not depicted as singing and dancing, but as hard working. The 
section on the Hoklo is titled “The callused hands and feet of the Hoklo.” It describes 
how when the Hoklo came to the region most of the land was already owned by the Amis 
and the Hakka, so they either had to work in the sugar factory (see Chapter 5), open up 
new land for development, or work as tenant farmers for others: “life was hard, most 
lived hand-to-mouth.” It then describes in moving terms a stone tablet that was 
discovered with inscriptions describing the incredible hardships of those early years, “a 
grain of sand, a stone, share equally the tears of blood.”  
 The section on the Hakka community also starts with a description of how they 
originally came to the valley, starting with those Hakka who were recruited by the Qing 
to help suppress Aborigine rebellions in Hualian at the end of the nineteenth century 
(although the description does not refer to the Aborigine rebellions directly as such). It 
mentions that some intermarried with the Amis population, and that more came over 
during the Japanese era because government policies encouraged people to settle the 
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large tracts of “unmanned” fertile land. It then mentions by name the leader of one Hakka 
clan who came to the region as a group, and who built the oldest “earth god” ʦϚ˚ 
(Tǔdìgōng) temple in the valley. Finally, the section describes how fertile the region is 
and how efficiently the “diligent and thrifty” Hakka were able to cultivate it.  
 Interestingly, there is no section on the Mainlander population of the valley. The 
only mention of the village where most of the Mainlanders live is in reference to the 
Amis folk etymology of the village’s name. Historic buildings and temples8  are 
mentioned: The train station, the medical clinic established by the Japanese (and still 
inhabited by the Japanese educated doctor), the valley’s irrigation system (first built 
during the Qing era, but greatly expanded during the Japanese period), the ruins of a 
Shinto Temple build during Japanese rule, the martyr’s shrine dating from the Qing era, 
and the local Taoist temple (rebuilt after World War II), are all given brief histories. 
Particular attention is paid to the heroic efforts to preserve local gods when they were 
banned as part of the Komika movement (see Chapter 5). There is also a description of an 
abandoned dormitory for tenant farmers, many of whom were Plains Aborigines from the 
East Coast. The building was abandoned when most of them moved back West during the 
difficult war years, but some of the small shrines they built still remain.  
 The remaining entries mostly deal with local natural scenery and wildlife, billing 
the valley as Taiwan’s “largest natural classroom.” The flip side of the map discusses the 
park and the natural scenery at length, clearly the valley’s biggest selling point. But there 
are also two large panels on local culture. The first one is devoted to the “unschooled 
painters” of Fountainhead – the same ones whose work is featured in the book Mr. Yang 
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presented me with. Not surprisingly, considering Mr. Yang’s role in developing the map, 
these painters are described in glowing terms. It even provides quotes from some of 
Taiwan’s foremost painters praising their work. The second panel describes a tradition of 
playing drums to commemorate the birthday of the village deity. It traces this tradition 
back to 1889 when Qing soldiers built a fort at the site of Fountainhead primary school 
and consecrated a temple to the deity. However, it also makes it clear that the local 
tradition of having annual drum contests was started in 1998 as a way of commemorating 
the old traditions. 
 
The Americans Visit 
In January of 2001 a group of high school students from South Dakota arrived in 
Fountainhead. They called themselves the “Ambassadors of Excellence,” so named 
because they were all students who had demonstrated some academic or artistic talent. 
There was a whole day of events planned at Fountainhead middle school. The teachers 
taught the visitors how to make grasshoppers by folding blades of grass, and the kids all 
seemed to enjoy playing basketball together in the afternoon. Then came the cultural 
events. The students from South Dakota performed a mixture of Broadway show tunes, 
Brazilian salsa, and Lakota Indian dances (although I do not believe any of them were 
actually Lakota or Brazilian). The village performances seemed to come straight out of 
the map. The Bunun sang, the Amis danced (all in traditional dress), and the Han Chinese 
students performed on the drums.  
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Dancing for Opportunity 
The School Principal 
As a bureaucrat in the state educational system, Principal Chen had to function within a 
very different set of constraints than did a freelance cultural worker like Mr. Yang. 
Principal Chen is an excellent administrator, who understood the political and 
bureaucratic skills necessary to operate within the system, and this is what endeared her 
to the local community. As an Amis woman, and a vocal advocate of promoting the 
culture and well being of “her people,” she was still popular among the Han Chinese 
parents in the village because of her ability to attract state funds to improve the school 
both physically and academically.  
 I lived together with the principal, the school director (also Amis) and a Truku 3rd 
Grade teacher in the school’s small faculty dormitory for an entire school year. She is one 
of the most driven and hard working people I have ever met. She never sleeps more than 
five hours a night. If she is not attending a meeting somewhere, she is on the phone, or 
else at her desk going over the school’s paperwork. If she has some free time, she uses it 
to inspect ongoing construction project on the school grounds - and there are many of 
those as she is always finding new money to improve the school’s facilities. She is not 
someone with tremendous ‘book learning’ but she is very intelligent, and she understands 
how to “get things done” (ਮ՗, zuòshì). It is knowledge she is proud of and she tries 
hard to share it with those who work under her. She actively cultivates the talents of all 
the teachers at the school, but she seems to particularly take Aborigine women faculty 
under her wing. While teachers appreciate her guidance and her attention to detail, these 
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qualities also make her a very demanding boss. She does not run the school as a 
democracy, and there was a certain degree of frustration amongst some of the faculty at 
her authoritarian leadership style. 
 Principal Chen is Amis, but she grew up in a Atyal village, and spoke Atyal as a 
child. She remembers her parents speaking Japanese to each other when they did not 
want the children to understand what they were saying, but she herself does not speak any 
Japanese. Later in life, as a teacher in the 1980s when everyone in Taiwan began 
rediscovering their own language and culture, she taught herself to speak her mother 
tongue by speaking to members of the older generation. She also can speak some Hoklo. 
While she is far from fluent, she has a great ability to use language for dramatic and 
humorous effect, and is able to use Hoklo well enough to charm Hoklo speakers. She 
quite often plays on the different meanings that the same sound has in the various 
languages she is surrounded with: Mandarin, Hoklo, Atyal, Amis, and even Hakka and 
English.  
 Principal Chen never married, or if she did marry at some time in the past she 
does not talk about it. It seems hard to imagine her having much time for anything other 
than her work. While women wield a fair amount of power in Taiwanese society, they 
usually do so in the background, leaving public life to the men (Simon, 2003). Although 
some women manage to function in the public world in a more feminine fashion, there is 
no doubt that Principal Chen has a distinctly masculine approach to her public behavior: 
she often uses sexual humor, she can drink heavily if she needs to, often encouraging her 
staff to drink excessively at special occasions, she can also be aggressive and 
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authoritative on occasion. How is it that such behavior is accepted in a society where 
women are usually expected to be demure? I think part of it is that she is an older, 
unmarried woman but certainly an important part is that she is not Han Chinese. As an 
Aborigine woman, there are different expectations for what is appropriate or expected. 
For instance, Aborigines are considered to be more open about their sexuality, something 
that is often discussed in the myths and stories of the Amis. Her behavior certainly does 
not go without criticism. She has a “reputation” for being a strict and “severe” (ᄽࣁ, 
lìhai) boss, that I doubt would be as negative if she were a man.  
 In some ways the school is run like a military academy, which was in the model 
that Taiwan’s schools had been run on for many years, although things were beginning to 
change, especially among the younger generation of teachers who have been influenced 
by contemporary Western educational theory. Many behaviors were fairly standard for 
Taiwanese schools, but were strictly enforced: students should solute and greet teachers 
by title when passing them, students should salute and shout “Reporting!” (ైዘ, bàodǎo) 
before entering the teacher’s office (as in the military), when the entire school was 
assembled, such as at the biweekly flag raising ceremony, the principal would drill 
students in kneeling and standing to attention. If the students did not immediately snap to 
attention then they would have to do it several more times until they were all in unison. 
Similarly, the students were taught to cheer in unison using an Amis language cheer. The 
recasting of nationalist era educational behaviors and symbols in Amis cultural terms was 
typical. Once the teachers joked during the flag raising ceremony that they should beat 
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the Aborigine drums when students march out from their classrooms for the flag raising 
and then add an Amis chorus to the national anthem (field notes, January 9, 2001). 
 Nothing bothered the principal more than Amis children who spoke quietly, 
shuffled their feet and did not look adults in the eye when speaking to them. She believed 
strongly that self-presentation, even one’s handwriting, strongly affected one’s ability to 
function in the world. And these lessons did not just apply to students. She was equally 
adamant about how teachers presented their public self. Of course, with teachers she 
focused on different things, such as how they wrote official memos and reports. Incorrect 
form would be scolded, but she also provided valuable lessons on how to deal with the 
bureaucracy. Her knowledge of proper form and procedure earned her respect at the 
Hualian Ministry of Education. When it came time to file all the applications for funding 
under the category of Schools in Remote Areas਷ჯϚੈዖऔ (piānyuǎn dìqū xuéxiao) 
throughout the county (and Hualian is one of the counties with the largest number of such 
schools in Taiwan), Principal Chen was put in charge of collecting, editing, summarizing, 
and even re-writing all of the reports. At the time she commented to me that many of the 
school principals did not know how to do this properly, making mistakes, not applying 
for all the money they qualified for, or simply not presenting their case in the correct 
bureaucratic language. 
 The principal was also very clear that she saw culture as a means of creating 
opportunities for the Amis, both by drawing state funds into the school, and also because 
of the opportunities presented to them through travel and competition. During one 
meeting with one of the top KMT officials in the county government, the drunken 
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politician proceeded to tell us, for some time, how he had come to understand that 
Aborigine's were the key to the whole province, but that they could only have power if 
they united. Obviously meaning that they should unite behind him. He told us how he had 
been going around to all the villages - dancing and drinking for nights on end. He had lots 
of plans and proposals, some of which he outlined, but the main plan seemed to be for 
some kind of a chain of Aborigine theme hotels, which would have playgrounds, hot 
springs, and hunting grounds! An aborigine guide would bring people in to where the 
(stocked) animals were, and would then hunt (with rifles because arrows are too 
dangerous). If they did not catch anything they could still buy meat to eat at the restaurant, 
otherwise it would be cleaned and cooked for them in traditional style. The main point 
being that at least 60% of the workers would be Aborigine. This is considered good, 
because then they need not go so far away to work. I asked the Principal what she thought 
of this proposal and all she said was that if they really hire 60% Aborigine workers that 
would really be something, and it would be good. (field notes, October 13, 2000). 
 There may have been some bitterness in the principal’s response on this occasion, 
but this hard-nosed attitude in which creating opportunities for Aborigines came before 
any kind of cultural or identity based politics reflected a general attitude that could be 
seen in the integration of “local culture” into the school curriculum. Because, for the 
Amis, local culture often means “dance,” I will look next at the role of Amis dance at 
Fountainhead primary school. 
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A Brief History of Amis Dancing 
While the history of dancing amongst the Amis goes back beyond recorded history, it is 
known that during the Japanese era the Amis custom of dancing to entertain important 
guests became a regular feature of the hospitality extended to Japanese visitors. 
such visitors included "tourists, representative of the railroad 
administration or the sugar factory or public servants" (this latter probably 
meaning, primarily, police officials), who would be entertained in each of 
the hamlets by its women's dance group beginning at dusk, with 
accompanying food and drink. The guest could choose, from among the 
dancers, the one he liked the best and she would eat and drink with him for 
the duration of the evening, which might go on until midnight. The visitor 
would be expected to give a present of money for the performance, which 
would later either be shared out among the dancers and their leaders or 
used collectively to buy materials for costumes, or for a collective feast, 
etc. (Thorne, 1997: 133, n. 92) 
Such dancing also became a regular feature at official events organized by the Japanese 
colonial administration. For instance, 100 Amis danced when a royal Prince visited 
Taiwan in 1923, and again to “welcome the new governor” the following year (Thorne, 
1997: 140). 
 The occasion which most Taiwanese today associate with Aborigine dancing is 
the Amis Harvest Festival ᕚϷ୰ (fēngniánjì). In the early years of Japanese rule on the 
east coast of Taiwan, these traditional festivals were banned, in an attempt to promote 
Japanese religion and suppress local traditions. They later reinstated the ritual, but 
changed it in some very important ways: First, when it was revived in 1927, the 
traditional leaders of the event were replaced by the Japanese appointed tomok. Secondly, 
the role of women was increased relative to that of men, probably as a means of reducing 
the political power of male age-grade societies (awid in Amis). And, third, the object of 
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worship was officially changed to Japanese, as opposed to Amis, deities (Thorne, 1997: 
132-33). After the KMT arrived many Amis converted to Christianity (see Chapter 5), 
and the Harvest Festival was initially banned by church leaders as superstition, only to be 
brought back later once Christian themes were integrated into the event (Chang, 1989: 
92). 
 It was cultural tourism which finally secured the continued importance of 
Aborigine dance in Taiwan, including the Amis Harvest Festival. Aborigine dance had 
been an important part of domestic tourism since the 1960s when Atyal dancers at 
Sun-Moon Lakĕ̈ᆻ (Rìyuè tán), in the West, and Wulaiॏդ (Wūlái), in Northern 
Taiwan, would dance for tourists, the vast majority of such tourists were American 
soldiers coming and going from Vietnam (Thorne, 1997: 214). It was not till 1978 that 
the Amis began to organize collective dances in which several villages would come 
together to hold their Harvest Festival. Such events were still under the leadership of the 
tomok, and received government subsidies (Chang, 1989: 114). Now the festival is 
coordinated along the entire East coast, although it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
get younger members of the community to return from the city to participate. It is 
because of this history, linking Aborigine dance with tourism that dance has come to 
symbolize Aborigine culture for most Taiwanese, and to symbolize Amis culture in 
particular (Thorne, 1997: 216). 
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The Aborigine Cultural Exposition 
There is an Aborigine joke that was told to me on at least two occasions during my 
fieldwork, both times by Aborigine school teachers. It describes an Aborigine man who 
has never been in the city before. He is tired and decides to stay in a hotel for the night. 
Because he does not have much money, he asks for the smallest room in the hotel. He is 
directed towards the elevator. Later, he is woken up by an angry clerk because he was 
found sleeping on the floor of the elevator! Having never seen an elevator before, he 
mistakes it for his room. The principal used this story when speaking at a conference 
associated with the Aborigine Song and Dance Cultural Education Exposition (ࢎ̠ͻᆫ
Ⴌᗠீ୰í̂ ˣ૦ԯ࣊ေ᝴ᆄަ੃, Yuánzhùmín yuèwǔ yìshù jì: wénhuà jiàoyù zhǎnyǎn 
guānmó huódòng) held at the Pingtung Aborigine Cultural Park (ܴسࢎ̠ͻ̂ˣฐੈ, 
Píngdōng Yuánzhùmín Wénhuà Yuánqū) at the end of October 2000. Before being 
assigned to Fountainhead village, Chen had previously been principal at an Aborigine 
primary school on the coast, and had won the national dance contest with the students of 
that school. This qualified her to take the students to an international dance contest in 
Singapore. She had also taken the children to perform in Japan. For her it was the ability 
to take the children to Pingtung County, Singapore, or Japan that was the most important 
aspect of participating in such competitions. Many Aborigine children never had the 
opportunity to leave the village they grew up in. Although Fountainhead village is a mere 
forty minutes drive from Hualian, an hour by train, some children had never been there. 
Principal Chen felt it was important for the students to be exposed to cities so that they 
would be able to function in the wider world without being afraid, or looking foolish like 
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the man in the elevator. In her talk she recounted a story of an Aborigine student on the 
trip to Singapore who did not know how to sleep in a Western bed. Instead of pulling 
back the covers to sleep under the sheets, he slept on top of the bed with the bed cover as 
a blanket. For the principal it was exposure to other cultures, and modernity, that was the 
most important aspect of such contests, not preservation of tradition (field notes, 
November 1, 2000). In Gramscian terms, it was a means of acquiring symbolic capitol, 
and protecting the students from “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu and Nice, 2000: 170; 
Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 4) 
 The park where the cultural exposition was held was established in the 80s with 
the support of then provincial governor James Soong (Ү๥ະ, Sòng Chǔyú), the park 
itself has something of an Epcot center feel, complete with tourist transport trolleys. 
There is a museum with Museum of Natural History style dioramas of each of the nine 
ethnic groups, and outside there are sample houses from each group as well. The event 
lasted two days, and was a celebration of all of Taiwan’s Aborigine cultures. At the 
opening ceremony there were nine young women dressed in the “traditional” attire of 
each of Taiwan’s nine officially recognized Aborigine ethnic groups9 (it was pointed out 
to me that the women themselves were not from each of these groups). All the dance 
performances were “traditional” dances, performed in “traditional” attire. There were 
only a few groups representing each of the different ethnic groups, as well as one 
professional troupe of Aborigine dancers who were much younger than the rest of the 
participants, and who performed some songs and dances which drew on all of the various 
Aborigine traditions, promoting a sense of Aborigine unity. This sense of unity was 
227 
exemplified by the song “We are all of the same family” (ӎ࡮ݶɿࣂʇ, wǒmen shì 
yìjiārén). Outside there were booths from each of the groups attending, at which various 
goods were being sold to help subsidize the cost of the trips. Each of the booths was 
different, some selling goods that were clearly identifiable as Aborigine foods or crafts, 
while others sold more modern goods, or even simply exhibited photographs and 
information about the attending schools. For instance, one booth documented the mother 
tongue language learning efforts of a school in Pingtung County.  
 The booth for Fountainhead was staffed mostly by Han Chinese women, some of 
whom had children performing in the Aborigine dance contest. It was here that I first saw 
Mr. Yang’s map, which was prominently displayed, along with old pictures from a book 
of historical photographs of the village that Mr. Yang had put together. In addition to 
these Han Chinese women, there was also a group of Amis Grandmothers who had come 
to perform in the contest. These grandmothers ۇฤ (āmā) were a rowdy bunch! The 
entire trip they were chewing betlenut, singing songs, and drinking a tremendous amount 
of rice wine У਎ (mǐjiǔ). One of the Han Chinese teachers who had come on the trip, 
and with whom I shared a hotel room on the first night, was clearly upset at their 
behavior. You could still hear them dancing and singing late at night when everyone else 
was exhausted and going to bed. When asked why the older dance troupe was nearly all 
female (some of the other dance groups at the event were more balanced, or even mostly 
male), the teachers gave us two answers: “(1) The men aren't as involved. (2) Amis is a 
matrilineal society.” (field notes, October 31, 2000). Another, more likely, explanation is 
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that the men of that generation were no longer alive, or in poor health. Very few 
Aborigine men live to old age (see Table 2). 
 
The Dance Contest 
On December 19th, 2000 was the regional dance contest for the East Coast. Fountainhead 
did not win. The principal was clearly devastated, although she kept insisting that 
winning did not matter that much. The school that won was a school in one of the largest 
Amis settlements in the Rift Valley, a school that had devoted itself to promoting Amis 
culture for many years. But the students at Fountainhead had been training hard all 
semester, with the whole school dancing together during every break period. Although 
only the best dancers, and students (the principal kept pointing out that only those with 
good grades would be allowed to compete) were able to be on the team, the entire school 
participated in the practice sessions. The younger students clearly loved the excitement, 
and would sometimes dance as they went from class to class. A significant number of the 
dance team members were not themselves Amis, but were Han Chinese. This did not 
seem to detract from their enjoyment. 
 Even though Fountainhead Primary did not win the dance contest, the students 
had several other occasions to perform as a “troupe.” Such as at a regional Christmas 
celebration sponsored by local companies. Even if Aborigine identity received 
government and even corporate sponsorship, the student’s own choices were clearly for 
popular culture. At the end of the school year there was a student talent show, and the 
students spent hours and hours practicing dance moves they saw on television. These 
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were more reminiscent of the dance moves seen by the chorus on Michael Jackson’s 
Thriller or Beat it videos then they were of Aborigine identity. The enthusiasm with 
which students practiced on their own for these performances contrasted sharply with the 
regimented way in which they were drilled in Aborigine dance. It was not so much that 
they did not care for Aborigine dance, they clearly enjoyed it. But they also knew what 
was “cool.” 
 
Learning “Local” Languages 
Fountainhead’s Languages 
The difference between popular dance songs the students saw on TV and the Amis 
traditional dances they performed at school events makes clear the problems faced by 
efforts to preserve the Amis language. In a decentralized cultural market Amis must 
compete with not only other regional languages, but also Mandarin Chinese, which 
remains the national language and the language in which all classes are taught, as well as 
“global” languages such as English and Japanese, the two countries most responsible for 
manufacturing the cultural commodities consumed in Taiwan. For parents, the potential 
economic rewards of having their children learn Mandarin and English are far more 
attractive then those associated with preserving the mother tongue. Many parents raise 
their children in Mandarin, using their mother tongue only for speaking with their spouse 
when they do not want the children to understand. In some cases, especially in families 
where the parents are away and raising the children falls to the grandparents, the 
grandparents might speak to the children in the mother tongue, but the children usually 
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respond in Mandarin. Language maintenance seems to be strongest amongst Hoklo 
speakers, followed by Hakka, then the Austronesian languages, with almost zero 
retention of mother tongue amongst Mainlander immigrants (Tsao, 2001). 
 Sitting in the teacher’s office of Fountainhead Primary School, the predominant 
language one hears is Mandarin. Mandarin is what teachers most often use with each 
other, with students, as well as what students use with each other. Occasionally a local 
visitor, such as a politician, or salesman, will come and will speak entirely in Hoklo with 
the teachers. Some teachers who share a similar ethnic background will speak to each 
other in their mother tongue, although such conversations are usually fairly short, lest 
they alienate any of the other teachers. Sometimes the children will use their mother 
tongue or one of the other local languages for dramatic or humorous purposes, but rarely 
will these be extended conversations.  
 It has not always been this way. From the 1930s till the 1980s, under both the 
Japanese and the KMT, local languages were banned. Students who spoke the local 
language would be punished in school – even if they were caught using the language off 
of school grounds! Interestingly, twice in the history of the school, Hakka became a 
semi-official language within the school. Right after the Japanese left, and before the 
KMT established its Mandarin language policy, classes at Fountainhead Primary School 
were actually taught in Hakka. Again, after the lifting of Martial Law, and before the 
arrival of Principal Chen (who is herself Amis), the school was under a Hakka principal, 
and Hakka became the language of the teacher’s office, although not the classrooms. One 
Amis teacher who was there before the new principal came complained to me about how 
231 
this practice made her feel quite excluded. Although there is clearly a feeling amongst the 
non-Aborigine staff that the new principal favors Aborigines, they seem to prefer the 
atmosphere in the office these days to how it used to be. 
 
Language Learning at Fountainhead Primary 
Growing up, most teachers encountered only one linguistic market – Mandarin. Later, 
after the end of Martial Law, new markets started to open up, and some felt motivated to 
acquire linguistic capital in their mother tongue. Principal Chen was motivated to learn 
Amis after attending a series of weekend retreats, while another teacher learned Hakka 
after marrying into a Hakka family. While for some Aborigine teachers, such as the 
Principal, learning their mother tongue was clearly a political decision; there seemed little 
desire to promote mother tongue education amongst the younger generation. English was 
considered to be a much higher priority. English is one academic subject where there is 
the greatest discrepancy between rural and urban students. Urban students are more 
readily able to attend Bushibans to improve their English skills, and this gives them a 
clear advantage in one area over rural students. At present, native language skills have 
only limited value for further education, although plans are under way to make certain 
forms of Aborigine scholarships dependent upon language skills, as well as to make the 
system of adding points to the JCEE dependent upon language skills. However, with the 
demise of the JCEE this is surely to change as well.  
 Only one English language cram school was run in town. It was run by a teacher 
who had grown up in Fountainhead, but who had had the opportunity to study abroad for 
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some time in England and America. With his education he could easily have gotten a job 
in Taipei, but he was committed to helping out the children in his community. The school 
was paid for by the community on a collective basis, and spots were made available for 
poorer students who could not attend. In this way it was not unlike the traditional charity 
and clan schools of the Qing era. Most of the students were from the Han village, but 
some Aborigine students from the neighboring village attended as well. 
 In the neighboring Bunun village, the Presbyterian Church played an important 
role in teaching Bunun to the local children. However, in the Amis village the 
Presbyterian church was not so important. Most people attended the Catholic Church 
instead. While services were conducted both in Amis and Mandarin, with prayer books in 
Amis as well, Mandarin has come to be used more and more. The priest confided in me 
that he did not think native language education was very important anymore, and that the 
next generation of Amis would be better off learning English. He himself was Bunun and 
he divided his time between the Bunun Catholic Church and the Amis one. Still, for those 
few young people who did regularly attend events at the Catholic church, they were 
exposed regularly to both written and spoken Amis.  
 The 9-year Curriculum was just being phased in during the period I was in the 
field. Local language learning only took place within the context of the singing that 
accompanied the Aborigine dances. It was not until the next year that Amis, Hakka, and 
Hoklo would become official parts of the school curriculum. On a return trip I had the 
opportunity to observe an Amis class and a Hakka class. For these classes all the students 
were grouped together, regardless of grade. The Amis class involved learning songs in 
233 
which a few vocabulary words, such as animal names, were introduced. In the class I saw, 
which took place about half way through the school year, only those students who spoke 
Amis at home seemed to be able to sing the song and identify the vocabulary words. The 
other students just tried their best to keep the tune. The Hakka class, on the other hand, 
was more focused on reading and writing. Bunun was not offered yet even though there 
were a couple of Bunun students at the school. The principal said that they were making 
better arrangements for the Bunun students the following year. 
 Mandarin and English, on the other hand, were strongly emphasized. All students 
were encouraged to memorize the classic book of 300 Tang poems࢒༷ʓС࡜ (Tángshī 
Sānbǎi Shǒu). There are national competitions in student’s ability to recite these poems, 
and principal Chen felt that those students who were able to memorize enough to do well 
would benefit from success on these exams. English at this time was only required from 
the fifth grade although it would eventually begin in third grade; however, the school was 
able to get support of the local community to hire a cram-school English teacher who 
taught all levels. During breaks and clean-up the tapes used by this school were broadcast 
throughout the whole school. When I returned the next year, the school had their own a 
full time English teacher and they no longer needed to sub-contract to the cram-school. 
 
Opting Out 
Of all the Aborigine teachers I met, only one used his Aborigine name. Mark, was 
teaching the first grade class at Betelnut primary school at the time I was doing my 
fieldwork, but he eventually left education. Mark was one of the most successful 
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members of his generation, having graduated from National Taiwan University’s 
program in law. A remarkable feat considering that neither of his parents received more 
than a primary school education. However, he was not happy with a normal career, and 
was politically motivated to work to help “his people” in some way. He tried teaching, 
but was dissatisfied with the limitations of what he could do at the school, and opted 
instead to become a priest. 
 Mark’s parents had grown up in the mountains. Mark’s father still disappeared for 
days at a time up into the mountains, where he seemed to feel more comfortable than in 
their house in the village. Mark’s mother did not understand Mark’s obsession with study 
and travel, and wished he would settle down and marry a Bunun woman. She had stopped 
speaking to one daughter who had married a Han Chinese. She could not believe that her 
daughter would do well in such a marriage, assuming that she would simply be taken 
advantage of - that Han men would not treat a Bunun wife as an equal (field notes, March 
28, 2001). Mark’s family still owned land on top of the mountain, but national laws 
prevented them from farming it. The only cash crop they could grow was bamboo, the 
young shoots of which were valuable enough that during the harvesting season Mark’s 
father would sleep in their section of the forest with a gun to defend against thieves. 
 Mark was also quite different from his siblings, who had failed to escape out of 
the bottom rungs of the working class. Mark’s brother had previously worked in the 
mountains, opening up new land for development. He left that job after a dangerous fire 
broke out due to lack of discipline among the workers (field notes, April 23, 2001). He 
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then took a job at a factory on the east coast, but he had returned home again because his 
wife was pregnant with their third child. 
Talking about being up in the mountains he said that there were two kinds 
of people: plains people, and mountain people. They each liked the life 
they were accustomed to, and it would always be that way. He is not a 
plains person. His brother [Mark], however, had already spent too much 
time in the plains, and wasn't really a mountain person any more. (field 
notes, April 23, 2001). 
Mark admitted that he was no longer a “mountain” person. He tried to help out with 
protecting the family land up in the mountain from bamboo poachers, but his father told 
him that he was better off reading books. 
 Although Mark was long associated with the Presbyterian church, it was only in 
college that it became a central part of his life. He was not happy with the student 
organization for Aborigines at the university because it was dominated by Amis, who 
tend to be the most cohesive and organized Aborigine ethnic group, as well as one of the 
most numerous. He particularly objected to the implementation of an age grade ranking 
system akin to the one that was traditionally used to organize Amis men into work groups. 
He felt that this system was very undemocratic, as each age grade is traditionally 
expected to do whatever the older age grade asks them to do without questions (field 
notes, March 11, 2001). The Presbyterian church, on the other hand, gave him a network 
of friends whom, while not all Aborigines, treated him as an equal because of their 
religious beliefs (interview, March, 2001). 
 Joining the church had also given him an opportunity to travel. Mark has been to 
Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and America. He is much more cosmopolitan and 
politically aware than any of the other teachers I met. He was aware of the limitations of 
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religion and the church, but he had clearly made a decision that joining the church was 
the most effective way he could make a meaningful contribution.  
 There are very few options available to Aborigine intellectuals. They can, like the 
principal, seek to work within the system, appropriating state funds to help impoverished 
communities; however, such a course of action means working within the ideological 
constraints of the compromise that had been worked out within the official school 
curriculum. Aborigine culture, within this curriculum, could only be defined within terms 
of the local community, effectively marginalizing and depoliticizing it. Only by opting 
out of the system, as Mark did, was it possible to openly promote an alternative view of 
Aborigine culture. Because Taiwan’s political opposition were partners in the cultural 
compromise encoded in the new curriculum, the only institutional support for an 
alternative comes from within the Presbyterian Church.  
 
Conclusion 
Comparing local cultural performances, like the one I witnessed in Fountainhead when 
the American students came to visit, with multicultural events held in Philadelphia, one 
can see the similarities and differences in the two forms of Multiculturalism. Goode and 
Schneider describe how the ritual exchange of food and cultural performances in 
Philadelphia serves to push into the background important structural differences within 
and between communities: 
The cultural-pluralism model has created externally defined groups who 
are encouraged to forget internal differences and to create and participate 
in homogenous cultural performances. Such presumably homogenous 
communities are expected to be joined to the larger society by official 
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representatives. The cultural-pluralism model is unthreatening. It states 
that the way to improve intergroup relations is to learn to understand and 
appreciate each other. It implies that problems emerge from lack of 
contact, lack of knowledge, and fear of strangers. It requires only that 
people experience each other’s “cultures,” learn more about teach other, 
and censor racist thoughts. Much of what is presented about other cultures 
reflects a narrow range of safe domains like traditional foods and music, 
thus avoiding dangerous topics related to values and morality. The 
cultural-pluralism model ignores the socially constructed racial hierarchy 
in the United States. It permits painless, enjoyable exercises and is 
practiced by all organizations, regardless of their agendas. (Goode and 
Schneider, 1994: 95, see also 179-180) 
Multiculturalism in Taiwan shares with American multiculturalism a view of culture as a 
commodity to be exchanged through ritual performances, sharing of food, etc. However, 
Taiwan’s multiculturalism’s roots in Japanese traditions of localism, and a system of 
client-patron relationships maintained from the Japanese colonial era, means that it 
operates differently than American multiculturalism, with its roots in a history of slavery, 
immigration, and settler-state nationalism (Gran, 1996: 324). For Taiwan’s Aboriginal 
intellectuals it means that they have a choice: either promote Taiwanese culture as a 
commodity in order to channel state funds, or to opt out of the system, working within 
alternative frameworks such as the Presbyterian church. The Hoklo cultural nationalism 
promoted by the DPP (see Chapter 6) does not seem to offer a viable alternative. 
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Notes
 
1 Source for data on “all Taiwanese”: (Ministry of the Interior, 2004) 
2 Source for 1999 Aborigine data: (Directorate General of Budget Accounting and 
Statistics, 1999) 
3 Source for 2000 Aborigine data: (Council on Indigenous Peoples, 2001) 
4 Source for 2001 figures: (Council on Indigenous Peoples, 2001; Directorate-General of 
Budget, 2004; Ministry of the Interior, 2004) 
5 Source for 1999 figures: (Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics, 
1999) 
6 Junior College and above, including University.  
7 For a discussion of the relationship between baseball and Aborigine identity, see 
Chapter 9. 
8 See Chapter 6 of Lu Hsin-yi’s book The Politics of Locality, for a discussion of the role 
of “cultural-historical tourism” in the construction of Taiwanese identity (Lu, 2002: 135) 
9 In 2000. As of 2004, there are now twelve officially recognized Aborigine ethnic 
groups, with some Seediq ᒯᅮѠ૰ (Sàidékèzú) still fighting for recognition as 
separate from the Truku. 
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CHAPTER 8 
BETWEEN CONSENT AND COERCION: LANGUAGE, NATIONALISM AND THE 
POLITICS OF CORRUPTION 
 
Theorizing Nationalism’s Failures 
The study of language and nationalism tends to focus on its successes, on those writers 
and intellectuals who have so perfectly internalized the national ethos that they offer us a 
window on the soul of a nation. Less often do we explore the failures of linguistic 
nationalism; and when we do, we tend to focus on the coercive power of the state, as if 
the realm between consent and coercion was an empty no man’s land, frequently 
traversed but never occupied. In nationalism failure is never the exception but the norm, 
for the contradictions inherent in any nationalist program mean that it can be only 
partially successful at best, incorporating some sectors of society while excluding others. 
Nationalism is only completely successful in the utopian imaginings of its adherents, 
never in its institutionalized reality. Drawing on an exploration of the differences in how 
Pierre Bourdieu and Antonio Gramsci theorize consent, I offer a theory of linguistic 
nationalism grounded in the political processes necessitated by nationalism’s failures. 
 Both Bourdieu and Gramsci are known for their explorations of the middle 
ground between consent and coercion. In this middle ground coercion appears to actors as 
if it was consent. As Gramsci puts it, “Coercion is such only for those who reject it, not 
for those who accept it. ... One can say of coercion what the religious say of 
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predestination: for the ‘willing’ it is not predestination, but free will. (Gramsci, 1985: 
130; Ives, 2002a: 330). Bourdieu termed this acceptance “misrecognition” in order to 
capture the process by which people come to accept the coercive forces of the 
marketplace as legitimate and natural (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 38). For both 
scholars, the legitimacy granted to the forces of domination depended upon the 
socializing force of education, but it is here, in relation to education, that the differences 
in their two approaches is most apparent. Bourdieu emphasizes institutions such as 
schools, which establish the legitimacy of the dominant social norms through their ability 
to differentially reward those who accept this legitimacy. For Gramsci, who was 
grounded in his personal experiences dealing with Italian parliamentary politics and 
organizing worker’s collectives in Turin, education was a political process, and political 
parties are themselves seen as an important socializing force. This difference of emphasis 
ends up having a profound effect on how the two theorists think about role of language 
and culture in defining a nation.  
 Bourdieu often uses the term “the cultural arbitrary” to refer to those cultural and 
linguistic forms embraced as legitimate by schools (1990: 9). It is the existence of such 
an arbitrary social norm, rather than its specific nature, which is important for his theory 
of symbolic domination. For Gramsci, however, there is nothing “arbitrary” about the 
choice of the dominant language or culture. These choices are always political, and as 
such they are the result of a historical process that includes negotiation, compromise, and 
the building of alliances between groups. Accordingly, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is 
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grounded in the political process of establishing consent, rather than the institutional 
process of reproducing it. This is a crucial difference for the theory of nationalism, for all 
nationalist projects are subject to a constant process of tearing apart and rebuilding, and 
any theory of nationalism must be as capable of explaining nationalisms failures as its 
successes. 
 Nationalism failures do not arise when the state must employ coercive means to 
quell dissent; they arise when coercion appears as such to the population. Gramsci saw 
the “normal” exercise of hegemony in parliamentary democracies as requiring attempts to 
“ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority” (Gramsci et al., 
1972: 79, n. 49). Gramsci’s theory of hegemony grew out of his own obsession with the 
failures of Italian nationalism. He saw Italy’s failure to produce a genuinely 
national-popular culture as a direct result of the Risorgimento, when Cavour quashed 
Garibaldi’s popular uprising after it had served its purpose, reassuring the landowners 
that there would be no radical revolution, but only “molecular transformation” – what 
Gramsci called a passive revolution, highlighting its gradualism and elitism as compared 
with a popular revolution (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1972: 46). As a result, Italian culture 
remained more European and “cosmopolitan” than genuinely Italian, an alien culture 
imposed from above by the country’s intellectual elites (Gramsci, 1985: 27). He 
contrasted this with French culture, with its popular serial novels, national language, etc. 
For Gramsci the success of French nationalism was a direct outgrowth of the Jacobin 
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revolution, in which the bourgeoisie formed an alliance with the rural peasantry against 
the aristocracy (Gramsci et al., 1972: 77-80).  
 The result of Italy’s failed revolution was a culture of corruption. He spoke of 
corruption as what lay in the realm between consent and coercion, and as being typical of 
those situations where “it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and when the use of 
force is too risky” (1972: 79, n. 49). In the context of this note, Gramsci is talking about 
acts of bribery and fraud, but I would like to suggest that the notion of corruption be 
extended beyond mere graft to include language, culture, and ideology as well. In the 
context of Bourdieu’s theory of linguistic markets we already have a notion of culture as 
a form of corruption. Bourdieu had to explain how it was that linguistic markets could 
serve as a mechanism for the reproduction of class relations when the possibilities for 
social advancement are necessarily fewer than the number of people who possess the 
correct form of cultural capital. He proposed that “the controlled mobility of a limited 
number of individuals can help to perpetuate the structure of class relations” (Bourdieu 
and Passeron, 1990: 54). Bourdieu’s approach suggests that of game theory, in which 
group behavior is accounted for in terms of the cumulative calculations of all individuals 
in the group. It is enough for a few members of a class to succeed on the basis of their 
cultural capital for the class as a whole to continue to view the market itself as legitimate. 
The problem with such a game theory approach is that it does not provide an account of 
how such a market came to be viewed as legitimate in the first place. Why do not markets 
more accurately reflect the cultural capital actually possessed by the majority of the 
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population? Bourdieu can only tell us that it is not in the interests of the elite, but 
Gramsci’s focus on the historical process of state formation provides us with a model in 
which the shifting political fortunes of allied groups can be linked to the 
institutionalization of related forms of symbolic capital.  
 This is not to imply that Gramsci would ascribe a simple one-to-one 
correspondence between changes in elite composition with changes in linguistic markets, 
although there are some interesting insights that can come out of such an analysis 
(Tollefson, 1993). Central to Gramsci’s “differential analysis of the structures of 
bourgeois power in the West” (Anderson, 1977: 20) is a theory of how competing class 
interests congeal through the political process and come to be universalized in the 
hegemonic ideology of the state. The success of French nationalism derived from the 
process by which Jacobins were forced to “widen [their] class interests and to discover 
those interests which [they] had in common with the popular sectors” (Mouffe, 2002: 
295). This contrasts with the Italian passive revolution, in which the urban bourgeoisie in 
the North formed an alliance, not with the southern peasantry, but with the southern 
aristocracy. Gramsci refers to such alliances as historical blocs, and their creation serves 
to tie the interests of subaltern and hegemonic groups. It is in the political process of 
forming such alliances that nationalism takes shape. This sets Gramsci’s theory of the 
realm between consent and coercion apart from that of Bourdieu. Because Bourdieu lacks 
a theory of the political process by which the cultural arbitrary is formed, he naturally 
assumes that there is an unproblematic relationship between the interests of the dominant 
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culture and those of the ruling class (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 9). For Gramsci, on 
the other hand, the particular form of nationalist culture that emerges from the creation of 
a historical bloc does not simply reflect the interests of the dominant group, but also those 
of the subaltern groups, which are tied to it. While, for Gramsci as much as for Bourdieu, 
a groups’ intellectuals (a broad category which includes school teachers, clergy, 
politicians, and technocrats) are the key to its cooptation into a particular hegemony, 
Gramsci understood that this process was not a transparent one. The incorporation of a 
subaltern group has its effect on the very nature of hegemony, and upon the language and 
culture of nation, which serve to legitimate it.  
 While Gramsci has been frequently invoked in discussions of linguistic 
nationalism, there is a certain tendency to elide these important differences between his 
theory of hegemony and Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic domination. Bourdieu’s theory 
has been fruitfully applied to explain how subaltern groups come to embrace the 
dominant language and culture, even when doing so devalues their own cultural and 
linguistic traditions. In his discussion of linguistic markets Bourdieu offers a mechanism 
by which such linguistic values are reproduced. Possession of the correct form of 
linguistic capital can provide access to jobs and social networks in which other forms of 
capital can be acquired. However, anthropologists seeking to apply Bourdieu’s model 
have quickly run up against its limitations. In Kathryn Woolard’s seminal article, 
“Language variation and cultural hegemony” (Woolard, 1985), she takes Bourdieu to task 
for placing undue emphasis on the dominant linguistic markets controlled by state 
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institutions, such as schools. Drawing on the example of Catalan in Spain, she points out 
that civil society can be an equally important site for the creation of symbolic value, and 
that these informal markets may not reflect the same language attitudes as those 
controlled by the state.  
 Since Woolard’s book, other authors, such as F. Niyi Akinnaso (Akinnaso, 
forthcoming) and Niloofar Haeri (Haeri, 1997), have extended this argument, showing 
how in Nigeria and Egypt the state and civil society had very different roles in the 
creation and maintenance of linguistic markets. What emerges from this ongoing dialog 
with Bourdieu is a move to a more Gramscian approach, one in which the historical 
processes that shape linguistic markets are given analytic priority over the institutional 
process of reproducing them. Haeri explores the impact of globalization on language 
markets in Egypt: 
In Egypt, one of the consequences of the global economy is a 
segmentation of the labor market that has produced a demand for 
proficiency in European languages. The increase in the number of 
foreign-language private schools has meant, among other things, that 
Egypt now has two educational systems. Public state schools cannot 
satisfy the demand for highly skilled foreign-language-proficient labor, in 
part because the colossal state bureaucracy needs to fill its own ranks with 
their graduates. Hence, some state institutions reproduce values for the 
official language, while others pursue goals and policies that marginalize 
the currency of that language. (1997: 796) 
And in Akinnaso’s work the legacy of colonial state formation has left a patchwork of 
hierarchically related language markets:  
Yet another reason for lack of congruence between policy and practice in 
Nigeria is the shifting locus of power across federal, regional, and local 
contexts and from State institutions to traditional administrative 
246 
 
institutions. … Thus, the dominant group in one context or institution may 
become powerless in another, and, therefore, be subject to a different set 
of linguistic values. Ultimately, then, the idea of a dominant language or a 
dominant linguistic value is relative. (Akinnaso, forthcoming: 58) 
This view of language markets as segmented and divided by the same political and 
economic forces which shape nation building and economic markets expands on 
Bourdieu’s original formulation by revealing the complex “variations in market 
conditions and competition between markets” overlooked by Bourdieu (forthcoming: 12). 
What I am arguing for by emphasizing Gramsci’s theory of history as a means for 
reconceptualizing Bourdieu is a view in which the extent to which such variation and 
competition is allowed or encouraged is seen as essential to understanding the structure 
of a particular hegemony. I believe it is the underlying logic by which languages 
interrelate, rather than the specific value of any particular language that is key for 
understanding the nature of a specific linguistic hegemony. In Gramscian terms this 
relationship between languages can be seen to be a product of the political alliances 
underlying the ruling historical bloc, and thus reflecting the interests of both the junior 
and senior partners in this alliance. Changes in the logic of the market can, in a 
Gramscian perspective, signal shifts in the nature of the ruling bloc. It is exactly such a 
shift that is now happening in Taiwan’s linguistic marketplace, and I argue that only a 
proper historical account of the shifting nature of Taiwan’s ruling historical bloc can 
allow us to provide a meaningful explanation of these linguistic changes. 
 Before exploring the application of Bourdieu and Gramsci in the Taiwanese 
context, I first explore in greater depth Gramsci’s theory of nationalism. Specifically, I 
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look at Gramsci’s embrace of linguistic nationalism for Italy in light of debates over the 
role of “modernity” in nationalism. Language modernization is a key component of most 
nationalist programs, and Gramsci was no exception in his desire to unite Italy under a 
single language. However, I argue that his hopes for modernization must be 
contextualized within his larger body of work, especially the links between his early 
linguistic work and his theory of hegemony. I then clarify the relationship between 
Gramsci’s theory of historical blocs and nationalism by clarifying the differences 
between my approach and that of Partha Chaterjee. Chaterjee uses Gramsci’s theory of 
passive revolution to argue that post-colonial nationalisms are not inherently anti-modern. 
However, because Chaterjee’s focus is on those paradigmatic thinkers who best 
expressed Indian nationalist ideology at various stages in its development, he overlooks 
the role played by subordinate partners of the ruling historical bloc in shaping that 
ideology. As a result, and by his own admission, he over generalizes from the Indian case, 
obscuring the tremendous variation inherently possible within Gramsci’s theory of 
passive revolution. Having thus clarified Gramsci’s theory of nationalism, I then proceed 
to elaborate on the above-mentioned discussion of Bourdieu’s theory of language markets, 
before tackling the application of both of these concepts in the Taiwanese context. 
 
Gramsci, Nationalism, and Modernity 
Gramsci embraced linguistic unification as a means of empowering Italy’s subaltern 
groups (Gramsci, 1985: 182). But it would be a mistake to make too much of this, 
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without placing Gramsci’s endorsement of Italian linguistic unification within the context 
of his larger body of work. As with his endorsement of American “Fordism,” which he 
saw as key for the salvation of the Italian worker, Gramsci was able to embrace some 
elements of modernization as liberating while simultaneously critiquing the power 
relations upon which modernization was founded (Gramsci et al., 1972: 312). He 
attacked those plans for linguistic modernization not firmly grounded in the daily 
practices of the Italian people. Writing against the adoption of Esperanto as the national 
language of Italy, which was being advocated at the time, Gramsci argued that the 
“history of the fortunes and diffusion of a given language depend strictly on the complex 
social activity of the people who speak it” (Gramsci, 1985: 27). Gramsci’s endorsement 
of linguistic nationalism was not a desire to see an artificially imposed national language, 
but the creation of a genuinely national-popular culture, which would unify the divided 
Italian underclass. He draws a comparison between the history of French and Italian 
written vernaculars: 
Evidence of the origin of the historical differentiation between Italy and 
France can be found in the Strasbourg oath (around 841), namely in the 
fact that the people participated actively in history (the people-army) by 
becoming guarantors of the observance of treaties between the 
descendants of Charlemagne. ... In Italy the first vernacular documents are 
individual oaths for establishing ownership over certain monastery lands 
or they have an anti-popular character (Gramsci et al., 1972: 227). 
Gramsci bemoaned the lack of a popular vernacular literature in Italy comparable to the 
work of Alexander Dumas (Gramsci, 1985: 355). At the same time, as a victim of Italian 
Fascism, Gramsci was well aware of the limits of national-popular culture. His advocacy 
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of a modern, cosmopolitan, nationalism was a reaction against the backward-looking 
nationalism of the Fascists: 
Nationalism of the French stamp is an anachronistic excrescence in Italian 
history, proper to people who have their heads turned backwards like the 
damned in Dante. The ‘mission’ of the Italian people lies in the recovery 
of Roman and medieval cosmopolitanism, but in its most modern and 
advanced form (Gramsci et al., 1972: 247).  
What we see here is an essential tension in Gramsci between his endorsement, on the one 
hand, of revolutionary internationalism, and on the other the particularism of his 
historical approach which called attention to the unique characteristics of hegemony in 
Italy and the unsuitability of a Russian style revolution in the “advanced” capitalist 
societies of the West. 
 This tension that we see between Esperanto and Italian, between cosmopolitan 
nationalism and a nationalism rooted in the past, and between global revolution and a 
specifically Italian revolution, is fundamentally a tension between modernism and its 
critique. For Jürgen Habermas, such tensions are inherent in all nationalist projects. For 
Habermas, nationalism exists to solve a particular problem associated with the process of 
state formation. As the modern state replaced feudalism, the basis of legitimation for the 
state shifted from residing in the personal authority of the royal family to the “popular 
sovereignty” of the people, who are now “authors” as well as “subjects” of the law 
(Habermas, 1996: 285). This created a problem, especially for central European states, 
which did not exist as coherent territorial entities before their transformations, since the 
concept of popular sovereignty is, according to Habermas, simply not powerful enough to 
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mobilize the people to fight for such a transformation. They fight, not just for individual 
freedom based upon a concept of universal rights, but for the particularistic freedom of a 
“cultural community bound together by origin and fate” (1996: 287). This is a reasonable 
functionalist account of the role played by nationalism in the emergence of at least some 
nation-states (even Habermas admits that this model does not necessarily apply to 
Western European states, or the United States (1996: 283, 286)), but it fails to provide a 
credible account of why nationalism works. For Habermas, the success of nationalism 
relies upon its dependence on “prepolitical” facts, on the “quasi-natural features of a 
historical community” (1996: 287). It is true that such quasi-natural features are the 
building blocks of nationalism, but it is a gross mistake to assume that the decision as to 
how to employ them in the construction of a national identity are somehow “prepolitical.” 
To do so is to ignore the fact that nationalism is always the outcome of a political process. 
Habermas’ utopian vision of a nationalism grounded on nothing more than a shared legal 
tradition seems to be based on the assumption that such prepolitical holdovers as 
“culture” can be simply swept aside; but, if we understand nationalism as constitutive of 
the modern state, it will become clear that cultural traditions cannot simply be swept 
aside. 
 Habermas’ distinction between irrational premodern nationalism and modern, 
rational-legal citizenship is exactly the sort “liberal dilemma” Partha Chatterjee accuses 
modern Marxist theorists of nationalism of falling into. He calls this “sociologism”: 
fitting nationalism to certain universal and inescapable sociological 
constraints of the modern age, or alternatively, reducing the two 
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contending trends within nationalism, one traditional and conservative and 
the other rational and progressive, to their sociological determinants 
(Chatterjee, 1986: 22) 
Chatterjee attempts to work his way out of this dilemma by separating the underlying 
logic of nationalist thought from its particular forms. In his terms, this calls for an 
analytic separation of the “thematic” aspects of nationalism, its “epistemological as well 
as ethnical system,” from its “problematic,” those “concrete statements about possibilities 
justified by reference to the thematic” (1986: 38). This allows him to argue that the 
thematics of post-colonial nationalism, their underlying justificatory structures, are 
universally modern, even if their particular problematics embrace premodern forms. This 
is not to say that the thematics of post-colonial nationalisms are Western, but simply that 
they are constructed in dialog with the discourses of Western modernity. In fact, they 
must differentiate themselves from colonial thought, even as they adopt “the modes of 
though characteristic of rational knowledge in the post-Enlightenment age” (1986: 41).  
 Chatterjee draws upon Gramsci’s theory of history and revolution to provide an 
“analytical framework in which the ideological history of the Indian state can be studied” 
(1986: 30). Chatterjee makes it clear that Gramsci’s theory of history does not provide a 
blueprint, universally applicable to all modern nation-states, but derives its strength from 
an analysis of the tensions, which always exist in the process of forming such states. In 
particular, Chatterjee highlights the tension, in Gramsci, between popular radical 
movements such as the French Jacobins, and gradualist movements, such as the passive 
revolution in Italy.  
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The equilibrium that would result from the struggle between these two 
tendencies was in no way predetermined: it depended on the particular 
‘moments’ of the relation of forces, especially on the relative quality of 
the ‘subjective forces’ which provided the political-ideological leadership 
to each tendency. (1986: 46) 
Accordingly, Chatterjee sees his task as tracing the balance of power between these two 
tendencies through an examination of Indian nationalist thought at various historical 
“moments.” As a result, Chatterjee’s analysis of the development of Indian nationalist 
thought is oddly Hegalian, focusing on the internal contradictions of various systems of 
thought, with seemingly little desire to engage in the type of historical analysis he lauds 
Gramsci for doing. Thus he asserts that India represents a “paradigmatic” example of 
Gramsci’s theory of “passive revolution” (emphasis in original, 1986: 49), even while 
admitting that supporting such a claim would require a study of “several” such “historical 
cases of ‘passive revolutions’” (1986: 30). He is able to do this because the tensions he 
identifies reside purely at the level of ideology, and are not grounded in a theory of 
“historical blocs” as they are in Gramsci’s writings.  
 In order to understand how Gramsci understood the tension between the universal 
rational-legal values of modernity and the particularistic national-popular culture he 
thought was necessary to liberate Italy, we must return to the linguistic roots of his theory 
of hegemony. Peter Ives has argued convincingly that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
grew out of his college studies in linguistics. Much of his writings in the notebooks were 
concerned with the tension between “normative” and “spontaneous” grammar, but even 
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more importantly, Ives argues, was his distinction between genuine and artificial 
normative grammars: 
Instead of the opposition between spontaneous consensus and forced 
coercion, Gramsci is formulating a distinction between those normative 
grammars that truly express or are successful in creating a “national 
popular collective will” and those that are not successful but instead need 
to be imposed and enforced. That is to say, the normative grammar of a 
popular unified national language is different from an artificial, 
Manzonian-style language. The normative grammar is the result of only a 
passive revolution which exists due to the disunity and incoherence of 
various existing spontaneous grammars. Like the role of “organic” 
elsewhere in the Quaderni, Gramsci uses immanent or spontaneous 
grammar to determine the gradation or the type of normative grammar, or 
of hegemonic relationship. (Ives, 2002b: 223) 
Ives argues that, for Gramsci, the goal of the workers movement was precisely to relieve 
the tension that exists between spontaneous and normative grammar, and that this could 
be done only “by paying careful attention to the process through which the normative 
grammar is formed and maintained” (2002b: 223). The incomplete nationalism brought 
about by a passive revolution always relies on a certain degree of coercion (as well as, as 
we argue above, corruption). And while Gramsci seems to have truly believed that an 
“organic” national-popular culture could possibly emerge, he understood that it would 
take a political struggle to create the conditions under which this could happen. He also 
firmly believed that it was necessary to make the implicit explicit, and to educate the 
public as to the normative structures underlying popular culture (Gramsci, 1985: 186-87). 
Gramsci’s belief that an “organic” culture could emerge from below seems to suggest 
both a lingering belief in some kind of primordial Italian culture, and a belief that this 
culture is directly linked to the interests of the subaltern classes. But, even here, Gramsci 
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clearly understood the constructed nature of such a culture, and the need to build it up by 
creating “organic intellectuals” who are able to articulate and generalize the interests of 
the subaltern classes (Salamini, 2002: 70). (Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals is discussed 
in Chapter 7.) Moreover, the subaltern interests that this culture represents would not 
simply be those of the “working” classes in general, but would transcend divisions within 
the subaltern classes. In Gramsci’s writings on the “Southern Question” he argued that 
one of the essential features of Italian hegemony was the division of the industrial 
working class in the North from the Southern peasantry (Gramsci, 1957). A genuinely 
national-popular culture would represent subaltern class interests by facilitating the types 
of political action necessary to overcome such divisions and realize their shared interests. 
 
Linguistic Nationalism as Symbolic Domination 
The appeal of Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic domination for the study of language policy 
is obvious. Bourdieu offers an explanation of why language policies matter (Bourdieu, 
1991). By granting official status to one language as opposed to another, language 
policies assign more symbolic value to one language (or language variety) as opposed to 
another. This necessarily benefits those who have greater mastery of the official language, 
enabling them to cash in their linguistic capital in the economic and political spheres. It 
also explains why those who lack mastery of the official language might still value it over 
their own mother tongue; because, those same linguistic markets devalue their own 
language. In this sense, Bourdieu’s theory of ideology is remarkably similar to that of 
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Marx, who located ideology in the very nature of exchange relations1 (Hunt, 2002: 460). 
For Marx, the free exchange of goods gives the illusion of equality, masking the real 
power inequalities within the sphere of production (Marx and , 1977: 163-77). Similarly, 
Bourdieu’s theory employs the market metaphor, not to suggest that symbolic goods can 
be freely exchanged in the marketplace in the same way as capital, but to highlight the 
inequality in the symbolic resources with which we come to the marketplace. While, 
symbolic goods are not directly exchangeable in Bourdieu’s model, their employment can 
be used to secure a better job, political power, or higher social standing; however, unlike 
money or goods, we still possesses as much linguistic capital after the exchange as we did 
before it. Symbolic capital is something that we acquire throughout the course of our 
daily lives. It is part of who we are, of what Bourdieu calls the habitus, or, in John 
Thompson’s words, the “dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain 
ways” (Thompson, 1991: 12). Because the system by which symbolic value is created 
and reproduced is invisible to participants in the process, they come to misrecognize this 
value as something intrinsic to the symbolic capital itself. Thus, speakers of the most 
valued language are seen as possessing other desirable traits, such as intelligence and 
grace.  
 Bourdieu’s theory is an excellent explanation of the role played by culture in the 
reproduction of social inequality, particularly with regard to the internalization of 
dominant cultural traits by the subaltern classes. But his focus on the role of educational 
institutions, and pedagogic authority in the creation of symbolic value leads him to take 
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as given the legitimacy of those institutions (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 41). While 
Bourdieu is aware that there exist alternative markets in which other forms of symbolic 
value are valued over those officially endorsed by the state, such as among Algerian 
intellectuals under French colonialism (1990: 29), he sees these alternative markets as 
spaces where “the rule of the legitimate language is merely suspended, not 
transgressed”(Woolard, 1985: 743). For Bourdieu, “there are never any really 
counterlegitimate languages” (1985: 743). Kathryn Woolard provides an excellent 
counter-example in her study of Catalonia, Spain (Woolard, 1989). There, she found that  
While the Francoist government did succeed in imposing the domination 
of a centralized (and increasingly multinational) finance capitalism over 
the Spanish economy, it stymied but did not obliterate the regional 
economic dominance of the Catalan bourgeoisie. Catalans continue to 
dominate the internal economic structure of Catalonia (which contributes 
significantly to that of Spain). Although the Castilian language was 
successfully imposed by state institutions as the means of access to 
functionary positions, Catalans continue to be predominant in ownership 
and management of the private sector, which is still characterized by small 
and mid-sized industries (Woolard, 1985: 742). 
As a result of this historical process, and the continued power of the Catalan bourgeoisie, 
Catalan is valued much higher than the official Castilian language. This is true even 
among the industrial workforce, the majority of which does not speak Catalan (1985: 
742).  
 Woolard argues that “authority and hegemony cannot be mechanically read out 
from institutional dominance” (1985: 743), and that the “coincidence of political, civil, 
and economic dominance” can obscure “the processes by which such hegemony is 
actually consolidated” (1985: 742). She urges an emphasis on “primary relations, 
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face-to-face encounters, and the invidious distinctions of informal, everyday life” (1985: 
743) as the primary forces shaping linguistic markets in “the Western bourgeois state” 
(1985: 742). By “primary relations” she means especially the “primary economic 
relations” which shape our everyday life (emphasis added, 1985: 742). In emphasizing 
economic relations over the role of institutions such as education, Woolard is asserting 
the importance of civil society over that of the state in the construction of linguistic 
markets. While there is no reason to doubt the veracity of this claim for the Catalonian 
example she discusses in her work, there are three problems associated with the elevation 
of such an example to the status of a general rule: First, it is not clear that it can 
reasonably taken as a rule for all “Western bourgeois states,” if we can even assume that 
there is such a single model that uniformly applies to all countries in Western Europe and 
North America (Gran, 1996). Second, it leaves open the question of what role the state 
might play in shaping language policy outside the West. Third, and most importantly, it 
leaves open the question of the how the relationship between state and civil society might 
affect linguistic markets. I argue below that the “process by which hegemony is actually 
consolidated” in any given state involves the forging of a particular relationship between 
state and civil society, the nature of which is always contested. To assume the primacy of 
one realm over the other is to risk abandoning the task of analysis before it has even 
begun. 
 F. Niyi Akinnaso’s analysis of language markets in Nigeria takes up Woolard’s 
discussion of alternative linguistic markets, but provides an example of the important role 
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that can be played by the state in the construction even of such “alternative” markets. The 
process of colonial state formation influenced not just Nigeria’s continued reliance on 
English as a national language, but also left its mark on regional language markets in 
which Nigeria’s other languages compete with English for legitimacy. 
This imperial process of State formation has had several implications for 
language management, notably, (a) the evolution of new political and 
economic systems of dependency and inequality in which languages and 
their speakers were forced into relations of stratified diversity; (b) a dual 
pattern of colonialism and stratification; and (c) a segmented labor market 
which generated complementary, even sometimes opposing, demands for 
proficiency in different languages. (Akinnaso, forthcoming: 59) 
The complex history of alternative markets discussed in the work of Akinnaso, Haeri and 
Woolard “calls into question the linear association between the official language, the 
State, the dominant class, and power which underlies Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic 
domination” (forthcoming: 59). 
 Bourdieu, all too often, seems to suggest that the official policies of the state, or 
more precisely, the cultural arbitrary that such policies promote, reflect the “objective 
interests (material and symbolic) of the dominant groups or classes” (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990: 9). I believe that it is with this conception of ideological domination as 
being relatively easily and unproblematically mapped on to class relations that the 
problem lies, rather than in Bourdieu’s focus on state institutions per se. As James Collins 
reminds us, “the vagaries of publication and translation” have limited the scope of what 
English speaking audiences are able to read of Bourdieu until quite recently, thus 
ignoring the more “nuanced account of class relations and symbolic practices” in his 
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other work, such as Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984; Collins, 1997: 807). Moreover, the 
problem is not with Bourdieu focusing too much or too little on the state, as opposed to 
civil society, but on his failure to historicize that relationship. 
 There is a danger in making too much of the state-civil society dichotomy. It 
arises, Gramsci tells us, from a “false distinction in liberal theory, which assigns 
economic activity to the sphere of civil society in order to place it beyond the reach of 
government regulation” (Buttigieg, 1995: 445).  
Gramsci identifies two major flaws with liberal theory, whose main thrust 
is to legitimize and justify a “free-market” system: (1) it is based on an 
economistic concept of the state and civil society; and (2) it contradicts 
reality, since “laissez-faire liberalism, too, must be introduced by law, 
through the intervention of political power: it is an act of will, not the 
spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts” (1995: 445-46). 
For Gramsci, and, I would add, for Bourdieu, civil society is “is best described not as the 
sphere of freedom but of hegemony” (1995: 427). As Joseph Buttigieg puts it, “The 
acquisition of a hegemonic position in civil society is ultimately more important to the 
ruling classes than the acquisition of control over the juridico-political apparatus of 
government” (1995: 448). When the ruling classes control the state, as in the Nigerian 
case, they will certainly use that control to seek consent in the realm of civil society, but 
where specific sectors of the ruling class do not have such control, as in Catalonia, then 
necessarily they will seek legitimacy and consent through other means. 
 The problem is not that the theory of symbolic domination or hegemony stresses 
either the state or civil society, but with attempts to discuss ‘the state’ or ‘ruling classes’ 
as if these were unproblematic categories whose referent was immediately apparent.  
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To assume that states would always find in linguistic hegemony more 
power to be harnessed to their advantage is to assume a chain of historical 
relations among the state, the dominant groups, and symbolic capital that 
is predictable and timeless. Specifically, it means assuming that the state 
has no rivals in its claims to the symbolic capital of the official culture of 
the country and that that symbolic capital would simply reinforce rather 
than challenge its hegemony. I would argue that there may be historical 
and ideological constraints in realizing that wish. At the very least, the 
state has to struggle to make the hegemony of the official culture 
beneficial to its own interests (Haeri, 1997: 801). 
Haeri’s statement of the problem is clear, but James Collins is correct to take her to task 
for failing to note that a suitable solution already exists in the work of Antonio Gramsci 
(Collins, 1997: 807).  
 
Conclusion 
As we have already discussed, Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony does not entail a 
simplistic assumption of a perfect fit between class interests and what Bourdieu refers to 
as the “cultural arbitrary,” moreover, it is firmly grounded in the historical process by 
which specific sectors of the ruling classes forged a historical-bloc with other ruling 
groups, and even with certain elements of the subaltern classes. At the same time, it is 
important not to discount the importance of Bourdieu’s focus on the actual mechanisms 
by which the cultural arbitrary is inculcated into the habitus of the subaltern. 
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Notes
 
1 Hunt correctly grounds Marx’s theory of ideology in his structural analysis of 
commodity relations, but Hunt’s economic reductionism ultimately blinds him to the 
utility of Gramsci’s historical approach. A structural analysis of class relations is 
insufficient to explain the differences between various forms of hegemony. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION: WHAT TAIWAN CAN TEACH US ABOUT LINGUISTIC 
NATIONALISM 
 
While the proximate cause of my research was the announcement of Taiwan’s new 
9-year Curriculum, this dissertation was equally motivated by the theoretical questions 
concerning the relationship between language and nationalism (discussed in Chapters 1 
and 8). Specifically, what is the relationship between linguistic markets and linguistic 
nationalism? In order to answer that question I have drawn extensively on the work of 
two scholars: Pierre Bourdieu and Antonio Gramsci. The former because his theory of 
linguistic markets offers an explanation of the mechanisms by which linguistic ideologies 
are reproduced, and the latter because he offers us a way of linking linguistic ideology to 
wider political and economic processes. I have accordingly focused tremendous attention 
on the political and economic processes by which ethnic and state formation took place in 
Taiwan, following Gramsci’s model of focusing on the process of alliance formation 
between elite and subaltern groups.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
One of the dominant approaches for studying nationalism has been to construct 
taxonomies. These taxonomies can be useful in terms of constructing various ideal types 
that can serve as a framework for empirical investigations, but in terms of actual 
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implementation these taxonomies often break down. We can see an example of the 
strengths and limits of such a taxonomic approach in Benedict Anderson’s essay 
“Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism: is There a Difference That Matters?” 
(2001). In trying to categorize Taiwan, Anderson evokes three different kinds of 
nationalism: creole nationalism, official nationalism, and linguistic nationalism. This is 
useful, in that each of these ideal types teaches us something about Taiwanese 
nationalism. It is certainly “creole” in the sense that Taiwanese nationalism is a 
“demographic blending of settler and indigenous peoples” (2001: 33). Under both 
Japanese rule and during the early years of KMT rule, official nationalism declared 
Taiwan to be a part of a larger nation-state (Japan or China), and language was central to 
this policy. But what does it mean to say that Taiwan has been a product of three types of 
nationalism? What do we need to understand is the ways in which each of these types of 
nationalism were applied in Taiwan, by whom, and to what effect? And in order to 
answer those questions we must have a theory of Taiwanese history, a theory of how 
power is wielded in Taiwanese politics. Political power, economic power, and linguistic 
power. It is for this reason that the works of Pierre Bourdieu and Antonio Gramsci have 
been so important for this work. In Chapter 8 I discussed some of the differences between 
their approaches. Now, in conclusion, I would like to discuss what it is that the 
Taiwanese case can teach us about their theories. 
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Language Markets 
In Chapter 8 I criticized Bourdieu for focusing too much on issues of social reproduction, 
and ignoring the important role that political processes play in shaping (and reshaping) 
linguistic markets. This is not to be understood as a blanket rejection of Bourdieu’s 
theoretical contributions. Quite to the contrary. The theory of linguistic markets is still 
useful if we understand that there is competition both within and between linguistic 
markets. In the Taiwanese case there is only one official linguistic market, the market 
shaped primarily by language-in-education policy, but also in policies pertaining to 
language use in government (such as the civil service examinations discussed in Chapter 
5). However, there are also alternative language markets, such as those one might find in 
the marketplace, where one is more likely to hear Hoklo than the official Mandarin (see 
Chapter 2). In this regard there are two important trends. The first was that started in 
1990, by which the control of the central government over dictating official language 
policy was weakened. This process of decentralization allowed for local markets to assert 
themselves more forcefully (Wu, 2004). Thus, the relationship between the official and 
local linguistic markets was transformed, without threatening the status quo of the official 
market. The second development was the transformation of the DPP from an opposition 
party to a ruling party. With a tenuous hold on power, the DPP had only a limited 
mandate, and linguistic nationalism was one tool at their disposal for shoring up that 
support. This meant moving beyond decentralization of linguistic markets to attempting 
to transform the official language market itself. Efforts to replace Mandarin with Hoklo 
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(such as on the civil service examination) were quickly rebuffed, but more subtle gestures, 
such as establishing a uniquely Taiwanese orthographic system in Tongyong Pinyin have 
been more successful.  
 Each of these transformations in Taiwan’s linguistic markets poses both hopes 
and challenges for Taiwan’s Aborigine population. Chinese linguistic nationalism during 
the first half of the twentieth century hurt Austronesian languages more than other 
languages, due to the small size of their speech communities, and their lack of political 
and economic power, yet, for the same reasons, decentralization of language policy does 
not hold out much hope for these dying tongues. Forced to compete with other Taiwanese 
languages, Austronesian languages will surely lose out. Token gestures, such as the 
introduction of a mere two hours of native language education each week, will do little to 
reverse a century of decline. The result of these changes has been the creation of a 
linguistic hierarchy, in which local language markets must compete with each other. The 
markets for Austronesian languages are at the bottom, with those of the least populous 
Aboriginal groups ranked at the very bottom. Also at the bottom might be included the 
languages of foreign brides, as more and more Taiwanese men marry women outside of 
Taiwan (Lu, 2003a). 
 But what is the language at the top of the hierarchy? I have argued (see Chapter 5) 
that as the result of both Globalization and Taiwan’s long history of close relations with 
the United States, this language might now be English, rather than Chinese. Although 
other East Asian languages, such as Japanese and Korean compete with Chinese as 
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regional languages, English remains the dominant global language. In the Taiwanese 
movie Yi Yi (Yang, 2000), we see a meeting between a Hoklo speaking Taiwanese 
businessman and a prospective Japanese partner. This meeting takes place entirely in 
English. To the same extent that speaking in Hoklo is associated with provincialism, as in 
the use of Hoklo in television advertisements for folk health remedies, English is 
associated with an international perspective. The most prized hosts on Taiwan’s version 
of MTV are those raised and educated in the United States, like David Wu Ѻʩ႖ (Wú 
Dàwéi), whose very Americaness is one of his biggest selling points (there are even 
David Wu branded English teaching materials). Taiwan is not a situation, such as 
described by Niloofar Haeri in Egypt (Haeri, 1997), where English has displaced the 
official language of the upper classes – Chinese is still a necessary part of Taiwanese 
social life – but ease in English speaking environments is as important as perhaps French 
once was for some members of the Russian aristocracy. 
 This picture of multiple linguistic markets, at the local and global levels, 
competing with the official language market of the state is quite different from what 
Bourdieu observed in France. As Haeri points out, 
Bourdieu himself, writing on the language situation in France after the 
Revolution, speaks of the “anonymity” of the emerging standard French 
and of the “aristocracy, the commercial and business bourgeoisie and 
particularly the literate petite bourgeoisie” who had more access to the 
official language but who spoke their own dialects. (Haeri, 1997: 799) 
It is not necessary to abandon Bourdieu, simply to historicize him, to locate language 
markets within political and economic frameworks at the local and international levels, 
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and to see language markets as constantly changing and evolving in relationship to the 
same political processes which shape, and are shaped by, power relations at each of those 
levels. In order to do this I have found it useful to turn to the work of Antonio Gramsci. 
 
Historic Blocs 
One of the hidden agendas of my work is to contribute to an understanding of world 
history (Gran, 1996) which moves beyond a paradigm of “civilizations” (Huntington, 
1998), beyond East and West, to see Taiwan in terms that do not mystify our 
understanding of its own history with concepts such as “Confucian morality.” This is not 
to say that culture does not play an important role in Taiwanese society, but that culture 
itself must be understood as part of a political process. Nor is this to reduce culture to 
politics, but simply to accept the, for lack of a better word, dialectical relationship 
between the two. As Marshall Sahlins said,  
Ironic it is (once more) that anthropologists have been to so much trouble 
of late denying the existence of cultural boundaries just when so many 
peoples are being called upon to mark them. Conscious and conspicuous 
boundary-making has been increasing around the world in inverse relation 
to anthropological notions of its significance. (1999: 414) 
Understanding the political processes of cultural formation is not to deny their 
explanatory value, but to seek to explain it by connecting it to something other than itself. 
For Sahlins, these are “indexes of more basic structuring codes, modes of order that are 
themselves largely imperceptible” (1999: 413). But, I would argue, these basic 
structuring codes are themselves political. Antonio Gramsci does not argue that there is a 
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directly observable relationship between specific cultural phenomena and specific 
political positions, rather, he offers us a theory of culture and ideology in which both are 
seen as emerging out of the political process. We can see this clearly in the Taiwanese 
case. 
 I have argued that by looking at the alliances which hold together Taiwan’s ruling 
coalitions we can see Taiwan as entering a critical period during which the alliances 
which took hold during the Japanese era, between the state bureaucracy, workers and 
management at large state-owned enterprises, Aborigines, and farmers, are strained to 
their limits by the shift to an export-oriented economy on the one hand, and the loss of 
legitimacy suffered by official Chinese nationalism when faced with an increasingly 
powerful China across the Taiwan Strait on the other.  
 We can see, starting with the emergence of a unified Hoklo identity at the end of 
the nineteenth century, the link between the emergence of a strong rural gentry class and 
an emergent Taiwanese nationalism. This nationalism has not developed consistently, but 
became stronger whenever the power of the central state over local elites began to wane. 
It happened under the Japanese when, forced by rice shortages and a wartime economy, 
they had to make concessions to Taiwanese farmers in the 1930s. It happened again in the 
1980s when the shift to an export-oriented economy helped Taiwan’s SMEs owned by 
members of this class. Taiwan’s rural gentry have always been petty capitalists (Gates, 
1996), but land reforms in the 1950s pushed them out of agriculture and into manufacture. 
At first land reforms did more to undermine than strengthen this class (see Chapter 4), but 
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the shift to an export-oriented economy in the sixties eventually gave them new strength 
and confidence. Combined with a newly strident middle class who rallied around 
identity-based issues, a strong opposition emerged which was able to challenge the 
dominant historical bloc. This challenge was, however, effectively neutralized by a 
compromise, reached in 1990 (see Chapter 2), in which official Chinese nationalism was 
replaced with a multi-layered nationalism imported from Japan in which cultural identity 
is seen as radiating out from local communities in a series of concentric circles which 
grow to encompass all of Taiwan, China, and eventually the rest of the world. While this 
compromise held steady for nearly a decade, the newly powerful DPP government is now 
seeking to challenge this model. Central to this challenge is a desire to displace Chinese 
culture from its status as the circle that encompasses that of Taiwanese identity. However, 
some Taiwanese fear that this would eventually lead to the emergence of a Hoklo 
nationalism akin to the official Chinese nationalism of a previous era. 
 It is in the context of such a struggle that Aborigine identity takes on special 
significance, far beyond that which would seem to follow from the relatively small size 
of Taiwan’s Aborigine population. Aborigine identity signifies all that is unique about 
Taiwanese identity, and support of Aborigine ethnic aspirations seems to suggest a level 
of multicultural tolerance that serves to subdue fears of an emergent Hoklo nationalism. 
These links between Aborigine identity and nationalism are well illustrated by the ways 
in which Aborigine identity has been used to promote Taiwanese baseball. When the 
professional baseball leagues in Taiwan were starting to loose ratings due, in part, to the 
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high percentage of foreign players, a new league was formed in an effort to capture the 
flagging market. The name of the company which owned the Taiwan Major League 
(TML, ͔ᝰʩᑸຽ, Táiwān dà liánméng), the Naluwan Corporation, as well as “the 
names of the four teams - Agan (Jin’gang, Robots), Fala (Leigong, Thunder Gods), Gida 
(Taiyang, Suns) and Luka (Yongshi, Braves)” were taken from Taiwan’s Austronesian 
languages (Morris, 2004: 196). The official anthem of the TML, “supposedly based on 
rhythms and patterns of several types of Aboriginal tribal songs, consists of lyrics (see 
below) in Mandarin, Taiwanese, English, Japanese and Aboriginal languages”: 
NALUWAN -- True Heroes 
Take charge - the fervent spirit of the rainbow, 
Our hearts are filled - with great fire shining bright, 
Struggle on - with hopes that never die, 
Start anew - a space for us alone. 
Fight! Fight! Fight, fight! Speed just like the wind, 
K! K! K! Power stronger than all, 
Homu-ran batta - truly strong and brave, 
Aaa ... Na-Lu-Wan, the true heroes! (2004: 199) 
This link between Aborigine identity, baseball and Taiwanese nationalism is very strong 
in the Taiwanese psyche. A little-league baseball game pitting rural Taiwanese 
Aborigines against a championship Japanese team would become “a defining moment in 
the history of Taiwanese nationalism” (2004: 183). 
[It] began in August 1968, with two great victories by the Maple Leaf 
(Hongye) Elementary School team over a visiting team from Wakayama, 
Japan. This Hongye Village team, made up of Bunun Aborigine youth 
representing their tiny Taidong County school of just 100 students … 
became superstars after their victories over Wakayama at the Taibei 
Municipal Stadium. (Morris, 2004: 182).1 
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But despite their symbolic importance to the DPP, and their close political ties to the 
KMT, Taiwan’s Aborigines remain at the bottom of the economic ladder, outnumbered 
by foreign workers who most Taiwanese prefer to hire over Aborigines for low wage jobs. 
What little support the DPP had managed to win amongst Aborigines was severely 
threatened when Vice President Annette Lu ѼԤሞ (Lǚ Xiùlián) called for moving 
typhoon victims from Taiwan’s mountain regions (most of whom are Aborigine) to 
Central America in order “to give them a new start,” a message she later repeated even 
after criticism (Lin, 2004). 
 The current situation in Taiwan is very fragile, globalization, as well as political 
pressure from Beijing continually pushes Taiwan toward greater and greater integration 
with mainland China, Taiwan’s largest trading partner, with an “estimated 1 million 
taishang [͔ੌ  (Táishāng)]: workers and businessmen from Taiwan who … live 
full-time in mainland China” (Huang and Schuman, 2004). At the same time, Hoklo 
ethnic nationalism can never fully reveal itself without danger of backlash, forcing 
nationalist elements to at least give lip service to localism and multiculturalism. It often 
appears as if the question of Taiwanese independence or eventual re-unification with the 
mainland underlies cultural policy, but I would like to suggest that the reverse is actually 
the case. The covertly pro-independence DPP’s support draws on precisely those whose 
SMEs are most involved in doing business with the mainland, while the pro re-unification 
KMT leadership represents large state owned enterprises allied with local interests 
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thorough client-patron relationships established in the Japanese era. Cultural policy 
serves to mask these realities rather than as a surrogate for them. 
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Notes
 
1 This excitement has not been dulled by the later revelations that nine of the 
eleven players were ineligible and were playing under false names (Morris, 2004: 183). 
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